Concept
Costs of Averting Harm
Plaintiff's fault outside ordinary negligence: strict liability and avoidable consequences
Costs of Averting Harm
Section 919 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts pays for what § 918 expects. Section 918(1) denies damages for harm that reasonable effort or expenditure after the tort would have avoided;1 § 919 repays the plaintiff for making the effort. Subsection (1) covers a plaintiff whose legally protected interests another's tortious conduct has endangered, and it entitles that plaintiff to recover expenditures reasonably made, or harm suffered, in a reasonable effort to avert the harm threatened.2 Subsection (2) gives the same entitlement to a plaintiff who has already suffered injury by the tort and who reasonably tries to avert further harm.3 Under both, the question is whether the effort, and the expenditure or harm it produced, was reasonable.
Repayment accompanies the expectation because the cost of an avoidance effort is itself a loss the tort produced. Money spent to keep a loss from growing, or an injury suffered while trying to save property from a threat, would not exist had the defendant acted lawfully. A rule that demanded the effort and left its cost with the plaintiff would bill the one blameless party for the defendant's wrong. It would also give the plaintiff a reason to stand by while the loss grew, and that waste is what the avoidable-consequences doctrine exists to prevent. Reimbursement removes the reason: the defendant pays the modest cost of prevention in place of the larger loss it prevents. The doctrine's recognized purposes point the same way. It holds a wrongdoer to the damages its conduct caused and not to losses reasonable care would have avoided, it enables the innocent party to take reasonable protective steps, and it avoids economic waste.4
The two subsections differ in a single fact, which is whether any harm had occurred when the plaintiff acted. Sort the facts by that point first. Then ask whether the plaintiff's effort was reasonable in light of what the plaintiff knew when choosing it. The threatened-harm case comes first.
Threatened Harm
Tortious conduct that endangers a plaintiff's legally protected interests, without yet injuring them, entitles the plaintiff to recover expenditures reasonably made, and harm suffered, in a reasonable effort to avert the harm threatened.5 Each element limits the rule. The interest at risk must be one the law protects, and the defendant's conduct must be tortious, so a plaintiff who spends money guarding against a risk the defendant had no legal duty to prevent falls outside it. The harm must still be a threat: it has not happened, and the plaintiff acts to keep it from happening. The entitlement then covers two kinds of cost, the money the plaintiff spends and the injury the plaintiff suffers while making the effort.
This rule reaches back before the moment of injury, where the avoidance duty itself does not. That duty arises only after harm from tortious conduct has occurred, and a plaintiff need not anticipate a harm.6 Section 919(1) therefore imposes no obligation on a plaintiff who faces a threat. It grants a permission with a guarantee attached: the plaintiff may act, and if the effort is reasonable, the party who created the danger pays for it. Once harm does occur, § 918(1) takes over and governs what the plaintiff must do next.7
Recovery does not depend on whether the effort worked. As one standard formulation puts it, the plaintiff recovers the reasonable costs of minimizing damages whether or not the damages were successfully avoided.8 Expenses reasonably incurred in an effort that fails are recoverable, and so is further harm the plaintiff sustains as a result of a reasonable effort.9 The plaintiff must decide before knowing how events will unfold, so a rule that repaid only successful efforts would saddle the plaintiff with the risk that the effort fails, a risk the defendant's wrong created. Reasonableness is therefore judged from the plaintiff's position when the choice was made, without hindsight about the outcome, and a reasonable effort that falls short remains reasonable.10 The same logic covers a threat that never materializes. If recovery required the harm to occur, a successful effort, which prevents the harm, would never be repaid; the section speaks instead of the harm threatened, and the effort that averts it is reimbursed.
To test the spending, ask whether a reasonable person facing the threat as the plaintiff then understood it would have spent that much. The standard has two dimensions: the threat must have justified acting at all, and the amount must be proportionate to what was threatened. A homeowner who spends $3,000 on a trench to keep a neighbor's negligent leak from reaching a modest well is repaid. One who builds a $300,000 filtration plant to protect the same well is repaid only what a sensible person would have spent, and the excess falls on the plaintiff. Without that ceiling, the defendant would fund extravagance the plaintiff would never have undertaken with personal money. The standard also protects the plaintiff, who need not take unduly burdensome or risky action, explore every conceivable possibility, or try methods that reasonably appear futile. The source states that protection for breach victims, and the same measure suits a tort plaintiff.11 One further limit applies: the expense must be shown to result distinctly from the tortious conduct, because mere inconvenience or annoyance does not qualify.12
Preventive spending takes more than one form. In Belkus v. City of Brockton, a Massachusetts landowner whose property had flooded repeatedly from a culvert the city maintained improperly recovered the cost of raising the level of his basement to stop further flooding. In Stratford Theater, Inc. v. Town of Stratford, a Connecticut theater owner whose building was frequently flooded from a broken sewer line recovered the cost of repairing the town's line instead of altering his own property.13 Both plaintiffs had been flooded before they acted, so the decisions also belong to the next subsection's setting. They show that the protective step may be work on the plaintiff's premises or work on the source of the danger. They also show where the reasonableness standard does its work: whether extensive renovation is a sensible answer to repeated flooding is a proportionality question for the factfinder, and the answer turns on how likely and how large the threatened loss was when the plaintiff chose to spend.
Further Harm After Injury
Section 919(2) applies the same reimbursement principle to a plaintiff who has already been hurt: one who has suffered injury by the tort of another may recover expenditures reasonably made, or harm suffered, in a reasonable effort to avert further harm.15 Whether harm had occurred when the plaintiff acted separates it from § 919(1).16 Both begin after the tort that joins it to § 918(1), which denies recovery for harm that reasonable effort or expenditure would have avoided.17 The two provisions are halves of one rule. Section 918(1) tells the plaintiff what the law expects, and § 919(2) tells the plaintiff who pays for meeting that expectation.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability has changed the consequence of not acting. Its commentary says a plaintiff's failure to mitigate should no longer bar recovery of the avoidable damages and should instead be a factor in assigning percentages of responsibility.18 That comment speaks to the plaintiff who fails to act. This section concerns the plaintiff who does.
A single set of numbers shows how the two sections fit. A negligent driver disables a commuter's car for four days. She would earn $100 on each day she reaches work, but she earns only $50 in all, and cabs at $20 a day would have gotten her there. Under § 918(1), the defendant is credited with the $350 she reasonably could have earned beyond what she did earn, and that credit is itself presumably reduced by the $80 the cabs would have cost, to $270. She therefore recovers $80 of her $350 shortfall.19 Under § 919(2), had she taken the cabs, she would have earned the $350, lost nothing from missed work, and recovered the $80 in fares as an expenditure reasonably made to avert further loss. The recovery is $80 either way, because the credit and the reimbursement are one transaction seen from two sides. A plaintiff who takes the cabs is never worse off for having done so, and an answer that finds a failure to mitigate and stops there leaves out the half of the rule that protects the plaintiff who did what the law asked.
Section 919(2) repays only reasonable efforts, and reasonableness has the same two dimensions as in the threatened-harm case: the further harm must have justified acting, and the amount spent must be proportionate to what was at stake. The ceiling matters because the ordinary discipline on spending, the spender's own money, disappears once someone else is paying. A plaintiff could otherwise choose the costliest protective step and send the bill to the defendant. The distinct-result limit applies here too, since an expense must result from the harm and not merely from inconvenience or annoyance.20
Recovery follows the reasonableness of the effort, whether or not the effort works. A plaintiff recovers expenses reasonably incurred in attempting to limit the harm even when the attempt fails, and also recovers damages for further harm suffered as a result of a reasonable effort.21 Medical testing after an injury is the ordinary example, since the cost of the tests is ordinarily recoverable as a reasonable step to limit the harm.22 The plaintiff must choose before the outcome is known, so reasonableness is judged from the plaintiff's position at that moment.23