Concept
Benefits and Collateral Sources
Plaintiff's fault outside ordinary negligence: strict liability and avoidable consequences
Benefits and Collateral Sources
Three rules in the Restatement (Second) of Torts decide what happens when something of value reaches the plaintiff alongside the tort, and the source of that value picks the rule. If the tortious conduct itself conferred a special benefit on the interest it harmed, the value of the benefit is considered in mitigation of damages to the extent equitable.1 If the tortfeasor, a person acting for the tortfeasor, or another who is or believes he is subject to the same tort liability made a payment, the payment is credited against the liability.2 If the payment or benefit came from any other source, it is not credited, even though it covers all or part of the harm.3
The earlier parts of this chapter asked how the plaintiff's own conduct reduces recovery. These rules ask what the plaintiff has already received. Compensatory damages aim to put the plaintiff where the plaintiff would have stood had the wrong not occurred, so a benefit that already repairs part of the loss raises the question whether the defendant should pay for that part again. A gain the tort itself produced shrinks the real loss. A payment from the defendant's side satisfies part of the very debt being sued on. A benefit from an independent source, such as an insurer the plaintiff paid or a relative who helped, satisfies nothing the defendant owes, and crediting it would shrink the defendant's bill because of arrangements the defendant had no part in.
On an exam, ask first who or what supplied the benefit, because the answer selects the rule before any arithmetic begins. The next subsection takes up a benefit the tort itself conferred. The two after it follow the line between the defendant's side of the dispute and everyone else, and a benefit that fits neither of the first two categories lands in the independent-source category, where the default is no credit.
Special Benefit Rule
Section 920 addresses a tort that does two things at once: it harms the plaintiff and it improves something. When the defendant's tortious conduct harms the plaintiff or the plaintiff's property and in doing so confers a special benefit on the interest that was harmed, the value of the benefit is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.4 Mitigation here means a reduction in what the defendant owes. Unlike avoidable consequences, the rule asks nothing about what the plaintiff did or failed to do; the only question is what the wrong itself produced. Two limits are built into the text: the benefit must run to the interest that was harmed, and the offset reaches only as far as equity allows.
Both limits follow from the purpose of compensatory damages. When the same wrong that damaged an interest also improved it, the plaintiff's net loss is smaller than the gross harm, and awarding the gross figure would leave the plaintiff better off than before the wrong. The offset applies the ordinary measure of damages: the plaintiff is paid for the loss actually suffered, not for a loss the tort partly cancelled.
The first limit, that the benefit must reach the interest that was harmed, is the one students most often overlook. A harm and a benefit can be netted only when both sit on the same ledger. A plaintiff whose land is damaged and whose land is also improved has a single account to balance. If a defendant could claim credit for any fortunate consequence anywhere in the plaintiff's life, the defendant could pay for an injury with unrelated good luck, and juries would have to value every change in the plaintiff's circumstances after the tort. The usual error is to credit any good consequence that traces back to the tort, when the question is which interest the benefit attached to.
The second limit, that the offset applies only to the extent equitable, makes the credit a question of fairness and not of arithmetic. A benefit can be real on paper and still cost the plaintiff something to enjoy, or produce no money with which to enjoy it. If the spring adds value only after the owner pays to develop it, or only if the owner sells land the owner wants to keep, deducting the full increase would reduce the defendant's liability by a gain the plaintiff cannot yet reach. The words 'to the extent equitable' let the factfinder shrink the credit or withhold it in those cases.
The wrongful pregnancy cases show the rule under strain when the benefit is emotional. A defendant's negligence, such as a failed sterilization, produces an unwanted pregnancy, and the question is whether the value to the parents of having the child should be set against the cost of raising it. The tort system seeks to compensate proven wrongs, yet society may wish parents to embrace their children, and those competing policies make the cases hard.5 Critics of the offset add that the benefit here produces no money: the wrongdoer would receive an immediate cash reduction in liability while the parent pays cash outlays for years, perhaps for life, and that result sits uneasily with the ordinary rule that a tortfeasor answers for the harm the wrong causes.6 That is a criticism of how the offset can operate in these cases, not a settled application of § 920. It presses hardest on the equitable-extent limit, since a deduction that gives the defendant cash now and leaves the plaintiff with long-term costs is hard to call equitable.
Payments by the Tortfeasor
Section 920A(1) gives the defendant a credit for money that has already reached the plaintiff from the defendant's side of the dispute. A payment made by a tortfeasor, or by a person acting for the tortfeasor, to the person injured is credited against the tort liability, as are payments made by another who is, or believes he is, subject to the same tort liability.8 Three kinds of payer qualify: the tortfeasor, someone acting for the tortfeasor, and a different person who shares or believes he shares the same liability. Whichever one paid, the amount reduces what the plaintiff can still collect from the defendant.
The credit follows from what a judgment does. A judgment orders the defendant to pay for the harm the tort caused, and the plaintiff may collect that obligation once. A payment toward the same harm from the defendant's side therefore partly satisfies the very debt being sued on, much as a partial payment reduces what a lender may still demand. If the court ignored the payment, the plaintiff would keep the money and also hold a judgment covering it, and the same loss would be compensated twice.
Each payer carries that logic in its own way. When the tortfeasor pays, payer and debtor are the same person. When someone acts for the tortfeasor, the payment is still the tortfeasor's own, made through an intermediary. A liability insurer that pays a claim under the defendant's policy is performing the defendant's obligation with protection the defendant bought, and another agent who pays on the defendant's behalf does the same. In each case the plaintiff receives money from the defendant's side, toward the harm in suit.
The third category reaches a payer who is neither the defendant nor the defendant's agent but who stands on the same liability, as a co-tortfeasor does. One injury has one measure of compensation, so money paid by a person answerable for that injury has already compensated the plaintiff to that extent. A payment received from or on behalf of a joint tortfeasor in settlement of his potential liability to the plaintiff for the same injury is accordingly credited to the defendant.9 The words 'or believes he is' extend the credit to a payer whose liability was never established, so the credit does not depend on proving that the payer would have been held liable.
The provision draws its line between the wrongdoer's side and everyone else, and the usual error is to draw it somewhere else. A student who asks only whether a payment covered part of the plaintiff's loss will credit nearly every payment. The right question is who paid and in what capacity. The same $10,000 hospital bill can be paid by the defendant's liability insurer in one case and by the plaintiff's own health insurer in another, and either payment makes the plaintiff equally whole. Only the first reduces the judgment, because the health insurer is meeting an obligation it owes the plaintiff under its own contract, most often for premiums the plaintiff arranged and paid, and it is not discharging the tortfeasor's debt.10 Payments and benefits from such independent sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability even when they cover all or part of the harm.11 The next subsection develops the reason for that rule. For now the sorting is enough: payment from the wrongdoer's side pays the debt, and payment from an independent source is a different transaction.
Collateral Source Rule
Section 920A(2) supplies the default for benefits that reach the plaintiff from outside the dispute: payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.13 Which payments come from other sources depends on the line drawn in the previous subsection. Money from the tortfeasor, from someone acting for the tortfeasor, or from another who is or believes he is subject to the same liability reduces the judgment.14 Everything outside that circle leaves the defendant's obligation where it was, and the plaintiff recovers as though the help had never arrived.
The same $100,000 bill would be treated differently if the driver's own liability insurer had paid it. A liability insurer satisfying the tortfeasor's obligation sits on the credited side of the line, while a health insurer paying under its own contract with the plaintiff is performing a separate bargain. The identity of the payer decides the question. The size of the payment, its purpose, and the fact that it covers the very loss in suit do not.
The rule rests on a comparison of two unfair results. Giving the defendant the benefit of the payment would be more unjust than letting an innocent plaintiff recover twice, especially because in most cases the plaintiff personally arranged and paid for the coverage.15 If the defendant received a credit, the premiums a plaintiff paid over the years would become a discount for the wrongdoer, while a plaintiff who never bought coverage would collect in full. The same reasoning reaches other help from outside the defendant's side, such as a gift or an employer's benefits: the foresight or generosity of someone else should benefit the victim and not the person who caused the harm.
The objection most often pressed against the rule is that the plaintiff recovers twice for the same loss, once from the insurer and again from the defendant.16 Subrogation answers most of it. Under the subrogation clause of the usual contract between a health insurer and its insured, the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from whatever the insured later recovers from the defendant or the defendant's liability insurer, so the plaintiff most often does not keep both payments.17 Benefits from workers' compensation, public aid, and the military services work the same way, with the plaintiff obliged to repay the benefit out of the judgment.18 In the hospital scene above, a subrogation clause in Ferrante's policy would send the $100,000 awarded for the bill back to the insurer. The common law applied the collateral source rule whether or not the policy provided for subrogation, so the defendant's lack of a credit never depended on the insurer's repayment right.19 Subrogation therefore moves the money without changing what the defendant owes: the defendant still pays the full bill, and the plaintiff's windfall disappears wherever a repayment right exists.
One edge remains contested. Some courts credit the defendant with medical charges that a provider waived, as when a hospital billed $10,000 and agreed to accept $5,000.20
The common-law rule has been a frequent target of tort reform, and it no longer governs everywhere.21 Many states have modified it, at least in some circumstances, so that the plaintiff's recovery may be reduced by amounts received from first-party insurers and other collateral sources.22 Where a credit is allowed, it is usually net of whatever the plaintiff or someone on the plaintiff's behalf paid to secure the benefit.23 That netting carries the original reason into the modified rule, because a plaintiff who paid for protection does not lose the value of the payment.
Insurance and public benefits also tempt students to reach for avoidable consequences, on the theory that a plaintiff whose insurer paid the bill has already minimized the loss. Courts take the other route: when insurance or public benefits reduce the plaintiff's net loss, they invoke the collateral source rule and not avoidable consequences, so the plaintiff recovers full damages despite the reduction.24 The two doctrines ask different questions. Avoidable consequences removes harm the plaintiff could have prevented by reasonable effort or expenditure after the tort, such as the amputation that follows an untreated broken leg.25 An insurer's payment prevents nothing. The injury, the hospital stay, and the bill all occurred, and the payment only changes who bore their cost.