Concept
The Implied Assumption Rule
Implied assumption of risk: knowledge and appreciation of the risk
Implied Assumption of Risk
The Implied Assumption Rule
Implied assumption of risk lets a defendant who owed a duty and was negligent still defeat the plaintiff’s claim by pointing to what the plaintiff knew and chose. Section 496C(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the defense in a single sentence: a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself or his things, caused by the defendant’s conduct or by the condition of the defendant’s land or chattels, and who nevertheless voluntarily chooses to enter or remain within the area of that risk, under circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to recover for harm within that risk.1 The sentence holds three conditions (full understanding, voluntary choice, manifested willingness) and one consequence, and the rest of this chapter takes them apart.
The word “implied” tells you where the defendant’s proof must come from. Under the traditional view, consent to relieve another from liability for negligence may be inferred from the plaintiff’s conduct, and that inference is where the principal difficulties have arisen.2 Express assumption of risk is the easier case: the parties agree in advance, usually in a release or disclaimer, that one will bear the risk of the other’s negligence, and ordinary contract principles govern.3 A student who signs a parachute school’s disclaimer of liability for its own negligence has assumed the risk expressly, and her suit after a careless first jump turns on whether the disclaimer is enforceable. In an implied case no document exists, so the defendant must reconstruct the agreement from the plaintiff’s knowledge and behavior.
Courts also sometimes use the phrase “assumed the risk” for a different point. A spectator who chooses an unscreened seat at a professional baseball game is said to have assumed the risk of balls that reach the stands through no fault of the ballpark operator, but the real reason he cannot recover is that the operator owes no duty of reasonable care against the inherent and incidental risks of the game, so the operator was not negligent in the first place.4 That is a no-duty rule. The defense in this chapter operates only after the plaintiff has shown that the defendant owed a duty and breached it.
The theory behind the defense is consent. A person who fully comprehends a risk and chooses voluntarily to incur it implicitly agrees to accept responsibility for the harm that results, and that agreement relieves the person who created the risk. The maxim volenti non fit injuria, “to the willing, there is no injury,” captures the idea.5 The theory explains each condition. The consent must be informed, because no one can agree to a danger he does not understand.6 It must come from a voluntary choice. And because the law infers the consent from conduct, the conduct must be capable of being read as consent. Not every voluntary encounter with a known danger qualifies. A pedestrian who dashes into the path of a speeding car, fully aware of the risk, does not thereby consent to relieve the driver of the obligation to exercise care for the pedestrian’s safety, or of liability for failing to do so.7
The first question draws the most dispute, because knowledge here means the plaintiff’s actual, subjective knowledge. The defendant must show that the plaintiff actually knew, understood, and appreciated the risk, as § 496D requires, and the test asks what the plaintiff did know, not what the plaintiff should have known, which is the contributory negligence question.9 In the same vein, the defense demands actual knowledge of the particular risk and appreciation of its magnitude.10
Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden of pleading it, producing evidence on it, and proving it.11 When available, it operates to defeat or reduce the defendant’s liability even though the defendant owed a duty and was negligent. The two inquiries must therefore stay separate: duty is a question of law for the court, assumption of risk is a question of fact for the jury, and analyses that commingle them lead to error.12
The rule’s reference to the condition of the defendant’s “chattels” keeps product injuries in view. Strict products liability, for example, allows an injured party to recover against a seller for personal injury or property damage caused by a defective product, and a plaintiff who claims a manufacturing defect need not prove that the manufacturer was negligent.13 Proof of a defect, or of fault, says nothing about what this plaintiff understood and chose, and the implied defense looks only at the plaintiff’s side of the encounter.
A lent car shows the defense at work. Newman lends Knieval his car and warns him that the brakes do not work. Knieval says he will drive slowly and rely on the emergency brake, and he is injured when the brakes fail. Each condition is met: Knieval knew of the specific defect, chose to drive anyway, and by announcing his plan to go ahead despite the warning, showed that he was willing to take the chance. He assumed the risk of injury from the defective brakes.
Change the facts. Newman says nothing about the brakes. Before starting off, Knieval notices that the pedal feels loose, does not look into it, and drives away; he is hurt when the brakes fail. A loose pedal invites a check, so Knieval can fairly be called careless, but nothing shows that he understood the brakes were defective and chose to drive without them. The knowledge condition fails, and the implied defense fails with it. His carelessness raises a contributory negligence question, not an assumption-of-risk question.14
The sections that follow take the four questions in turn: knowledge and appreciation, the scope of the risk assumed, the voluntary choice, and the conduct that shows willingness. Two limits qualify the rule from the outset. Subsection (2) provides that the rule in subsection (1) does not apply in any situation in which an express agreement to accept the risk would be invalid as contrary to public policy.15 And statutes can keep evidence of a particular kind of plaintiff conduct out of the case. Arkansas, for instance, makes an occupant’s failure to wear a seat belt inadmissible in a civil action, with exceptions in some products liability cases, and a West Virginia court applying the clear language of a statute refused to let a car maker offer evidence of seat belt nonuse in an air bag non-deployment case.16 The chapter closes by placing the defense beside contributory negligence and comparative fault.