Concept
Voluntary Choice to Encounter
Implied assumption of risk: knowledge and appreciation of the risk
Voluntary Choice to Encounter
Once the plaintiff understands the danger, Section 496C(1) asks whether the plaintiff nevertheless "voluntarily chooses to enter or remain" within the area of the risk.1 Knowledge and appreciation settle what the plaintiff understood; voluntariness settles whether the plaintiff was free to stay out. Courts count it as the second of two elements or the third of three, and they describe the defense as a free and voluntary encounter with a known and appreciated risk.2 The freedom matters because the defense treats the plaintiff's choice as acceptance, and a plaintiff who goes forward because every other path is closed has yielded to the danger without accepting it. The cases reduce to two questions: Did the plaintiff have a reasonable alternative? If not, who created the predicament?
In ADM Partnership v. Martin, Maryland's highest court put the requirement in terms of freedom. A plaintiff assumes a risk voluntarily only by being willing to take an informed chance, and neither the circumstances nor coercion from the defendant may restrict the plaintiff's freedom of choice.3 When the defendant's conduct leaves no reasonable alternative, the plaintiff has not assumed the risk even without protesting, because a defendant who puts the plaintiff to a choice of evils creates "a species of duress" that destroys the idea of freedom of election.4 The court set out the governing rule in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496E(2): acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's tortious conduct has left the plaintiff no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to avert harm to himself or another, or to exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.5
That subsection protects two kinds of plaintiff. The first must accept one danger to escape another, and the rescuer is the clearest case, because the only alternative to attempting the rescue is to let the threatened harm happen.6 The second would have to surrender something the law entitles the plaintiff to in order to stay clear, so nobody must forgo a public railroad crossing because the railroad has let it fall into disrepair.7 Tenant cases show the same pattern. A tenant does not assume the risk of a landlord's negligent maintenance of a common stairway that the tenant must use to reach the apartment.8 In Rush v. Commercial Realty Co., a tenant who had no choice but to use the privy the landlord supplied for the building did not assume the risk of its defective floor, because she was not required to leave the premises and go elsewhere.9 In each case the defendant's wrong created the pinch. A rule built on the plaintiff's acceptance would otherwise let the defendant force a danger on the plaintiff and then point to the plaintiff's choice.
The answer reverses when the plaintiff has a reasonable way to avoid the danger. A driver who knows that the defendant's negligence has left a large mudhole in a highway does not act voluntarily in crossing it if the driver is away from home and has to get back, but does act voluntarily if a reasonably short and convenient detour in good condition lies at hand.10 Pomeroy v. Westfield denied the defense for want of an alternative, and Campion v. Rochester puts the burden on the defendant to show that a safe alternative existed.11 In Marshall v. Ranne, a property owner knew that a neighbor's boar was vicious, but his only choices were to stay a prisoner in his own house or to try to reach his pickup truck past the animal, so his encounter with the boar was not voluntary.12
A winter parking lot shows how one fact moves the answer. In Morgan State University v. Walker, a college left its dormitory lot crunchy with ice and snow, and a visiting mother who knew of the ice and crossed it to reach her car was held to have assumed the risk, so summary judgment for the university stood.13 The court noted that voluntariness would have been a jury question had the plaintiff been a student who lived in the dormitory and had no other way out.14 The ice and the plaintiff's knowledge of it were the same in both versions. What separates them is whether the plaintiff had any reasonable way to avoid the lot.
Pressure from circumstances the defendant did not create does not make the choice involuntary. The Restatement comment quoted in ADM Partnership regards acceptance of a risk as voluntary even when the plaintiff acts under compulsion of circumstances that the defendant's tortious conduct did not create. Where the defendant owes no independent duty to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff faces a choice of risks or is driven by his own necessities to accept a danger, the situation is not charged against the defendant.15 Its example is a renter forced to take a house in obviously dangerous condition because he cannot find or afford another dwelling; he assumes the risk despite the compulsion.16 Nothing the defendant did removed the renter's freedom, so there is no duress to attribute to the defendant.
A plaintiff's reluctance does not make the choice involuntary. In many cases voluntariness may be inferred from the plaintiff's conduct in entering or remaining in the zone of danger, even when the plaintiff acts reluctantly or under protest.17 Protest matters only if the plaintiff had no reasonable alternative.
Nor must the choice be an unreasonable one. Consider a plaintiff who understands the risk that defective brakes pose and chooses to encounter it anyway. In the few states where secondary assumption of risk, reasonable or not, remains a complete defense, that plaintiff loses even though the choice was a reasonable one. Most states instead conclude that reasonable secondary assumption should not reduce or bar the claim.18 Voluntariness measures freedom of choice, and the wisdom of the choice is a separate matter that comparative fault takes up later in this chapter.
The second step does the work in landlord cases and in the dormitory-lot variation, where the party who controls the only path out is also the party whose negligence made that path dangerous.