Concept
Conduct Showing Willingness
Implied assumption of risk: knowledge and appreciation of the risk
Conduct Showing Willingness
Understanding a risk and choosing to meet it still leaves one condition unmet. The Second Restatement bars recovery only when the plaintiff encounters the risk "under circumstances that manifest his willingness to accept it."1 The earlier conditions look inward, at what the plaintiff knew and whether the plaintiff was free to stay away. This one looks outward at the plaintiff's conduct and asks what it tells the defendant. The defense rests on consent to relieve the defendant of liability, so the conduct must be capable of being read as implicitly manifesting that consent, and not every voluntary encounter with a known danger can be read that way.2 Exam facts routinely supply knowledge and free choice while leaving this message in doubt, and that is where careless answers go wrong.
A pedestrian who dashes into the path of a speeding car shows the gap. He fully understands the risk and chooses to cross, yet his plan works only if the driver takes care for his safety, so his conduct expresses the opposite of a release. He may be contributorily negligent, but he has not assumed the risk. What his conduct shows is fault, and the fault doctrines at the end of this chapter measure fault; the conduct does not show consent.3
Consent also requires actual knowledge, because conduct cannot signal acceptance of a danger the plaintiff never perceived. A plaintiff who sits in a chair with a defect he did not know about has not consented to that risk, whether or not the sitting was negligent. Negligence turns on a different question: whether a reasonably prudent person would have noticed the defect or inspected the chair before using it.4
Analytically, a stronger case for implied consent arises when the plaintiff confronts negligence that has already occurred, but even there the consent proves illusory. The plaintiff may have chosen to take a risk, yet that conduct can hardly be read as consent to excuse the defendant if the risk comes true; it manifests fault, not consent. A plaintiff who proceeds this way may be foolish, but foolishness is not agreement to sustain injury without recompense.5
Willingness can show itself in how the plaintiff chooses among alternatives. Where the defendant offers options at different prices and the plaintiff clearly understands that the cheaper one is more dangerous, those facts bear on whether the plaintiff impliedly waived the risk.6 A plaintiff who trades safety for savings with open eyes gives a court something to read as acceptance, which the pedestrian never does.
A legislature can also remove the plaintiff's conduct from the case before anyone weighs it as willingness. Seat belt nonuse is the familiar example. Arkansas provides that an occupant's failure to wear a belt "shall not be admissible into evidence in a civil action," though it allows the defense in some products liability cases.7 In Estep v. Mike Ferrell Ford Lincoln-Mercury, a West Virginia court held that the clear language of its statute barred a car maker from introducing evidence of nonuse in a case about an air bag that failed to deploy.8 Where such a statute applies, conduct that a defendant would otherwise offer as willingness never reaches the factfinder.