Concept
Protests and Promises to Repair
Voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice
Protests and Promises to Repair
A plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he voluntarily accepts it.1 The defense also requires actual knowledge of the particular risk and appreciation of its magnitude, and the defendant bears the burden of pleading, producing evidence, and proving it.2 On the voluntariness element, what the parties said to each other before the encounter can decide the case. The plaintiff may have objected to the danger. The defendant may have answered by promising to fix it or by assuring the plaintiff it was safe. The two statements work differently, and the objection alone settles less than students expect.
A protest cuts against consent. A worker who tells her employer that a machine is unsafe has shown that she does not welcome the danger. But a protest is not conclusive, because voluntariness may be inferred from the plaintiff's conduct in entering or remaining in the zone of danger, even when she does so reluctantly or under protest.3 The protest records her attitude at one moment, and the defense turns on what she then chose to do. Whether a plaintiff who objected went ahead anyway in acceptance of the risk is a question of fact, and assumption of risk is a question for the jury.4 Reasonable alternatives matter to that question: a plaintiff who has no reasonable alternative to encountering the known danger is not held to have assumed the risk.5
A promise to repair changes the analysis. When the plaintiff protests and the defendant promises to remedy the condition, the plaintiff's consent is vitiated, meaning the law treats it as absent, until so much time has passed that the plaintiff can no longer reasonably rely on the promise.6 Cases applying this rule usually involve employees, but the landlord cases below show the same logic at work for tenants. A promise gives the plaintiff a reason to keep going that has nothing to do with willingness to bear the danger, because she is counting on the defendant to remove it. Treating her continued exposure as consent would let the defendant profit from the very assurance that kept her in place.
The landlord-tenant cases add the assurance of safety to the promise of repair. A tenant who objects to a perceived danger on the premises, but then deliberately encounters it after the landlord assures her that the condition is safe or will be remedied, is not deemed to have assumed the risk, provided her reliance on the assurance was reasonable.7 Richardson v. Palmour Court Apartments applies that rule, on the footing that deliberately encountering a known risk is not necessarily evidence of consent to it.8 In every version of the rule, reasonable reliance is the variable that matters. How long the plaintiff waited and whether the defendant did anything toward the repair are the kinds of facts that bear on it, and like the rest of the defense they are ordinarily for the jury.9
The time limit keeps the promise from becoming a permanent shield. Once reliance is no longer reasonable, the promise no longer explains why the plaintiff keeps encountering the danger, and the ordinary inference from conduct returns. Reasonable reliance defeats only the voluntariness element. Whether the plaintiff also handled the condition unreasonably is a separate question, taken up in the section on voluntariness and reasonableness.