Concept
Voluntariness and Reasonableness
Voluntariness of the plaintiff's choice
Voluntariness and Reasonableness
Whether a plaintiff had a real choice and whether the plaintiff chose sensibly look like two questions, but they draw on nearly the same facts. The overlap begins with the way the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines an involuntary encounter. A plaintiff's acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's tortious conduct has left no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to avert harm to himself or another, or to exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.1 The test is written in the vocabulary of reasonableness. It asks what the plaintiff could reasonably have done instead, which is the measure a jury applies to the plaintiff's own care.
Two steps carry the overlap from definition to result. First, a person cannot consent to what is forced upon him, so a plaintiff who had no reasonable alternative to the risk acted involuntarily.2 Second, when every alternative is worse than the risk itself, a prudent person runs the risk. The same missing alternative that makes the encounter involuntary therefore tends to make it reasonable as well. A court that answers one question has usually answered the other, and a reasonable assumption of risk becomes a rarity.
Consider a driver whose wife must reach a distant hospital at once on her doctor's orders. He discovers a bubble in the sidewall of a tire the defendant negligently supplied, and he knows it may fail at any moment. No neighbor lives nearby and no ambulance can arrive in time, so he drives slowly and carefully, and the tire bursts. His choice was informed, because he understood the danger, but it was not voluntary, because he had no reasonable alternative to making the trip on that tire.3 It was also reasonable, for the same reason. The forced choice defeats the assumption-of-risk defense, and the sensible choice leaves no fault to charge against him.
Now change one fact. A second driver finds the same bubble, knows the tire may fail at any moment, and carries a good spare in the trunk. Changing it would take a few minutes, but the driver skips it to reach a ballgame early and find a better parking space. A reasonable alternative lay open and the driver passed it up, so the choice was voluntary, and it was unreasonable. Assumption of risk may now defeat or reduce the driver's recovery.4 The tire, the knowledge, and the danger are the same in both stories. Only the alternative differs, and that one fact flips both labels at once.
The two inquiries do not merge completely. A small group of cases remains in which the plaintiff reasonably runs a risk that the defendant's negligence created, and the choice still counts against recovery. Suppose a plaintiff injured on a country road needs medical treatment, and a visibly intoxicated driver comes along. The plaintiff accepts a ride, and the driver's negligence causes further injury. Even if the emergency made asking for the ride reasonable, it may make sense to relieve the defendant of liability, because the plaintiff was better placed than the defendant to decide whether to risk the defendant's negligence; applying assumption of risk here, rare though such cases may be, is tantamount to holding the plaintiff strictly liable for injury to themself.5 Some courts permit the defense in the passenger setting, though critics reply that its true basis is the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct in entering the relationship, so that the cases belong under contributory negligence.6
This overlap concerns implied assumption of risk, which the law infers from the plaintiff's conduct. Express assumption works differently: parties can assume risks, including the risk of another's negligence, by an express agreement to do so, and a release broad enough to cover the accident bars the plaintiff who accepted it.7
Comparative negligence puts the overlap to work. Under it, a plaintiff's negligence reduces recovery but does not usually bar it, which leaves one question for the plaintiff whose negligence consists of an unreasonable but knowing assumption of the risk: should that choice bar recovery or only reduce it?8 Most comparative-fault courts answer that the choice is ordinary plaintiff fault. The jury assigns the plaintiff a percentage of fault and reduces recovery accordingly. A knowing but reasonable choice involves no fault, so it leaves recovery intact. That result avoids an anomaly, because a system that barred the plaintiff who chose reasonably while merely reducing the recovery of the plaintiff who chose unreasonably would treat the careful plaintiff worse than the careless one. Jurisdictions that continue to apply contributory negligence may still recognize secondary implied assumption of the risk as a complete defense, as Morgan State University v. Walker illustrates.9
The rules therefore sort plaintiffs into three groups. An involuntary encounter, which is usually also a reasonable one, leaves recovery intact. A voluntary but reasonable encounter does the same in most comparative-fault courts. Only a voluntary and unreasonable encounter lowers recovery, and in a jurisdiction that keeps the separate defense it can defeat recovery entirely.
Reluctance cannot be the test of involuntariness. Nearly every plaintiff who meets a negligently created danger would rather the defendant had been careful, and nearly every such plaintiff goes forward unwillingly; if unwillingness sufficed, no choice among a defendant's risks would ever be voluntary. The Restatement test looks to alternatives instead of feelings: the encounter is involuntary only when the defendant's tortious conduct left no reasonable alternative.10 The driver who skipped the spare was not choosing among unwelcome options; that driver preferred the danger to the trouble of avoiding it. The hard cases lie in between, where an alternative exists but costs the plaintiff something, and there the question is whether the alternative was reasonable.