Concept
Strict Liability for Animals and Activities
Related effects of the plaintiff's conduct and consent
Strict Liability for Animals and Activities
A plaintiff who assumes the risk arising from a defendant's reckless disregard of his safety is barred from recovery for that harm.1 That rule, like those before it in this chapter, sets the plaintiff's conduct beside the defendant's state of mind. Strict liability takes away the second term. A defendant who is liable without even being negligent has no fault to compare, and the question becomes what the plaintiff's own conduct can do to a claim that never rested on the defendant's care.
The Second Restatement answers in two parts. Ordinary contributory negligence is no defense, but a plaintiff who voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known risk is barred.2 The Third Restatement largely replaces both parts with comparative responsibility, so the plaintiff's conduct reduces recovery by a share and no longer defeats it.3 The three subsections follow that order: the careless plaintiff, the plaintiff who knowingly faces the risk, and the Third Restatement's single approach.
Careless Plaintiffs Under Strict Liability
The traditional rule was that contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict liability case.4 The Second Restatement applies it to wild animals and to abnormally dangerous activities alike (§§ 515, 523, 524).5 The rule protects even a plaintiff whose carelessness consisted of failing to discover the danger. Where a nuisance rests on strict liability and the defendant is blasting close to a highway, a driver who negligently misses the warning sign, drives past it, and is hurt by the blast may recover.6
The reason lies in what strict liability rests on. The defendant willfully creates an abnormal risk through unusual conduct, and inherent in creating such a risk is the possibility that others will fail to anticipate or guard against it.7 A careless plaintiff's inattention therefore falls inside the danger the defendant chose to create. It does not arrive from outside the activity and shift the loss back to the plaintiff.
Critics find the rule illogical. If ordinary contributory negligence defeats a claim against a negligent defendant, why should it not defeat a claim against a defendant who was not even negligent?8 The answer depends on why the defense was refused in the first place. If the reason is that the party who created the abnormal risk should bear the harm that others' foreseeable lapses produce, adopting comparative negligence leaves that reason untouched. If the reason is that a complete bar is too harsh for a plaintiff who was merely careless, a percentage reduction answers it.
Courts in comparative-negligence jurisdictions have begun to apportion anyway. Kentucky adopted comparative negligence in a dog-bite case despite earlier law rejecting contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability (Maupin v. Tankersley), and Idaho did the same in a dog-bite case even though its comparative negligence statute by its terms covered only negligence (Boswell v. Steele). Missouri read its comparative negligence statute to reach both negligence and strict liability claims in a suit over an escaped bull (Coble v. Taylor).9 Andrade v. Shiers belongs to the same line of animal cases. One treatise reaches the general conclusion: comparative negligence should now apply to strict liability unless a statute requires otherwise.10
An exam answer should state the Second Restatement rule first and add the comparative-responsibility alternative when the facts point to a jurisdiction that has adopted it. The plaintiff's knowledge decides which branch applies, so the analysis keeps it in front.
Knowing Exposure to Strict Liability Risks
The careless plaintiff keeps the claim, but the plaintiff who knowingly faces the danger does not. Under the Second Restatement, a plaintiff's voluntary and unreasonable encounter with the risk, one form of assumption of the risk, is a defense.15 One who brings herself within reach of a dangerous animal, or who provokes it, cannot recover if she knew of the danger or the danger was obvious. The bar extends to people to whom strict liability ordinarily runs, invitees, licensees, and even known trespassers on the defendant's premises, if they knew of the danger and brought themselves within its zone.16 It parallels the bar against a plaintiff who assumes the risk of a reckless defendant's conduct.17
A complete bar fits this plaintiff because the plaintiff has done what the careless plaintiff has not. The careless plaintiff is one of the others whom the defendant's choice endangered, someone who failed to anticipate or guard against the risk. The knowing plaintiff anticipated the risk and went ahead.18 Three requirements confine the bar to that plaintiff: knowledge or obviousness of the danger, a voluntary encounter, and an unreasonable one.
Knowledge separates the careless plaintiff from the knowing one on the same road. A driver who negligently fails to observe a warning sign near a blast may recover. A driver who sees the sign or a flagman warning him not to proceed, and insists on proceeding, cannot.19
The encounter must also be both voluntary and unreasonable, and the two requirements protect different plaintiffs.20 Voluntariness protects the plaintiff the defendant has boxed in, because a defendant who creates a patently dangerous condition may not unreasonably limit the plaintiff's freedom of action or restrict the use of neighboring land. Reasonableness protects the plaintiff who relies on the defendant: at a circus, for example, a patron may reasonably assume that the operator will guard against obvious risks. A patron who crawls under the rope in front of a bear's cage and goes within six inches of the bars has left that protection. Courts have denied recovery to plaintiffs who approached an obvious animal danger in this way, reasoning that the plaintiff brought the calamity on himself (Ervin v. Woodruff) or voluntarily approached an obvious danger (Heidemann v. Wheaton).21
Foolishness alone is harder. A visitor who reaches through a fence toward a tiger acts unreasonably, but the question is whether she assumed the risk. In Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Center, a tiger case, the court held that strict liability applies to wild animals and left to the jury whether the owner had proved assumption of risk.22 The comparative view treats such conduct as fault to be apportioned, as with the pedestrian who crosses mid-road: she does not consent to a driver's negligence, yet liability may be apportioned to her.23
Alana and Ben were both hurt by the same animal. What separates them is whether each chose the exposure. Alana relied on the operator's protection, while Ben left it. An exam stem that describes a plaintiff who ignored a warning therefore calls for sorting what the plaintiff knew from what the plaintiff chose.
The Third Restatement Approach
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 25 applies comparative negligence principles to compare the plaintiff's negligence with the defendant's strict liability in cases involving animals and abnormally dangerous activities.28 Together with Apportionment of Liability § 8, it directs the fact finder in every physical-injury case to assign shares of responsibility to each party, whatever the legal theory of liability. A negligent plaintiff can therefore receive a share even though the defendant's liability is strict.29 A jurisdiction that still treats contributory negligence as a complete bar is unlikely to adopt that position. It fits best where fault is already apportioned, and one treatise reasons that the comparative rule should govern strict liability unless a statute requires otherwise.30
The Third Restatement thus collapses the Second Restatement's two tracks into one question: how much of the responsibility for the harm belongs to the plaintiff? Under the Second Restatement, the plaintiff who merely failed to guard against the danger kept the whole claim, and the plaintiff who knowingly and unreasonably encountered it lost the whole claim.31 In a Third Restatement state, both receive a share. In most cases a plaintiff's foolishness in encountering a known risk is properly characterized as mere negligence, so a deliberate choice to face the danger reduces recovery the way carelessness does.32 The same shift occurred in ordinary negligence law. Most courts concluded that it makes little sense to keep an independent assumption-of-risk defense within comparative negligence, since a plaintiff's unreasonable assumption of risk can simply be counted when fault is apportioned.33 What was once called assumption of the risk may now show only that the plaintiff is at fault. A pedestrian who crosses in mid-block, though not consenting to a driver's negligence, may have liability apportioned to her.34
Apportionment raises one conceptual difficulty. A strictly liable defendant may have been entirely careful, so the jury has no negligence on the defendant's side to compare. Courts have not answered coherently, and some have nearly admitted it. Confronting the same objection in strict products liability, the Supreme Court of California dismissed the argument that the jury would compare "apples and oranges" and redescribed the jury's task as an "equitable" apportionment of liability.35 The Third Restatement sidesteps the label by directing the fact finder to assign shares of responsibility to each party regardless of the legal theory.36
Some cases remain in which the plaintiff's conduct evidences implied consent to the risk and relieves the defendant entirely.37 Other plaintiffs fall outside strict liability altogether. It does not apply when a plaintiff suffers physical harm from contact or proximity with the defendant's animal or abnormally dangerous activity "for the purpose of securing some benefit from that contact or that proximity," or when the defendant carries on the activity under an obligation imposed by law.38 Nor does it apply to a plaintiff who participates in the activity. The comments to § 20 make clear that this form of strict liability reaches only the risks that others, besides the plaintiff, impose.39 A Kansas decision, Pullen v. West, is the case usually cited for the participation limit, and Peneschi v. National Steel Corp. is cited for treating a worker's acceptance of a job in the dangerous activity as assuming its risk. These limits concern the reach of strict liability and are not defenses. A plaintiff inside one receives no reduced award, because apportionment never begins.
The defendant's identity is itself unsettled. The Second Restatement makes "one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity" strictly liable, and whether an employee who conducts the activity is liable alongside the enterprise is unclear there and under Section 20 of the Third Restatement.40
The same blast hurt both plaintiffs, and the question that separates them is whether each stands outside the activity as a stranger to its risks. Teodoro does, so the jury reaches apportionment and his choice shrinks his award without ending his claim. Imogen does not, so the analysis ends before any percentage is assigned. An exam stem that places an injured person near an abnormally dangerous activity therefore calls first for sorting the plaintiff's role and only then for weighing the plaintiff's conduct. A statute, or a jurisdiction that keeps the Second Restatement rules, can displace this approach, so the answer should name the rule being applied.41