Concept
Strict Products Liability
Related effects of the plaintiff's conduct and consent
Strict Products Liability
Strict liability for animals and abnormally dangerous activities raised a question that strict products liability raises again: how should a plaintiff’s own conduct count when the defendant’s liability does not depend on care? Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts answered by sorting that conduct into two kinds and giving them opposite effects. A plaintiff whose only fault is failing to discover a defect, or to guard against the possibility that one exists, still recovers.1 A plaintiff who discovers the defect, grasps the danger, and unreasonably goes ahead anyway is barred.2
The line makes sense in light of when it was drawn. Manufacturer liability to remote buyers grew slowly. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (N.Y. 1916) effectively abolished the privity requirement in negligence cases,3 warranty claims against makers of defective food and cosmetics spread by the 1950s, and truly modern products liability began in the early 1960s with Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors.4 Section 402A followed in 1964, when the overwhelming majority rule made contributory negligence a total bar to recovery. The drafters were reluctant to defeat a products claim over conduct that was not egregious, so they narrowed contributory negligence and made assumption of risk the principal conduct defense.5
Comparative fault then upset that arrangement. Once states replaced the complete bar with apportionment, litigants argued that apportionment should govern strict products claims too. The argument had force, because plaintiffs often plead negligence and strict liability on the same conduct, and it seems odd for the plaintiff’s negligence to reduce recovery on one count and vanish on the other.6 The Third Restatement responds in § 17(a): a plaintiff’s recovery may be reduced when her conduct combines with the product defect to cause the harm and fails to conform to generally applicable standards of care.7 The Second Restatement had simply carried over the approach taken for abnormally dangerous activities, while comment d to § 17 limits no form or category of plaintiff conduct.8
Jurisdictions still differ. Statutes that require comparing the parties’ “negligence” or “fault” often define neither term, and courts have split on whether the language reaches strict products claims.9 In states that do apportion, the jury assigns the seller a percentage for selling the defective product and the plaintiff a percentage for negligent use.10 Assumption of risk remains a total bar to liability in a good number of states, even against strict products claims, although contributory negligence now merely reduces damages in most.11 Elsewhere what was once called assumption of risk may serve only to show the plaintiff’s fault, as with Prosser’s jaywalker, who did not consent to the driver’s negligence but may still bear apportioned liability.12 An answer on this topic therefore begins with comment n, adds what comparative responsibility does to it, and names the controlling jurisdiction’s rule.
Three questions organize what follows. What does a plaintiff’s failure to discover a defect cost? What does a knowing encounter with the defect cost? And how do misuse and apportionment divide responsibility when the plaintiff’s use of the product contributed to the harm?
Failure to Discover Defects
The first half of comment n protects the plaintiff whose only lapse was trusting the product. Such a plaintiff has made no choice about the defect, and the drafters, writing when any contributory negligence barred recovery, did not want to defeat a products claim over conduct that was not egregious.13 A plaintiff’s “simple” or “ordinary” fault in merely failing to discover a defect, or to guard against its possible existence, therefore does not shield the manufacturer from the harm the defect causes.14
Two cases show how far the protection runs. A consumer who bites into a candy bar and finds worms (Kassouf v. Lee Bros., Inc.) had no reason to inspect it first. In Smith v. Smith, a power saw suddenly started, and the user’s startled movement put his hand in the blade. A reaction to a sudden danger that the defect itself created is not the lapse the rule holds against a plaintiff.
The shield has survived comparative fault better than one might expect. Restatement (Third) § 17 comment d limits no form or category of plaintiff conduct, and once most states abandoned the all-or-nothing approach, courts could have thrown simple contributory negligence back into the well with every other kind of fault. Almost every court to consider the question has instead held that a plaintiff’s careless failure to discover a defect lies outside damages apportionment.15 The pressure to do otherwise is real. Suppose Ortney sues in negligence and strict liability, and the jury finds her 20 percent negligent. Under the approach of § 402A, contributory negligence was not a defense to strict liability, so the finding has no effect on that count. The judge enters judgment for 80 percent of her damages on the negligence claim and for 100 percent on the strict liability claim, although she cannot recover twice.16
The shield protects only the plaintiff whose lapse was not noticing. Ramirez uses an Accu-Cut saw whose blade tends to stick on stock thicker than an inch, senses that something is wrong, and keeps cutting. When the saw sticks and the board kicks back, his continued cutting may be charged against him as contributory or comparative negligence.17 A third kind of conduct sits between not noticing and knowingly facing a risk: carelessness unrelated to discovery, such as skipping a safety device. That plaintiff does not consent to the defect’s risk, but under comparative fault the conduct can still be apportioned, as with Prosser’s jaywalker.18
Jurisdictions treat this middle group differently. In General Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, a defective parking-gear design let a truck pop out of gear and crush its owner. Failing to discover the defect could not bar or reduce his recovery, but he could be charged with fault for parking unsafely, apart from the defect, and his damages reduced accordingly. In Bowling v. Heil Co., a worker put his head under a raised dump-truck bed and manipulated a lever just before the bed fell. The jury found him at fault but not an assumer of the risk, and the court refused to reduce his recovery.
Because the effect of plaintiff conduct turns on its kind, the analysis is best run by sorting the lapse before deciding what it costs.
Assuming the Risk of a Defect
The second half of comment n takes up the plaintiff who did find the problem. Voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, commonly called assumption of risk, remains a defense in strict products liability: a user who discovers the defect, is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to use the product is barred from recovery.22 Strict products decisions initially followed that approach.23 The drafters chose this plaintiff for the bar because comment n narrowed contributory negligence and emphasized assumption of risk as the primary defense.24
Consent explains the bar. A person cannot consent to what he does not know or to what is forced upon him, so the defense arises only when the encounter with the risk is both informed and voluntary.25 The Second Restatement and later theory add that the risk is assumed only if the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering it manifested willingness to accept responsibility for it.26
Knowledge is the element on which most arguments turn. A vague understanding that a product may be dangerous if not carefully used is neither knowledge nor appreciation of a particular risk. A plaintiff who does not know how the product can hurt him cannot weigh how likely and how serious the injury is, and so cannot make an informed choice.27 How much more is required divides the courts. One formulation demands that the plaintiff knew of the specific defect and was aware of the danger arising from it, while other courts require only knowledge of the specific risk and not of the precise mechanism or the manner in which the product is legally defective.28 In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., the court held erroneous an instruction that barred recovery whenever the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger. The defense is available in a strict liability action only when the plaintiff unreasonably proceeds to use the product with knowledge of the specific defect and awareness that the defect would cause injury.29
A plaintiff assumes the risk when he makes an informed choice based on the same risk-utility factors that the allegation of defect puts in issue.30 Two workers at the same unguarded machine show the difference. One whose hand slides into the exposed moving parts made an inadvertent mistake, and the fitting defense is contributory negligence. The other removes the protective guard after deciding it was not worth having. He made an informed risk-utility choice to forgo the guard, and that choice released the seller from the duty to design a machine whose guard cannot be removed.31 For the same reason, knowledge of the risk alone is not enough. The plaintiff must also know the burden of the safety device whose absence is the alleged defect, because without that knowledge his decision to face a known risk does not satisfy the rule.32
Voluntariness asks whether the plaintiff had a reasonable alternative to facing the risk. A choice is not voluntary when the defect leaves the plaintiff no reasonable alternative course of conduct to protect a right that the defendant has no right to take from him.33 The standard case is the employee who knows a machine is defectively designed but must use it or quit. The manufacturer has no right to deprive him of his job, and he can escape the risk only by giving it up. Because changing jobs usually costs a great deal, his decision to keep working is typically reasonable, and for that reason it is not voluntary.34
Comment n adds a third requirement, that the plaintiff proceed unreasonably.35 The addition departs from conventional assumption of risk, which does not require an unreasonable choice, because a plaintiff who assumes a risk for reasons and in a manner reasonable in all respects can still be barred from a negligence claim.36 The defense also differs from misuse. It does not require that the plaintiff use the product outside its intended and foreseeable limits, and the situations that give rise to it are often quite normal and foreseeable.37
An advance waiver of liability is a different route to the same end, and the law resists it. Many jurisdictions refuse to let potential defendants waive liability for future negligence, although in 2013 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Bowman v. Sunoco that public policy does not prohibit a waiver of liability for future negligence in favor of a non-contracting party.38 The chapter takes up releases in a later section.
Comparative responsibility has since loosened the bar. Many states with comparative negligence regimes treat a plaintiff’s conscious choice to encounter a risk as a form of negligent conduct, so the jury assigns the plaintiff a percentage of fault and assumption of risk becomes a partial defense instead of a complete bar.39 Under the Third Restatement the label no longer matters, because any plaintiff conduct that fails to conform to generally applicable standards of care can reduce recovery.40 What was once termed assumption of risk may now serve only to show that the plaintiff is at fault.41 A good number of states nonetheless keep it as a total bar, which sets it apart from contributory negligence, now a damage-reducing factor in most.42
Two arguments drove the shift away from the complete bar. The first is consistency. Once assumption of risk became a partial defense to negligence claims, treating the same conduct as a complete bar to the strict claim was hard to defend.43 It seems odd for a plaintiff’s fault to reduce recovery on one count and be ignored on the other.44 The second is incentive. In Daly v. General Motors Corp., the court observed that a complete defense sends the curious and cynical message that it profits a manufacturer to make a product so defective that, after an injury, it can argue that the user had to be aware of its patent defects, and it concluded that adopting comparative principles would not significantly impair safety incentives.45
Where the complete bar survives, the label a jury picks can decide the case. Hedgepeth climbs onto the top of a tank that is sometimes “real slick,” and he falls. If the jury finds that he fully appreciated the danger and chose to face it, a state that keeps assumption of risk as a complete defense and gives ordinary contributory negligence no effect in strict products cases denies him everything. If the jury finds only that he carelessly disregarded the risk of a slippery surface, the same state awards full damages with no deduction.46 A state that treats either kind of fault as damage-reducing gives him something under both labels.47
Where comparative responsibility governs, the label stops deciding who recovers. Suppose a defective radiator hose ruptures, the dashboard flashes an order to stop at once because the engine is overheating, and the driver lifts the hood, sees the ruptured hose, and drives a hundred more miles for pleasure. The engine catches fire and injures her. She has knowingly and unreasonably encountered a known risk, and comment n would bar her. A state that treats that conduct like any other plaintiff negligence reduces her recovery by her share of responsibility and still allows the rest.48
Because the label decides the outcome in some states and almost nothing in others, the analysis is best run in this order.
An answer should state the bar in comment n first and then add the comparative-responsibility alternative, since the jurisdiction’s choice controls and neither approach is universal.
Misuse and Apportioned Responsibility
Courts speak of a “misuse defense,” but misuse touches a strict products claim in three different ways, and only one of them is a defense. Sometimes misuse defeats the plaintiff’s prima facie claim, because it shows that the product was not defective.53 Sometimes the product is defective as to some foreseeable risk of misuse, yet an unforeseeable misuse produced the injury, so the defect was not a proximate cause. Those two limit the plaintiff’s own case, and the defendant need not plead and prove them. The third arises when the product is defective as to a foreseeable risk of misuse and the plaintiff misused it in that very way. The plaintiff then proves her prima facie case, and the defendant must prove the misuse as an affirmative defense, together with proof that the defect and the misuse both proximately caused the injury.54 Foreseeability sorts the three, and a foreseeable risk means a category of accidents that a reasonable person would consider in deciding whether to take a particular safety precaution.55 Restatement (Third) § 17 speaks only to the third category. It permits a reduction when the plaintiff’s conduct combines with the defect to cause the harm and fails to meet generally applicable standards of care, and general apportionment rules govern the manner and extent of the reduction.56
Foreseeability does the sorting because the ways a product might be misused are, as one court put it, like the stars, an endless number. To protect sellers from liability for an endless number of accidents caused by adventurous uses, courts have almost universally limited responsibility to foreseeable uses.57 Section 402A already shielded sellers from injuries resulting from mishandling, over-consumption, excessive use, and a failure to read and heed an adequate warning, and the Third Restatement confines design and warning defects to the foreseeable risks of harm the product poses.58
Suppose Pahti pries open a paint can with an Accu-Cut knife and the blade snaps. To recover he must prove that the knife was defective when used for its intended purpose or for one the manufacturer should have anticipated. If the use was unforeseeable, as it probably was, the knife is not defective even though it was unfit for that use. The limit makes sense, because a maker cannot be expected to design its knife for use as a screwdriver or a splint, and a knife cannot be all things to all people.59
A defective product can also escape liability when the misuse, and not the defect, produced the injury. In Daniell v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.M. 1984), the plaintiff deliberately locked herself in a car trunk intending to commit suicide, changed her mind, and could not get out because the trunk lid had no inside release. The car may have been defective for lacking a release, yet the court held that Ford would not be liable for so unforeseeable an occurrence as a failed suicide attempt.60 Daniell and the paring-knife example reach the same result by different routes. The knife user fails at the defect element, because the knife was not defective for that use. The trunk plaintiff might have shown a defect and fails on causation, because the harm came from a misuse no one could foresee. In neither case must the defendant prove misuse as a defense.
A plaintiff who ignores an adequate warning raises the same logic in a different setting. A user’s failure to follow a manufacturer’s warnings or instructions ordinarily bars recovery when the danger from noncompliance is evident, the noncompliance is a substantial cause of the harm, and the manufacturer has no simple way or apparent reason to design the danger out of the product. Courts have little sympathy with plaintiffs injured because they ignore warnings, despite common knowledge that users often do.61 A user who disregards an adequate warning about the rash risk of a solvent and works without gloves therefore loses in most courts. The solvent was reasonably safe as directed, and its irreducible danger was disclosed, so the product is not defective.62
Foreseeable misuse is the third category, and it is the only one in which misuse is an affirmative defense. Consider a tire that bursts when a driver exceeds the speed limit by a modest margin. Drivers exceed speed limits often enough that consumers reasonably expect manufacturers to design cars to account for it, so the tire is defective as to a foreseeable misuse. The defect remains the manufacturer’s responsibility, and speeding appears only as something the defendant must prove.63 If the speeding barred recovery, the manufacturer would never answer for the tire, which is why the Second Restatement refused to recognize that form of contributory negligence. As one court explained, the plaintiff’s asserted negligence was the very eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against, and it would be anomalous to hold that the defendant has a duty to install safety devices but no liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect against.64
Foreseeable misuse can also create a duty to warn. Courts have generally recognized a duty to warn of foreseeable misuses that result from human nature acting upon opportunity. A user stretching to reach the top of a window will be tempted to gain altitude by putting one foot on a paint shelf, and if that is dangerous, a warning can avert the danger.65
The two scenes involve the same ladder and the same kind of collapse, so the only fact that moves the category is whether the maker could foresee the use. Kovacs’s conduct matters only after he has shown a defect, and it matters then as plaintiff fault. Sato’s conduct never reaches that stage, because it removes the defect from the case.
Comparative responsibility lets foreseeable misuse reduce recovery without erasing it. A complete bar would free the manufacturer from liability for the very accidents that safe design exists to prevent, while a percentage reduction leaves it answerable for its own share. The label no longer matters under the Third Restatement, because any conduct that fails to conform to generally applicable standards of care can reduce recovery, and misuse by definition fails that test.66 Misuse stands apart from a careless failure to discover a defect, which almost every court still keeps outside the apportionment.67
Unforeseeable misuse stays outside apportionment altogether. A seller has no duty to guard against unforeseeable product risks, so in such cases there is no seller fault or product defect to compare.68 Deliberate misuse of a foreseeable kind runs back into assumption of risk. A user who knows a table saw should have a guard, sees that his has none, and uses it anyway has consciously encountered the risk. A good number of states still treat that choice as a total bar, and many states with comparative regimes treat it as ordinary plaintiff fault.69
Once misuse counts as plaintiff fault, the jury must assign shares, and the difficulty is that the plaintiff’s conduct is negligent while the seller’s liability may rest on no fault at all. Fault cannot be compared with strict liability, but each party’s conduct proximately caused the injury, so liability is apportioned by comparing each party’s causal contribution.70 Two factors guide the percentages: the nature of each person’s risk-creating conduct, including any awareness or indifference toward the risk and any intent about the harm, and the strength of the causal connection between that conduct and the harm.71 Applied to misuse, a user who understood the danger and went ahead weighs heavier than one who slipped, and a defect that made the injury likely whatever the user did carries a stronger causal connection than one that mattered only because of an unusual act. If the jury finds the seller 70 percent responsible and the plaintiff 30 percent, the plaintiff recovers 70 percent of her damages.72
Because foreseeability decides whether misuse limits the prima facie case or operates as a defense, the analysis is best run by sorting the use before any percentages are assigned.