Concept
The Strict Liability Rule
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
Abnormally Dangerous Activities
The Strict Liability Rule
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(1) states the rule on which this chapter is built: one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.1 Chattels are movable personal property, so the rule reaches bodily injury, damage to real estate, and damage to goods. The final clause carries the weight. In a negligence case, a defendant who proves that every reasonable precaution was taken wins, because the plaintiff cannot show a breach of the duty of care. Under § 519(1) the same proof is no defense. That is why the liability is called strict: it is imposed without regard to fault. One court treats "abnormally dangerous" and "ultrahazardous" as synonyms, so either label signals the same doctrine.2 Older usage also included "extrahazardous activity."3
Strict liability departs from the default that governs most claims for physical harm. Negligence law asks whether the defendant failed to use reasonable care, and when an injury comes from circumstances that careful conduct could not have prevented, the loss stays with the victim. In Cohen v. Petty, the defendant suffered a sudden fainting spell, lost control of his car, and injured the plaintiff. She recovered nothing, because he owed her a duty of reasonable care and not an absolute duty to avoid injuring her.4 The driver caused the harm, but he breached no duty. Section 519(1) removes the breach element for a narrow class of activities. The plaintiff must prove that the activity qualifies and that it caused the harm, but need not prove carelessness.
Set beside Cohen, the fumigation scene shows what the rule turns on. Neither defendant is blameworthy, and each caused real injury. The fainting driver was engaged in an ordinary activity, so fault controlled and he prevailed. Franklin chose an activity whose nature carries a risk that careful performance cannot remove, and the choice itself carries the cost.5 The plea "we did nothing wrong" is a complete answer in negligence and no answer at all under § 519(1).
Lawyers describe the difference as one between an act and an activity. Negligence measures a particular act against a standard of reasonable conduct, while strict liability looks at the kind of activity the defendant has chosen to carry on.6 That framing guards against the most common error in this area, which is to treat anything done in an unreasonably dangerous manner as abnormally dangerous. Doing an ordinary task dangerously is negligence by definition, because the inquiry into abnormal danger looks to the inherent nature of the activity and not to how careful the defendant was.7
The reason for liability without fault is a judgment about who should bear the cost of an accident that careful conduct would not have prevented. One court states the policy this way: the liability arises from the abnormal danger of the activity and the risk it creates for those nearby, and it falls on anyone who, for her own purposes, creates an abnormal risk of harm to her neighbors. The enterprise must "pay its way" by compensating for the harm its dangerous character causes.8 An older formulation puts the same idea as a matter of simple justice: when one person, in managing his own affairs, causes damage to another, however innocently, he should be the party to suffer.9
The cost allocation also changes behavior, though not in the way one might first expect. Strict liability does not push an actor to take more care than negligence law already demands. A potential defendant avoids accident costs by acting more safely only when safety costs less than liability, and the threat of negligence liability already supplies that incentive.10 What strict liability adds is pressure on the decision to engage in the activity at all. An actor who must pay for every injury, including the blameless ones, has reason to forgo the activity or to find another way to reach the same goal. Perhaps the cellar can be dug with a backhoe instead of blasting.11
Proof supplies a further reason. Some accidents destroy the evidence of how the defendant behaved, as an explosion of highly flammable cargo may, and a fault-only rule would let careless defendants in those cases escape.12 Strict liability can also be a middle course between prohibition and tolerance. A community might ban keeping a wild animal outright. If it tolerates the practice instead, liability without fault makes good sense.13
The justification is the choice to engage in the activity, so the liability points at the enterprise that makes that choice.14 The employee who sprays the gas or sets the charge carries out that choice without making it. Section 519(1) speaks of the one who "carries on" the activity and does not say in terms whether employees are covered. Authority on the point is thin, but the rationale favors the employer over the individual who performs the work.
Strict is not absolute, and two limits keep the rule from swallowing negligence.15 The first is that the plaintiff must show the activity is abnormally dangerous in the first place. Courts decide that by weighing the factors in § 520, which the later sections of this chapter take up one at a time.16 The second is that the liability is limited to the kind of harm whose possibility makes the activity abnormally dangerous, so a plaintiff hurt by an incidental risk of the same business must fall back on negligence.17 Strict liability therefore removes fault as an element, and every other element remains.