Concept
Second and Third Restatements Compared
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
Second and Third Restatements Compared
Two Restatement tests tell a court how to decide whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, and the difference between them can decide a case. The Second Restatement directs a court to consider six factors together, the § 520 list covered above, and a good many courts have embraced that multifactor approach.1 The Third Restatement, in § 20, suggests a somewhat simpler analysis that is largely consistent with the thrust of the Second.2
Both tests use the label “abnormally dangerous,” so the phrase alone will not tell you which one a court is applying. An earlier formulation spoke of “ultrahazardous” activities. The drafters of the Second chose the new name because the emphasis falls more on the abnormal character of what the defendant does in relation to the surroundings than on the high degree of danger, and the drafters of the Third kept it.3 Neither Restatement is law until a court adopts it or a legislature enacts it. A fair number of state courts have relied on the Second's factors, and it is too early to predict whether courts will adopt the Third's version.4
The Third Restatement defines the term through two requirements, and an activity qualifies only if it meets both:5
- The activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when all actors exercise reasonable care.
- The activity is not one of common usage.
The first requirement joins the risk factors to the care factor in a single question: does a highly significant risk remain even when everyone exercises reasonable care? Strict liability is meant for activities so inherently dangerous that the risk stays high despite all reasonable efforts to reduce it, and if reasonable care can make the activity generally safe, courts will not impose it.6 A court speaking through Judge Posner gave the economic reason. Strict liability pushes defendants to relocate an activity, to substitute less hazardous methods, or to reduce its extent, and where due care can substantially control the risk, such extreme measures are not called for.7
Setting the two requirements beside the Second Restatement's six factors shows what the shorter test keeps and what it drops:
- Factors (a) and (b), the degree of risk and the likelihood of great harm, are no longer listed separately. The first requirement asks instead for a foreseeable and “highly significant” risk of physical harm.8
- Factor (c), inability to eliminate the risk by reasonable care, becomes the clause in the first requirement that the risk persists even when all actors use reasonable care.9
- Factor (d), common usage, becomes the second requirement and moves from one factor among six to a necessary element.10
- Factor (e), inappropriateness to the place, no longer stands alone. Location can still be relevant under either requirement, and the factor is partly reflected in common usage.11
- Factor (f), value to the community, is likewise dropped as a separate item and is said to be reflected in the activity's commonness.12
Dropping the place factor changes little in practice, because a court is unlikely to reject strict liability simply because the defendant acts in an appropriate place. Storing mining wastes in retaining pools near the mine and blasting rock for a road where the rock is found are “appropriate” in that sense, yet most courts would impose strict liability on both anyway.13
The promotion of common usage matters far more. Under the Third Restatement, an activity that involves great and irreducible risk will not support strict liability if it is a matter of common usage.14 Driving is the classic example. More people are injured by automobiles in a week than by blasting in a decade, yet because driving is so common and so useful, courts have not applied strict liability to it.15 The result invites an obvious objection: if an activity poses unusual risk to others, why should the plaintiff be put off with the explanation that the danger is a common one?16 The Second Restatement avoids that objection only by weighing commonness as one factor among six. Even there, the defendant's best argument against strict liability is that the activity is one of common usage.17
In practice the two tests may converge. Whether or not courts expressly adopt the Third Restatement, they will probably decide cases almost entirely on the two considerations it emphasizes: whether reasonable care can make the activity generally safe, and whether the activity is a matter of common usage.18 Expect open questions even after a court chooses a formulation. When comparative negligence was adopted, it created the need for a whole new jurisprudence, and few of the issues were resolved by the statutes or decisions that launched the new regime.19
The classification also matters beyond a plaintiff's claim against the operator. The Third Restatement retains vicarious liability for those who hire independent contractors in eight situations, and work involving abnormally dangerous activities is one of them.20