Concept
Limiting Liability to the Kind of Harm
Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
Limiting Liability to the Kind of Harm
Classifying an activity as abnormally dangerous does not make its owner answer for every injury the activity touches. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(2) draws the boundary: “This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.”1 The § 520 weighing decides which liability rule governs the activity; § 519(2) decides which of the plaintiff's injuries that rule reaches. An injury that merely occurs while the defendant carries on the activity does not qualify. It must come from the risk that earned the activity its classification.
Why strict liability stops at the characteristic risk
Strict liability rests on the defendant's choice to engage in the activity, not on fault, and because of the nature of that activity courts place the resulting damages on the actor.2 Judge Posner, a leading advocate of economic analysis of tort doctrine, adds that courts impose strict liability to encourage defendants to relocate an activity, to substitute a less hazardous way of accomplishing the task, or to reduce its extent. Where due care can substantially control the risk, he concludes, such extreme measures are not called for, and strict liability should not apply.3 That logic explains the limit. A truck that hits a pedestrian or a hand that drops a tool is a hazard careful conduct controls, so the incentive to relocate or shrink the activity has nothing to work on.
One fumigator, two injuries
Fumigation with the toxic gas Vikane gives the cleanest pair of examples. A person poisoned by the gas suffers the harm that makes fumigation a strict liability activity; a person hurt in a truck accident does not. Delivering Vikane by truck is no more likely to cause that accident than delivering topsoil or lumber or collecting garbage by truck. Fumigation is a strict liability activity because of the risk of Vikane poisoning, not because of the risk of truck accidents.4
Suppose Jackson is injured in a truck accident while Franklin, a fumigation company, is going about its work, and the court instructs the jury that Franklin is strictly liable for any injury that takes place in the course of fumigation. Franklin should object, and the objection is sound. Strict liability makes sense only for the types of risks that make the activity abnormally dangerous, and Jackson, although hurt while Franklin was in the general course of its fumigation activities, was not hurt by the peculiar risk that makes fumigation abnormally dangerous. His injury arose from related, ordinary activity incident to fumigation.5 The instruction ties liability to when the injury happened, while § 519(2) ties it to what caused the injury. A sound instruction would ask whether the poison hurt Jackson.
Losing strict liability does not end Jackson's case, because a plaintiff whose injury falls outside the characteristic risk may still sue in negligence. When Lance Laborer drops a heavy package of explosives on Victoria Victim's head and causes a concussion, her claim is for negligence, not strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity.6 The weight of the package did the damage, and the explosive contributed nothing. The same result follows if a Franklin employee pokes a resident in the eye with the chemical applicator, or if a blasting company's employee drops a box of dynamite caps on a passerby's foot.7 Had the package detonated, the injury would have come from the risk that made explosives dangerous, and the characteristic-risk test would be met.
Mink and blasting: Foster
Foster v. Preston Mill Co. puts the limit under more pressure, because the plaintiff's loss plainly traced back to the blasting. Foster raised mink. The mill's blasting, at a distance of two and a quarter miles, frightened the mother mink, and they killed their young.8 Foster had warned the mill of this effect, and the mill kept blasting.
On the mill's appeal, the Washington Supreme Court rejected strict liability for the mink losses. The court began by identifying what makes blasting ultrahazardous: “the risk that property or persons may be damaged or injured by coming into direct contact with flying debris, or by being directly affected by vibrations of the earth or concussions of the air.” It found nothing in the decisional law to support a strict liability rule for the harm the mink suffered.9 The vibration and noise the blasting produced at that distance were relatively moderate, “no more than a usual incident of the ordinary life of the community,” and the trial court had found that the blasting did not unreasonably interfere with nearby landowners' enjoyment of their property, except at the mink ranch.10
The court tied the limit to proximate cause. “It is one thing to say that a dangerous enterprise must pay its way within reasonable limits, and quite another to say that it must bear responsibility for every extreme of harm that it may cause.” The same practical necessity for restricting liability within reasonable bounds that arises with proximate cause in negligence cases, the court said, “demands here that some limit be set,” and the limitation has been expressed by saying that the defendant's duty to insure safety extends only to certain consequences.11 Strict liability therefore dispenses with fault but keeps a boundary around consequences.
Foster's warning does not rescue the claim. A student's first instinct may be to call the mink loss unforeseeable, but a mill that has been told its blasting is killing mink can foresee the next loss. The analysis asks a different question, because strict liability depends on the choice to engage in the activity and not on fault.12 The question is whether the mink loss falls among the risks that make blasting abnormally dangerous: flying debris and the direct effects of earth vibration and air concussion. Moderate noise at a distance does not.
Foster also shows a companion principle: strict liability does not protect against “harms incident to the plaintiff's extraordinary and unusual use of land.”13 The trial court's finding shows the principle at work, since the blasting did not unreasonably interfere with nearby landowners' enjoyment of their property except at the mink ranch.14 Posner's incentive account points the same way. A blaster whom the rest of the neighborhood tolerates has little to relocate, substitute, or reduce on account of one unusually sensitive neighbor. The limit also resembles the modern trend in product cases, where recovery is confined to instances in which the defect proximately caused the injury.15 Courts in other fields likewise ask which feature of a site a rule reaches; in Stone v. York Haven Power Co., a statutory immunity applied to a lake but not to the dam that created it.16
Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., another mink-and-blasting decision, also denied strict liability. Denying strict liability does not close the courthouse door, however. Summit View, Inc. v. W.W. Clyde & Co. imposed liability in negligence for unnecessarily parking heavy equipment near mink sheds during whelping season.
The same limit in the Third Restatement
The Restatement (Third) keeps the limit. Its definition asks whether the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when all actors exercise reasonable care, and whether the activity is one of common usage.17 Liability is then confined to the consequences whose risk made the activity abnormally dangerous in the first place, a confinement that § 519(2) states for the Second Restatement and that comment l to § 29 carries forward in the Third.18 The analysis therefore does not depend on which formulation classified the activity.
Other rules shape who recovers from an abnormally dangerous activity, and none of them asks the question § 519(2) asks. The Restatement (Third) retains vicarious liability for those who hire independent contractors in several situations, including work involving abnormally dangerous activities.19 The Restatement (Second) applies its contributory-fault rule to strict liability for both wild animals and abnormally dangerous activities (§§ 515, 523, 524), which invites the question why ordinary contributory negligence is no defense when the defendant is not even negligent, and most states now reduce a plaintiff's damages by the plaintiff's percentage of negligence.20 Comparative negligence regimes raise further questions of their own, such as the case of a plaintiff who is 40 percent negligent when two defendants are 35 and 25 percent negligent.21 Those rules govern who pays and how much; § 519(2) governs whether the injury qualifies at all.
Applying the limit
The description of the risk in step two controls the outcome at step four. Describing the risk of blasting as danger to anyone nearby would sweep in the mink, while describing it as damage from flying debris or from the direct effects of earth vibration and air concussion leaves out moderate noise tolerated as an ordinary incident of community life, which is how Foster draws the line.22 An answer that stops after the § 520 weighing has analyzed half the problem, and an answer that finds the injury outside the characteristic risk should still test the claim as negligence.