Concept
Identifying the Possessor
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Identifying the Possessor
Strict liability for wild animals and for abnormally dangerous domestic animals runs against the possessor of the animal.1 The Restatement (Second) of Torts extends the same liability to one who, although not in possession, harbors such an animal.2 Classifying the animal therefore answers only half of an animal problem. The other half is deciding which defendant stands in the possessor's position, and that decision follows control over the animal and over the premises where it is kept. Title to the animal or the land matters only as evidence of that control. The sections below take control first, then the harborer, then the landowner whose land a wild animal merely visits, and finally the transfers of possession that move liability from one person to another.
Control Over the Animal
Liability for harm done by an animal, whether strict or based on negligence, falls on those who keep, possess, or harbor it, and not on the owner alone.3 The reason lies in why the law imposes strict liability on animal keepers at all. The person who chooses to keep an animal and is able to confine it is positioned to prevent the harm and to absorb its cost, and that position comes from controlling the animal and the place where it lives. Title is only a paper fact, and it may sit with someone who has no say over how the animal is kept. A rule keyed to title would therefore miss the person who actually decides whether the gate stays closed.
Some decisions find that person in the household or yard where the animal lived. Snow v. Birt and Terral v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. belong on that side of the line. In Terral, evidence that a dog spent most of its time on the defendant's porch and ate food put out there for his other dogs was enough for a jury to find that he harbored the dog. That was so even though he denied the dog was his, said he never let it inside with his other dogs, had not taken it to a veterinarian, and had bought it nothing.4
Other courts refuse to treat a defendant as keeper on facts that look similar. In Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church, a church was held not to be the keeper of a dog that belonged to an employee who lived on church grounds with his family and the dog. In Augsburger v. Homestead Mutual Insurance Co., the court held that owning the property on which a dog lives is not enough, standing alone, to make the property owner an owner of the dog.5 Both lines of cases ask who actually kept and controlled the animal, as distinct from who held title to the dog or the building. Some of these decisions interpret particular statutes and do not state the common-law rule. They show how courts search for control, and an exam answer should rest on that inquiry and not on any single result.
Harborers
The Restatement (Second) states the harborer rule directly: one who, although not in possession, harbors a wild animal or an abnormally dangerous domestic animal is subject to the same liability as if he were in possession of it.7 The word also appears in the rule for ordinary domestic animals, which reaches one who possesses or harbors such an animal, although liability there turns on intent or negligence and not on classification alone.8 Harboring moves the emphasis from possession and control of the animal to possession and control of the premises where the animal is kept.9 A person who lets an animal live on land he controls has chosen to host the risk and can end it by ordering the animal off. That choice and that ability are what justify liability for a possessor.
The standard illustration is a parent who allows an adult child to keep a lion in the parent's house. In American States Ins. Co. v. Guillermin, the parent was neither the lion's owner nor its direct controller, yet harbored it on premises the parent controlled and so carried the same liability as a possessor.10 Without the harborer rule, a keeper could hold a dangerous animal on his own land, place nominal title in someone else such as a child, and point to that person as the only responsible party. Extending liability to the harborer closes that gap, because what matters is who allows the animal to stay and not whose name is attached to it.
The Third Restatement drops the word harboring and imposes strict liability on owners or possessors of wild animals, including the owner who has permitted another to possess the animal.11 The change in vocabulary leaves the practical coverage similar, so an answer under the Third Restatement can use the same control reasoning.
Wild Animals That Wander onto Land
Harboring requires that the defendant permit the animal to be kept on premises he controls. That requirement separates the parent with the lion from a landowner onto whose land a wild animal merely wanders. A landowner is not strictly liable for injuries inflicted by a wild animal that intrudes upon the land. Liability arises only if the landowner was negligent, for example by negligently failing to repel the animal or to protect guests.13 Landowners are likewise not responsible for harm done by wild animals on their property unless they reduce the animal to possession or control or introduce a non-indigenous animal into the area.14 Strict liability responds to a risk the defendant chose to bring in and could confine. A landowner whose land a wild animal happens to enter has made no such choice, so the claim falls back on the ordinary fault standard.
In Belhumeur v. Zilm, a landowner was not strictly liable to a neighbor attacked by wild bees living in a tree on the landowner's property. The landowner had neither reduced the bees to possession or control nor introduced them.15 The Texas Supreme Court applied the same doctrine to a plaintiff who contracted West Nile virus from a mosquito bite on a railroad's right of way. The railroad had done nothing to attract mosquitoes native to the area and could do nothing to keep them out.16 Other courts have reached the same result in Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of Puerto Rico, Inc., where a hotel invaded by a rabid mongoose that bit a sunbathing guest was not held strictly liable because there was no evidence of negligence. They did so again in Overstreet v. Gibson Product Co. of Del Rio, where a rattlesnake was on the premises but the defendant had not harbored it.17
The bees and the lion were both found on the defendant's land but lay on opposite sides of the line. The lion lived there because the parent allowed it, and the bees lived there because they arrived on their own. An exam stem that places a wild animal on the defendant's land invites a jump to strict liability, since the classification step has already labeled the animal wild. That label governs only if the defendant is a possessor or harborer, and a landowner of a wandering animal is neither.
When Possession Shifts
Possession can pass from one person to another, and strict liability passes with it. The basis of liability is possession and control, so when an owner surrenders possession to another, the other becomes liable. Except perhaps as to wild animals or animals known to be dangerous, the surrender relieves the owner.19
In Scorza v. Martinez, a macaque escaped from Worldwide Primates and was captured by Gomez, who sold it to Martinez, who sold it to Scorza, a photographer who specialized in photographing people with exotic animals. The monkey bit Scorza, who sued Worldwide Primates for negligence in letting the monkey escape and for strict liability for possessing a wild animal. The court held that strict liability is not available against the owner of an escaped wild animal once someone else has taken possession of it.20 Worldwide Primates lost control when the animal left its enclosure, and the monkey then passed through the hands of people who chose to hold it and could confine it. Whether Worldwide Primates was careless in letting the monkey escape is a separate question under the fault rules.
Sales and adoptions work the same way. A seller was no longer a possessor of a dog ten days after selling it and handing it over to the buyers in Blaha v. Stuard. A humane society that had placed a dog with an adopter more than a year before the bite did not own, possess, harbor, or control it in Miles v. Rich.21 Because some of these holdings interpret particular statutes, they illustrate the control inquiry and do not fix a common-law rule.
Temporary custody produces no comparable shift. One who has only temporary custody of an animal, such as a pet sitter, is not deemed a possessor.22 What separates the buyer or adopter from the sitter is permanence. A sale or adoption hands over the decision to keep the animal, and a weekend of feeding and walking does not.