Concept
Liability for Wild Animals
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Liability for Wild Animals
Once a court classifies the animal as wild and identifies the defendant as its possessor, § 507 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies the rule of liability in two subsections. Subsection (1) makes the possessor liable for harm the animal does to another, whether to his person, land, or chattels, even though the possessor used the utmost care to confine the animal or otherwise prevent the harm.1 Subsection (2) limits that liability to harm resulting from a dangerous propensity characteristic of wild animals of the particular class, or of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.2
A wild-animal problem therefore raises two questions, in this order. Is the possessor liable without negligence? The rule of liability despite utmost care answers that. Does the harm that occurred fall within the propensity limit? That question comes second, and a short list of qualifications then adjusts both answers for particular plaintiffs, defendants, and jurisdictions.
Liability Despite Utmost Care
Section 507(1) places liability on the possessor and removes the defense a careful keeper would raise first. "Possessor" points back to the control inquiry covered earlier in this chapter, so liability falls on whoever keeps or harbors the animal. The words "person, land, or chattels" carry the rule past bodily injury, so a wild animal that wrecks a neighbor's garden creates the same exposure as one that mauls a visitor. And the clause about utmost care disposes of the possessor's best argument, that he did everything a reasonable keeper could.
The plaintiff therefore need not prove that the particular animal was vicious. Courts decide whether an animal has dangerous tendencies by looking at the entire class of animals, not at the individual that caused the harm, and the owner of a wild animal, other than one that is by nature harmless, is strictly liable.3 The contrast with domestic animals shows what the class does. The possessor of a domestic animal answers without fault only when he knows or has reason to know that the animal has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class.4 For a wild animal, the plaintiff proves the classification, the possession, and the harm, and need not prove what the keeper knew about this animal, because the class carries the danger.
Precautions are no defense, and that is what separates the rule from negligence. A negligence case turns on whether the defendant's precautions were reasonable, so a sturdy enclosure and a careful routine can win it. Under § 507(1) the same enclosure and routine count for nothing once the animal does harm. The keeper's duty is not one of extreme care that a sufficiently careful keeper could satisfy; it is a duty to prevent the injury altogether or pay for it. The Third Restatement reaches the same result by making the owner or possessor of a wild animal strictly liable for the physical harm it causes.5
The reason for withholding the due-care defense lies in what the rule is meant to accomplish. Judge Posner put the rationale in a hypothetical: keeping a tiger in the backyard is so hazardous, relative to the value of keeping it, that the law wants the owner to take every due precaution against escape and also to consider seriously getting rid of the tiger, and it supplies the incentive by refusing to make due care a defense.6 Strict liability produces three effects. Those tempted to keep a tiger think seriously about liability, and some give up the idea. Those who cannot do without a tiger take every possible precaution to restrain it. And the tiger's victims are compensated for injuries resulting from an arguably frivolous or even antisocial choice by the owner.7
Change the animal, and the case changes. A dairy cow that escapes from a farm secured with the same double latches and injures a passerby leaves the passerby the harder case: the cow is a domestic animal, so liability depends on the keeper's knowledge of an abnormal danger or on proof that the keeper was negligent in failing to prevent the harm.8 A motorist who collides with a stray cow on a highway has no strict-liability claim either; in most instances the owner is liable for negligence and only for negligence.9 Courts divide even on that. Some impose a duty of reasonable care though the owner may graze animals on open range, others hold that open-range rules relieve the owner of any duty to keep livestock off the roads, and some find no duty to those on the highway at all.10
Exam stems that dwell on the keeper's latches, alarms, and daily inspections test whether you will confuse this rule with negligence. For a wild animal, the first question is answered once the animal is classified, the defendant identified as its possessor, and the harm shown to be to person, land, or chattels.
The Dangerous Propensity Limit
Subsection (2) narrows what subsection (1) grants. It opens two routes into strict liability: a propensity characteristic of wild animals of the particular class, or a propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.12 Harm that results from neither falls outside the rule. Subsection (1) disposes of the possessor's care as a defense; subsection (2) asks a different question, whether the harm that occurred is the kind of harm the rule exists to cover.13
The class route looks at the kind of animal, not the individual. Courts decide whether an animal has dangerous tendencies by looking at the entire class, so a particular animal's gentle record neither adds to nor subtracts from the inquiry.14 This matches the classification step earlier in this chapter, which also asks about a class and ignores the individual animal's temperament. The knowledge route covers a propensity the possessor knows or has reason to know about, even when the class does not display it.
The second feature of the limit is causal. Strict liability applies only when the harm results from the dangerous propensity that created strict liability in the first place, a limit usually called scope of risk.15 The limit follows from the rule's justification. Strict liability answers a specific hazard, the characteristic danger that makes animals of the class risky to keep. If it covered every harm in which the animal was merely a factual cause, it would become insurance against any mishap that happened to involve the animal, with no principled place to stop. The keeper instead answers for the kind of harm that made the animal hazardous, much as a negligence defendant answers only within the scope of the risk that made his conduct negligent.
An escaped rattlesnake shows the limit at work. A keeper holds rattlesnakes in secure cages, and a hurricane of unprecedented ferocity, one that no one could have predicted, destroys the cages. Two days later a three-year-old playing in the street of the same cul-de-sac trips over the snake and breaks an arm. The keeper is a possessor of a wild animal, the snake was a factual cause of the injury, and the keeper's care is no defense under subsection (1). Strict liability still fails, because the harm did not arise from the dangerous propensity characteristic of rattlesnakes.16 A rock or a log in the street would have broken the child's arm just as well. Had the snake bitten the child, its venom would have been the very propensity that makes the class dangerous, and the careful cages and the unforeseeable storm would have been no answer.
The horse cases teach the same lesson. In Scribner v. Kelley, a horse frightened by circus elephants injured the plaintiff, and the court refused strict liability because the injury came from the horse's fright and not from any dangerous nature of the elephants. The animals were wild, the defendant was their possessor, and the animals were a factual cause of the harm. What was missing was the trait. What makes an elephant dangerous in the legal sense is its capacity to injure people, and a horse's panic at a large shape is a quirk of horses.
Failing the scope limit ends only the strict-liability theory. Whether the keeper was careless, for example by leaving damaged cages unrepaired, is a separate question the plaintiff may still try to prove. Exam stems typically establish three facts in sequence: the animal is wild, the defendant keeps it, and the animal had something to do with the injury. The step that remains is to ask what trait of the animal produced the harm, and whether that trait is either characteristic of the class or one the keeper knew about.
Limits on Wild Animal Liability
The rule of liability despite utmost care is a general rule, and the Restatement qualifies it in several places. A court that surveyed the Restatement's exceptions and defenses to the wild-animal rule worked through them one at a time to see where strict liability gives way,18 and this section follows the same route. The qualifications fall into three groups. Some depend on who the plaintiff is and what the plaintiff did, some depend on who the defendant is, and one depends on which state's law governs. The plaintiff-centered group comes first.
Misconduct by a third person leaves the possessor's liability intact. Under § 510 the possessor of a wild animal is strictly liable for the resulting harm even though it would not have occurred but for the unexpectable innocent, negligent, or reckless conduct of a third person.19 The danger comes from the animal, and a keeper who chooses to hold it accepts that any failure of confinement, whatever its source, releases the risk onto others. If a stranger's carelessness excused the keeper, the rule would fail in many of the cases where confinement fails, since an open gate or an unlatched cage usually reflects someone's mistake. The delivery driver who left the gate ajar in the lion cub example gave the tenant no defense.
The rule stops at the boundary of the land for people who invade it. Under § 511, a possessor of land is not strictly liable to one who intentionally or negligently trespasses upon the land for harm done by a wild animal the possessor keeps there, even though the trespasser has no reason to know the animal is kept there.20 A trespasser has chosen to enter a place the keeper controls, and the keeper has no occasion to prepare for him. The absence of any warning therefore gives the trespasser no claim.
Persons lawfully on the land stand on the other side of the line. Section 513 makes the possessor who keeps a wild animal on land strictly liable to persons coming upon the land in the exercise of a privilege, whether the privilege comes from the possessor's consent to their entry or otherwise.21 The section covers invitees and licensees. A visitor admitted by the keeper relies on the keeper to have contained what the keeper chose to keep, and the keeper who admits visitors can warn them or keep the animal away. The night intruder and the invited guest may meet the same tiger under the same rule, and entry status is the fact that moves the answer.
A lawful entrant can still lose by meeting the risk with open eyes. Under § 515(2), the plaintiff's contributory negligence in knowingly and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk that a wild animal will do harm is a defense to strict liability, and an invitee or licensee who knows that the dangerous animal is permitted to run at large or has escaped may be barred if he chooses to act upon the possessor's consent and thus exposes himself to the risk.22 The defense is narrower than ordinary contributory negligence, because the exposure must be both knowing and unreasonable. The Restatement (Second) applies the same rule to strict liability for wild animals and for abnormally dangerous activities.23 Most states have since adopted comparative negligence rules, which reduce a plaintiff's damages by the plaintiff's percentage of negligence, and a later section takes up how these rules fit with strict liability.24 The Third Restatement, which does not recognize assumption of the risk as a separate defense, instead withholds strict liability when the plaintiff suffers physical harm by making contact with or coming into proximity to the defendant's animal for the purpose of securing some benefit from that contact or proximity.25
A second group of qualifications turns on the defendant. The incentive rationale assumes a keeper who chose to keep the animal, and some defendants keep animals because the law requires it. The Third Restatement therefore withholds strict liability when the defendant maintains ownership or possession of the animal pursuant to an obligation imposed by law.26 An agency that a statute requires to take custody of a seized animal fits that description, and a zoo defendant raises the question in a more familiar form; see Guzzi v. New York Zoological Society. A keeper who chooses to hold a caged hyena for paying customers has no such obligation, so the ordinary wild-animal rule applies. The exception removes only the strict-liability theory, and the plaintiff may still try to prove negligence.
Some jurisdictions refuse strict liability for wild animals altogether. In King v. Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n, the New Hampshire court declined to adopt a rule of absolute liability for injuries to persons and property caused by wild animals as a general principle. It relied on an unbroken line of New Hampshire decisions that, apart from cattle trespass to real estate, impose liability at common law for negligence only, and it recalled that its recent decision on an exhibitor's caged hyena had been decided on negligence and not on absolute liability.27 The facts that support strict liability under § 507 therefore raise only a negligence question in such a state. Apply § 507 unless the stem places the case in a jurisdiction that requires negligence.
Steps three and four are the ones most often run together. Entry status decides whether the plaintiff is within the rule at all; knowledge decides whether a protected plaintiff has lost that protection. Failing a screen ends the strict-liability theory but not necessarily the claim, since the plaintiff may still try to prove negligence.