Concept
Plaintiff Conduct Defenses
Strict liability for harm done by animals
Plaintiff Conduct Defenses
The strict-liability rules for animals speak almost entirely about the defendant. Section 507(1) makes the possessor of a wild animal liable for the harm it does even though the possessor used the utmost care to confine it,1 and § 509(1) does the same for a domestic animal once the possessor knows or has reason to know that it has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class.2 Each rule describes what the possessor did or knew, and each removes one defense: the possessor's own care. Neither says what follows when the injured person helped cause the harm by teasing the animal, climbing into its enclosure, or reaching through a fence to touch it.
The answer depends on the theory of the claim. Strict liability is imposed without proof of fault, and neither negligence nor intent need be shown,3 so the keeper has no carelessness against which to weigh the plaintiff's. Claims that do rest on fault raise no such puzzle. A claim against the keeper of an ordinary domestic animal rests on the keeper's negligence in failing to prevent the harm,4 and reckless disregard of safety is judged by the same rules as negligent misconduct.5 A motorist who collides with a cow on the highway has no trespass claim and, in most instances, recovers for negligence and only negligence.6 Those are ordinary negligence claims, so the usual defenses to negligence are the ones to consider.
The strict-liability categories need a different answer, and two have developed. The traditional rule, from the Second Restatement, treats a plaintiff's ordinary carelessness as irrelevant and a knowing, unreasonable encounter with the danger as a defense. The modern alternative, reflected in the Third Restatement, reduces the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's own fault. The traditional rule comes first.
The Traditional Rule: Knowing Exposure, Not Carelessness
The Second Restatement sorts a plaintiff's misconduct into two grades and gives them opposite effects. Under § 515(2), the plaintiff's contributory negligence in knowingly and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk that a wild animal will do harm to his person is a defense to the strict liability.7 The same line governs the keeper of a vicious domestic animal known to be such, and a plaintiff who is aware of an animal's dangerous propensity and taunts it may be barred under the doctrine of assumption of the risk.8 Ordinary carelessness, such as failing to notice the animal or to watch where one steps, does not defeat the claim, because something more than slight negligence or want of due care must be shown.9 What the plaintiff knew separates the two grades.
Ordinary carelessness fails as a defense because the keeper's liability does not depend on negligence. One court, in a state that had not accepted the negligence doctrine for such animals, put the point this way: excluding negligence as the basis of liability forbids including contributory negligence as a defense, and something more than slight negligence must be shown to relieve the keeper of a vicious domestic animal known to be such from his liability as an insurer.10 The court borrowed its reasoning from Muller v. McKesson: an owner held to a rigorous rule on account of the danger to human life and limb should not be relieved of it by slight negligence or want of ordinary care.11 A negligence defense compares two lapses in care, and strict liability rests on no lapse by the keeper, so the traditional rule finds nothing of the same kind to weigh against the plaintiff's slip.
A plaintiff who knowingly confronts the danger stands differently, because the plaintiff has then brought the calamity on himself. The owner who wants this defense must prove acts, done with notice of the animal's character, showing that the injured person "voluntarily brought the calamity upon himself."12 Read with § 515(2), that standard gives the keeper three things to prove: the plaintiff knew of the danger, met it voluntarily, and acted unreasonably in doing so.13 Two kinds of knowledge therefore appear in these cases, and they do different work. The keeper's knowledge of an abnormal propensity creates liability under § 509; the plaintiff's knowledge of the danger supplies the defense.14
Approaching an obvious danger can have the same effect as provoking the animal. In Ervin v. Woodruff, a circus patron who crawled under a rope and went up to a bear's cage was struck by the bear and could not recover.15 The danger of a caged bear was obvious, and the patron chose to approach it. Proof of knowledge is what makes the difference, as Keyser v. Phillips Petroleum Co. shows. A customer put a hand into an unlocked box of snakes kept for public display and was bitten by a rattlesnake, and the court let him try to prove that he did not know of the danger.16 Reaching into the box was no less rash than crawling under the rope, but the defense is only as strong as the proof that the plaintiff understood what he faced.
Bar-exam stems often describe a plaintiff who should have been more careful, and the instinct is to treat that detail as a defense. It is not. A plaintiff who should have known better was negligent, and negligence does nothing against a strict-liability claim under the traditional rule.17 Only facts showing that the plaintiff actually understood the danger and chose to meet it move the plaintiff into the barred category.
The third step decides most problems. The structure is all or nothing: carelessness leaves recovery untouched, and knowing, unreasonable exposure ends it. The next section describes the modern alternative, which replaces that cliff with a percentage reduction.
Comparative Fault: Shares, Not Bars
The Third Restatement replaces the two grades with a single rule. If the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions, the plaintiff's recovery in a strict-liability claim for physical harm is reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's comparative fault.19 The Third Restatement also does not recognize assumption of the risk as a separate defense,20 so a plaintiff's failure to take reasonable precautions is handled through the proportional reduction and not through an all-or-nothing bar.
The change answers a question the Second Restatement left hanging. If ordinary contributory negligence is a defense when the defendant is negligent, why is it not a defense when the defendant is not even negligent?21 The traditional answer was that slight carelessness should not relieve a keeper held to a rigorous rule.22 Most states have since replaced the complete bar with comparative negligence rules that reduce a plaintiff's damages by the plaintiff's percentage of negligence, and that change removes much of the harshness: a plaintiff's carelessness can count without erasing the claim.23 What remains open is whether negligence should be a defense in strict-liability cases as well as negligence cases.
Some courts have answered yes. In Andrade v. Shiers, a Louisiana appellate court compared the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct with the owners' strict liability and allocated 80 percent of the fault to the plaintiff.24 An allocation of that kind reduces the plaintiff's damages in proportion to the plaintiff's share. Kentucky's high court adopted comparative negligence for a dog-bite case in Maupin v. Tankersley (2018), although the state had earlier rejected contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability. An Idaho decision, Boswell v. Steele, is to the same effect, and Missouri's court in Coble v. Taylor read its comparative negligence statute to apply to both negligence and strict liability in a case arising from damage done by an escaped bull.25
The Third Restatement also keeps a narrower rule that works on the claim itself and leaves the amount of the award aside. Under § 24(a), strict liability does not apply if the plaintiff suffers physical harm from making contact with, or coming into proximity to, the defendant's animal for the purpose of securing some benefit from that contact or proximity.26 The rule looks to why the plaintiff was near the animal. A plaintiff who seeks contact or proximity to get something for himself falls outside strict liability altogether, while a careless plaintiff who wanted nothing from the animal stays within it and has the award reduced.
The shift has not settled whether negligence and strict liability can rationally be compared. The question is put directly: can conduct constituting negligence and conduct forming the basis for strict liability rationally be compared?27 A keeper under strict liability may have been free of fault altogether, so no lapse in care sits opposite the plaintiff's. The Third Restatement answers by rule, reducing the strict-liability recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's comparative fault,28 and decisions such as Andrade and Maupin reach the same result by allocating percentages.
A stem that mentions the plaintiff's own conduct therefore calls for the governing rule before any arithmetic. In a comparative-fault jurisdiction, ask first whether the plaintiff sought contact or proximity to obtain a benefit, which takes the claim outside strict liability; if not, assign shares and reduce the award. Where the traditional rule governs, only knowing and unreasonable exposure matters, and it bars the claim. If the stem names no jurisdiction, state which approach you are applying and note the alternative, because courts have not adopted comparative fault uniformly.29