Concept
Knowledge and Voluntariness
Defenses to strict liability claims
Knowledge and Voluntariness
The general rule of the Second Restatement is that a plaintiff's ordinary carelessness is no defense to strict liability for an animal or an abnormally dangerous activity.1 The exceptions take the defense back only when the plaintiff's conduct goes beyond carelessness. Sections 515(2) and 524(2) reach a plaintiff who acts “knowingly and unreasonably” in exposing himself to the risk, and § 484(2) reaches one who does so “voluntarily and unreasonably.”2 Each exception therefore turns on two things: what the plaintiff understood, and how freely the plaintiff chose to face it. A plaintiff who blunders into a danger he never perceived keeps his claim, and so does one driven into the danger by circumstances the defendant created.
Both ideas are the working parts of the assumption-of-risk doctrine, under which a right-holder who voluntarily chooses to face a known risk bears responsibility for her ensuing injuries.3 Knowledge and voluntariness make the choice the plaintiff's own: no one chooses a danger she does not understand, and no one chooses freely when circumstances leave no reasonable alternative. Several illustrations below come from negligence and products cases, borrowed by analogy and marked as such. The first subsection fixes what the plaintiff must know. The second asks whether the plaintiff chose freely and whether the choice was unreasonable.
Actual Knowledge of the Risk
Actual knowledge means what this plaintiff knew about the particular risk when the encounter occurred. A plaintiff who acts “knowingly and unreasonably” under §§ 515(2) and 524(2) must have understood the danger he met.4 What a careful person would have noticed is a different matter. A failure to notice is ordinary carelessness, and §§ 515(1) and 524(1) say that carelessness is no defense.5 The standard therefore has two features: it is subjective, because it asks about the plaintiff's own state of mind, and it is specific, because the knowledge must reach the risk that actually caused the harm.
The line falls there because the exception rests on an informed choice. A plaintiff who understands a danger and goes forward has weighed it against whatever the encounter offers, and that decision shifts responsibility for the injury to him.6 A plaintiff who never grasped the danger has decided nothing. Nor can “should have known” stand in for “knew.” If it could, the exception would collapse into ordinary contributory negligence, which § 484(1) excludes.7 The same line separates assumption of risk from contributory and comparative negligence in other settings: the first turns on what the plaintiff actually knew, the second on what the plaintiff should have known.8
Direct warnings produce the clearest cases. A plaintiff who sees a sign or flagman warning him not to proceed, and insists on proceeding, cannot recover, as in Worth v. Dunn and Wells v. Knight.9 A driver who passes the same sign without noticing it stands differently. He had no notice, and a failure to look is the carelessness the general rule disregards.
Knowing the general hazard of a place also differs from knowing the risk that injures the plaintiff. A negligence-exam illustration makes the point. A bystander stands near a blower that a crane is lifting and understands that it could fall on his head. As the blower rises, it sets off an explosion that injures him. He may have accepted the risk of a falling load, but the explosion was a risk he did not know of, and the standard asks what he actually and subjectively knew, not what he should have known.10 A visitor who reads a sign warning of blasting, understands that charges are being detonated on the site, and walks in anyway is differently placed, because the hazard that injures her is the one she was told about and understood.
Courts disagree about how much of the danger the plaintiff must have grasped, and the products cases, which apply the parallel defense, show the range. Some insist that the plaintiff knew the specific defect and was aware of the danger arising from it. Others require only that the plaintiff knew the specific risk, without understanding the mechanical, chemical, or biological process behind it.11 Whichever view prevails, knowing the facts that give rise to a danger is not enough; the plaintiff must also understand the danger itself.12 In Bowen v. Cochran, the plaintiff knew that a gas grill might explode if he failed to light and vent it properly, and that sufficed although he did not understand exactly where unlit gas might collect.13 Carried over to animals and blasting, the narrower view asks only whether the plaintiff understood the kind of harm the animal or the activity threatened.
The defendant must prove knowledge; the apparent obviousness of a danger does not presume it.14 In Keyser v. Phillips Petroleum Co., a customer at a service station reached into an unlocked box of snakes kept for public display and was bitten by a rattlesnake. The court reversed on demurrer, holding that he was entitled to try to prove that he did not know the dangers.15 A jury need not accept a plaintiff's account of his own mind. It may test his testimony against what people of similar age, experience, and intelligence ordinarily understand about such a hazard, and that evidence bears on what he in fact knew.16 Some dangers are so plain that courts in negligence cases hold everyone to understand them, such as ice on exterior stairs, and to that extent the test shades from subjective toward objective.17 On an exam, treat obviousness as evidence from which a factfinder may infer knowledge, and keep asking what the plaintiff really understood.
Free and Unreasonable Choice
Knowledge opens the exception but does not complete it. The defendant must also show that the plaintiff chose to meet the danger freely and that the choice was unreasonable.19 Section 484(2) words the first requirement as “voluntarily,” and §§ 515(2) and 524(2) speak of a plaintiff who acts “knowingly.”20 The second requirement is the one that makes the defense a form of contributory negligence, because it asks whether the plaintiff's reason for facing the danger justifies facing it. A plaintiff who knew of the danger therefore keeps the claim unless the defendant establishes both requirements.
A choice is not voluntary when the defendant's conduct leaves the plaintiff no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to avert harm to himself or another, or to exercise or protect a right of which the defendant has no right to deprive him.21 The formulation was written for negligence, so it speaks of the defendant's tortious conduct; in strict liability the defendant's creation of the abnormal risk plays that part, and the idea carries over by analogy. A plaintiff boxed in this way is not choosing the danger. He is choosing among options the defendant has left him. The reverse also holds. Compulsion that circumstances unconnected to the defendant created does not make the plaintiff's acceptance involuntary, because the situation is not charged against a defendant who owes the plaintiff no independent duty.22 A genuine choice has three parts: the plaintiff understands the nature of the risk, has available one or more alternatives that reasonably avoid it, and decides that his interests are best served by meeting the danger.23
Rescuers show the first requirement at its plainest. A person who enters a danger to save another faces a choice between meeting the risk and allowing the threatened harm, and would-be rescuers do not assume the risk of their own injury by attempting the rescue.24 Courts applying the parallel products defense have reached the same result, as in Dillard v. Pittway Corp., an Alabama decision.25 The rescuer also defeats the second requirement, because deciding to rescue a child from a fire is eminently reasonable even though it knowingly exposes the rescuer to a risk of injury.26
Employment poses a harder problem, and the courts divide. The decisions here arise in products and negligence cases and carry over to strict liability by analogy. A worker who knows that a machine is dangerous but keeps working has chosen to stay in one sense, yet the choice looks illusory in another: the defendant has no right to deprive the worker of the job, and the worker can avoid the risk only by quitting.27 Many courts have nonetheless held that an employee who uses negligently maintained equipment rather than be fired assumes the risk, but the trend and the better view let the employee show that this compulsion defeats the defense.28 In Rhoads v. Service Machine Co., the court upheld a jury's rejection of the defense for a punch-press operator who knew the machine was unguarded.29 The Ohio Supreme Court went further in Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson, rejecting the defense in the workplace on the reasoning that workers are often effectively trapped into dangerous activities.30
Other courts treat the workplace like any other setting. They reason that any compulsion comes from the employer, a third party, and not from the defendant, and that workers sometimes make entirely deliberate decisions to face risks they fully understand to be unreasonable.31 That reasoning tracks the rule that compulsion the defendant did not create is not charged to the defendant. Karim v. Tanabe illustrates it: a machine operator grabbed a control box next to a moving chain and sprocket.32 The defense survives for the worker whose exposure was deliberate and not driven by the demands of the job.
A plaintiff who is entitled to be where the danger lies is protected on the same footing. No one must surrender a valuable legal right, one the defendant has no right to take, in order to stay out of the zone of danger. A tenant does not assume the risk of a landlord's negligently maintained common stairway that he must use to reach his apartment, and a plaintiff need not forgo a public railroad crossing because the railroad has let it fall into disrepair.33 Where an apartment building has only one reasonable exit, the occupant likewise does not assume the risk of a negligently maintained hallway leading out, as in Thomas v. Panco.34 By the same reasoning, a homeowner who knows that a nearby quarry blasts regularly does not freely accept the risk by continuing to live in her house, because she can avoid the danger only by giving up something the quarry has no right to demand.
The contrast case is the plaintiff who had a reasonable way to avoid the danger and chose to meet it anyway.
The visitor knew the danger and had a safe room available, and using it would have cost him nothing but the pictures, so his encounter was a free choice. Photographs do not justify facing a tiger loose on the grounds, so the choice was also unreasonable. Both requirements are met, and § 515(2) bars his claim.35 A plaintiff who has a perfectly reasonable alternative and knowingly meets the danger anyway cannot claim that he was compelled.36 His wish for photographs is pressure of his own making, and the defendant's creation of the risk did not produce it.37
Unreasonableness is the separate screen, and it is objective. A court asks whether a prudent person caring for his own safety would have decided to meet the risk, in view of the safer alternatives available to the plaintiff.38 A plaintiff with a good reason, such as saving a child or staying in a home he is entitled to occupy, has made the choice a prudent person would make, so there is no fault to set against the defendant's creation of the risk. Only the plaintiff whose reason is hard to justify, like the photographer, loses the claim.
The two requirements overlap. A plaintiff's decision to forgo a reasonable alternative resembles an unreasonable choice, which a court may treat as objectively negligent.39 In the other direction, the rescuer shows that the facts that strip a plaintiff of a reasonable alternative often also supply a good reason for the encounter. An answer should still address both elements. Facts of compulsion usually defeat the first, and facts of good reason usually defeat the second.
Defeating the contributory-negligence exception does not end the inquiry for an animal. Section 515(3) separately makes the plaintiff's assumption of the risk of harm from the animal a defense.40 That defense comes in two forms. Express assumption of risk is oral or written consent to a dangerous activity or condition.41 Implied assumption requires proof that the plaintiff knew and understood the danger and freely and voluntarily elected to encounter it, and it fails when the plaintiff had no reasonable alternative to meeting the known danger.42 Knowledge and voluntariness therefore govern this defense as well.