Concept
Greenman and Section 402A
Claims against manufacturers and other defendants arising out of the manufacture and distribution of products, and defenses to such claims
Greenman and Section 402A
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts holds a seller liable for physical harm caused by any product sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property.1 Two conditions apply. The seller must be engaged in the business of selling such a product, and the product must be expected to reach the user or consumer, and must in fact reach the user or consumer, without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.2 Subsection (2) then relieves the plaintiff of two burdens that older theories imposed: the rule applies although the seller exercised all possible care in preparing and selling the product, and although the user never bought it from, or entered into any contractual relation with, the seller.3 Neither negligence nor privity forms part of the plaintiff's case. This unit traces how courts reached that rule, starting in the law of contract and ending in the law of tort, and how the American Law Institute (ALI), the body of lawyers, judges, and scholars that drafts the Restatements, wrote the result into black letter.
Because a sale is a contract, the law of products liability began as a question about the obligations a seller takes on when it sells. The contract itself may define those obligations, or the law may imply them as a matter of public policy.4 At one extreme stands caveat emptor, "let the buyer beware": a buyer without express contractual protection has no legal recourse against the seller.5 Warranty supplied the first major exception. Beginning in 1913, an exception developed for products intended for human consumption (food, beverages, drugs) and eventually for products intended for "intimate bodily use," such as cosmetics, so that the warranty ran all the way to the ultimate consumer, as in Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc.6
These cases borrowed warranty's vocabulary, yet, as one court later observed, the theory was "essentially an action in tort dispensing with the traditional requirement of privity in contract actions."7 Courts then carried the theory beyond food and the body. They imposed strict liability without privity, and without a showing of negligence beyond the defect, for cinder building blocks in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, for an automobile in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., and for a combination power tool in Greenman.8
Justice Traynor had argued that the warranty detour was unnecessary. In his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1944), he observed that when a jury is left to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, "the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability." It was, he wrote, "needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence," and if public policy demands that a manufacturer be responsible for the quality of its goods regardless of negligence, "there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly."9 The same change would spare courts the fictions they had created in the food cases to carry a manufacturer's warranty to remote consumers, because those fictions become unnecessary "if the warranty is severed from the contract of sale between the dealer and the consumer and based on the law of torts as a strict liability."10
The California Supreme Court took that step in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., in an opinion by Traynor himself. Greenman watched a retailer demonstrate a Shopsmith, a combination power tool that works as a saw, a drill, and a wood lathe, and he studied the manufacturer's brochure; his wife then bought one and gave it to him. While he was turning a piece of wood on the lathe, the wood flew out of the machine and struck him on the forehead. His experts testified that inadequate set screws let normal vibration move the tailstock away from the wood.11 About ten and a half months after the injury he notified the retailer and the manufacturer of breaches of warranty and sued. The jury returned a verdict of $65,000 against the manufacturer and found for the retailer, and the manufacturer appealed on the ground that the state's sales statute barred the warranty claim for want of timely notice.12
Traynor rejected the notice argument first. Between the immediate parties to a sale, notice is a sound commercial rule that protects a seller against stale claims; applied to an injured consumer suing a remote manufacturer, it becomes a trap for the unwary, because a consumer unfamiliar with business practice is unlikely to think of notifying a stranger until after getting legal advice.13 The court then went further and held that the plaintiff needed no warranty at all: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."14 The purpose of that liability is to put the costs of injuries from defective products on the manufacturers that market them instead of on injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves, a purpose that sales warranties serve only fitfully.15
The facts show why. Greenman could point to an express warranty only because he happened to read the brochure, yet implicit in the machine's presence on the market was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built, and it should not matter whether he chose the machine because of the brochure, its design and apparent excellence, or his own assumption.16 The principle behind the outcome does not rest on contractual obligations. It rests on the idea that delivering an article is wrong when the article lacks the qualities the manufacturer represented it as having, the consumer could not readily detect their absence, and the article is not safe for the purposes for which consumers ordinarily use it.17 To recover, Greenman needed to prove only that a defect he did not know about made the tool unsafe and injured him while he used it as intended.18
The opinion's reasoning has three strands, and each strand answers a different contract-law obstacle. Because the law imposes the liability instead of the parties assuming it by agreement, no contract between manufacturer and plaintiff is needed, which removes the privity barrier. Because a manufacturer may not define the scope of its own responsibility for harm its goods cause, a disclaimer cannot shrink the liability. And because warranty rules were developed for commercial transactions, they govern an injured consumer's claim only where they serve the purposes for which the liability is imposed, a test that a notice requirement fails when the plaintiff is a stranger to the sale.19
Henningsen had reached a similar practical result earlier, but inside warranty. The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held the manufacturer of a defective automobile strictly liable to a consumer for injuries caused by defects, even though the case was brought for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability; the court stripped that warranty of its two most powerful contract defenses, lack of privity and disclaimer and remedy limitations.20 Greenman did not need to strip those defenses away one at a time. By treating the claim as one in tort, it made sales-law rules apply to an injured consumer only where they serve the purposes of the liability.
The ALI's Reporter for the Second Restatement, Dean William Prosser, was an advocate of strict products liability.21 Prosser first drafted the section's commentary in the late 1950s and early 1960s for a narrow draft limited to defective food and related products (drugs, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco), several years before a general doctrine of strict liability in tort for all products existed.22 The drafts widened as the case law did. A 1961 draft covered only food, broadly defined; a 1962 revision reached products for "intimate bodily use"; and a 1964 revision covered "any product," in line with intervening developments including Greenman. The Restatement Second of Torts then appeared in final form in 1965.23 When the ALI approved § 402A in 1964 and published it in 1965,24 it relied only on Greenman and a New York warranty case, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.25 Strict liability was not new to the Second Restatement. For abnormally dangerous activities it replaced the First Restatement's elements with factors, so that strict liability becomes more likely when, among other considerations, the activity creates a high risk.26 Section 402A is a separate rule for sellers of products.
Comment m to § 402A spells out the consequences. The liability does not rest on negligence, it is not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code's warranty provisions, the consumer need not have relied on the seller's reputation or skill, the consumer need not give the seller notice, and no disclaimer or other agreement affects it. A court may still call the rule a warranty if it wishes, but the comment cautions that the warranty is then "a very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods" and "is not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up to surround such sales."27 The label thus risks importing contract rules that the liability was built to escape.
A Restatement is the ALI's statement of the law, and the ALI has no authority to pass statutes or decide cases. Approving § 402A therefore did not create a cause of action for strict liability; courts did that by adopting it. Yet it is doubtful that any provision in any Restatement has had more impact on courts.28 Four states adopted § 402A principles in 1965, four more in 1966, and four more in 1967. By the mid-1970s more than forty had embraced strict manufacturer liability in tort for defective products, and Wyoming, the last, followed in 1986, for a total of forty-five.29 The reasons courts gave anticipate the next section. Manufacturers encourage purchases through extensive advertising, which some courts saw as a quid pro quo: manufacturers should stand behind their products when they cause injuries. Other courts reasoned that manufacturers can redistribute that liability, through insurance, to all users of the product.30 The Iowa Supreme Court, in Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., said its purpose in adopting § 402A was to relieve injured plaintiffs of the burden of proving the elements of warranty or negligence theories, so that the costs of injuries from defective products fall on the manufacturers that put such products on the market.31
Five states (Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia) formally rejected strict products liability in tort. Even so, the courts of Delaware, Massachusetts, and Virginia and the legislatures of Michigan and North Carolina have adopted much of the products liability jurisprudence built on § 402A.32 Delaware's reason is instructive. In Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc., its Supreme Court declined to adopt § 402A because of the legislature's then-recent enactment of the UCC, reasoning that "the General Assembly did not intend to permit the adoption of a competing theory of liability in cases involving the sales of goods and, thus, preempted the field." Most courts were little concerned with that argument, and it is now of modest historical interest.33 They regarded the UCC as contract or sales law that leaves untouched their traditional role as makers of common law tort rules. The practical differences between strict tort liability and warranty are now slight, though they persist in certain cases.34
Even among the states that embraced the doctrine by judicial "adoption" of § 402A, products liability law has moved far beyond the original formulation, and many states have altered their first approaches over time.35 Some never simply adopted § 402A. Oklahoma developed its own "Manufacturers' Products Liability," Alabama its "Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine," and Louisiana, New York, California, Florida, and Pennsylvania each followed its own course.36 Other states have made a statute the exclusive tort remedy for injury from defective products, as Connecticut and Kansas have. There the plaintiff sues under the statute and cannot assert negligence, breach of implied warranty, or other common law product theories.37
The ALI later issued the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability on the same subject, and courts have divided over it. South Carolina accepted the Third Restatement over the Second in Branham v. Ford Motor Co. (2010), while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to prefer the Second in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. (2014).38 A products problem therefore begins with identifying which source controls in the jurisdiction: a judicial adoption of § 402A, a state's own formulation, the Third Restatement, or an exclusive statute. The sections that follow take up the elements of a § 402A claim and note where the Third Restatement and state statutes depart from it.