Concept
Rationales for Strict Liability
Claims against manufacturers and other defendants arising out of the manufacture and distribution of products, and defenses to such claims
Rationales for Strict Liability
Section 402A makes a seller liable for physical harm caused by a product sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, provided the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product.1 The rule then discards the two facts that usually make liability feel fair. It applies although the seller “has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,” and although the injured user “has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.”2 A defendant that took every precaution, sued by a stranger with whom it never bargained, seems to pay for something it did not do wrong.
The objection is easier to weigh against the alternatives. A product sale is a contractual transaction, and the seller’s obligations may be fixed by the contract alone or implied by law as a matter of public policy. At one extreme lies caveat emptor: a buyer with no express contractual protection has no recourse against the seller.3 Strict liability follows the second route, in which the law implies the obligation, and the rationales below explain why courts were willing to imply it.
Justice Traynor made the first argument, one of candor, in his concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. Where a jury may decide whether the inference of negligence has been dispelled regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule “approaches the rule of strict liability,” and it is “needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence.” If public policy demands that a manufacturer be responsible for the quality of its goods regardless of negligence, there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly.4
The substantive reasons fall into three groups, and each looks at a different feature of the seller’s position: what the seller can do with the cost of injuries, what it can do to prevent them, and what the buyer can do to protect himself or herself. They overlap, and courts often draw on more than one. Learning which rationale supports a rule helps you reason about facts that no decision has addressed.
Loss Spreading
Section 402A(2)(a) shows that fault cannot be the reason for liability, since the rule applies although the seller exercised all possible care.5 Loss spreading supplies a reason that needs no fault. In the same concurrence, Justice Traynor wrote that the cost of an injury “may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.” Those who suffer injury from defective products, he added, “are unprepared to meet its consequences.”6
Three links connect that insight to the seller. First, holding manufacturers liable for losses caused by defects forces them to “internalize” those accident costs, just as they already internalize the costs of materials, labor, and capital.7 Second, the manufacturer, acting as a kind of third-party insurer, spreads the cost by passing it on to those who benefited from the enterprise: the owners, through lower profits, and consumers, through higher prices.8 Courts have put the point in terms of insurance, reasoning that the manufacturer can redistribute its liability to all users of the product.9 Third, competition often keeps manufacturers from raising prices much, so some of the cost lands on the enterprises that make and sell defective products, and, as the commentary puts it, not unfairly.10
The rationale fits only a seller that deals in the product as a business, which explains why § 402A(1)(a) limits liability to a seller “engaged in the business of selling such a product.”11 A fitness company that neither regularly makes nor sells exercise equipment cannot spread the cost of an injury from a machine, and because it does not design the machine, it cannot improve the design in any direct way.12 A computer maker and a computer retailer stand in the opposite position. When a computer’s defective mouse damaged a buyer’s house, both were liable under § 402A although neither had done anything negligent. Each was in the business of selling computers, the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous, and the buyer did not need to have purchased from the manufacturer.13
Loss spreading cannot carry the doctrine alone. An insurance rationale would justify liability for any product-caused injury, defective or not, yet courts reject absolute liability, so the rationale is at most “part of a makeweight argument.”14 The court in Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc. drew the same lesson. Enterprise liability, it objected, would make a manufacturer strictly liable, without fault, to a person struck by one of its trucks carrying goods to market, and “if adopted would compel us to apply the principle of strict liability in all future cases where the loss could be distributed.”15 Other strict liability doctrines look to the activity itself and not only to who can absorb the loss. Under the Second Restatement’s factors approach to abnormally dangerous activities, for example, strict liability is more likely if the defendant’s activity creates a high risk.16
Spreading is a positive attribute of tort liability, but it cannot independently justify strict liability. Compensation benefits the injured plaintiff, yet all consumers pay for it, and that cost is justified only when liability promotes product safety. That limit explains why strict products liability reaches only defective products.17 Safety is the subject of the next rationale.
Deterrence and Safety
Loss spreading asks who can best absorb an injury’s cost; deterrence asks who is best placed to prevent it. The question sits uneasily with § 402A(2)(a), since a seller that took every precaution seems to have nothing left to correct.21 The unease fades once you look at what a seller decides before any accident occurs: how much to inspect, how much to test, how hard to look for hazards. Many courts and commentators are persuaded that raising the standard of liability from negligence to strict liability improves product safety, though skeptics are not in short supply.22 Courts have reasoned that the risk of liability encourages manufacturers to make their products safer and to discover and disclose risks the consumer might not recognize.23
Justice Traynor’s Escola concurrence gave the argument its classic form. Even if there is no negligence, he wrote, “public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market.” The manufacturer is the right party because it “can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.”24
Markets will not do the job unaided. Take a safety device whose necessity consumers do not understand. A manufacturer would not volunteer that information, because telling consumers would likely raise their estimate of the product’s cost and reduce demand. Price competition then predictably forces manufacturers to forgo such safety investments, which leaves unreasonably dangerous products on the market.25 Forcing producers to internalize the accident costs of their defects is thought to push them back toward safety.26
A separate argument concerns proof. Negligence liability has evidentiary difficulties of its own, and those difficulties can justify strict liability as the only practical way to enforce the negligence duty to exercise reasonable care. Liability justified in this way rests on the negligence principle that risky actors must exercise reasonable care with respect to foreseeable risks of physical harm.27 Holmes described the solution: “the safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall be taken.” Rather than have the court make the safety decision on the evidence in the case at hand, strict liability “throws” that decision on the manufacturer.28
Workplace injuries followed the same pattern. Management engineers came to understand that such injuries were largely attributable to system design and not to individual malfeasance, yet tort law did not adequately encourage employers to adopt costly system changes, because an injured workman could rarely, if ever, prove that the employer’s system was unreasonably dangerous.29 A plaintiff attacking a manufacturer’s testing and quality control meets the same kind of obstacle.
The incentive does not stop at the manufacturer, but how far it extends is contested. A retailer may play a substantial part in insuring that a product is safe or may be in a position to press the manufacturer to that end, and Restatement (Third) § 20 places all sellers in the chain of distribution, retailers and wholesalers included, in the same category as manufacturers. The Uniform Product Liability Act would instead hold retailers and wholesalers liable only for their own negligence unless the manufacturer is out of business or unreachable, and more than half of state legislatures have enacted similar limits on the liability of non-manufacturer sellers.30 Used products divide the courts as well. Most decline to impose strict liability on sellers of used products, but not all do (compare Peterson with the contrary decisions).31 Where a seller does not design the product, as with the fitness company above, it cannot improve the design in any direct way, and the safety rationale has little to work on.32
The rationale has also lost ground in some settings. Today most commentators and courts reject the traditional rationales for defects in warnings and design.33 A related limit appears in the treatment of warnings. A user’s failure to heed reasonable warnings ordinarily should bar recovery only if the danger of ignoring them is evident, the disregard is a substantial cause of the harm, and there is no simple means or apparent reason for the manufacturer to design the danger out of the product.34
Consumer Reliance
Section 402A reaches a seller engaged in the business of selling the product, and it applies although the injured user never bought from or contracted with that seller.38 Between that seller and that user lies distance, and the third rationale starts there. The first two asked what the seller can do about the cost of injuries and about their prevention. This one asks what the buyer can do to protect against a hidden defect, and the answer is very little.
The classic formulation of the idea locates the duty outside contract: the rule “does not rest upon contractual obligations.”39 It rests instead on the principle that delivering an article is wrong when the article lacks the qualities the manufacturer represented it as having and so is not safe for its ordinary use.40 The missing qualities are ones “which could not be readily detected by the consumer,” so the buyer’s inability to find the defect is part of the wrong.41
Several features of the market explain that inability. Because no personal relationship links buyer and distant manufacturer, the buyer cannot rely on such a relationship to assure quality and must rely instead on information the manufacturer provides.42 Information has a price: acquiring and processing it takes the consumer’s time and effort, and these information costs explain why consumers are often poorly informed about product risk.43 Those who suffer injury from defective products are, in Traynor’s words, “unprepared to meet its consequences.”44
The seller’s side of the account explains why the law places the loss on the seller. Manufacturers encourage purchase of their products by extensive advertising, and courts have viewed such aggressive efforts to stimulate sales as involving a quid pro quo: the manufacturer stands behind its products when they cause injuries.45 The bargain runs between the seller and the public its promotion addresses, so the absence of a contract with the injured person, which § 402A(2)(b) expressly disregards, does not weaken it.46
Reliance explains the rule but is not an element of it. Nothing in the liability rule of § 402A asks what the plaintiff saw or believed; it asks about the product’s condition and the harm it caused.47 Compare § 402B, which makes a seller in the business of selling chattels liable for physical harm to a consumer caused by “justifiable reliance upon” a misrepresentation of material fact that the seller made to the public by advertising, labels, or otherwise, even though the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently or negligently.48 The § 402B claim turns on the statement and so requires reliance; the § 402A claim turns on the product. A plaintiff who never saw an advertisement and bought on price alone can still recover under § 402A by proving the defect and the injury.