Concept
Fault and Privity
Claims against manufacturers and other defendants arising out of the manufacture and distribution of products, and defenses to such claims
Fault and Privity
Subsection (2) of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts strips two requirements out of the strict liability claim. The rule of subsection (1) applies although the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product, and although the user or consumer has not bought the product from, or entered into any contractual relation with, the seller.1 The American Law Institute cannot pass statutes or decide cases, so § 402A created no cause of action by its own force, yet it is doubtful that any Restatement provision has had more impact on the courts.2 Courts applying the section quote subsection (2) in full, as the opinion in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc. does.3
Each clause removes the condition that controlled an older theory. Negligence asked whether the seller was careless, but under § 402A a seller is liable even if it was not negligent and exercised all due care.4 Warranty asked whether the plaintiff stood in the right contractual position, because implied warranty claims lie in contract.5 Clause (a) therefore leaves the condition of the product as the subject of proof, and clause (b) leaves the plaintiff’s contractual relationship to the seller out of the claim.
The rest of subsection (1) stays. The plaintiff must still prove that the seller sold the product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous, that the seller was engaged in the business of selling such a product, that the product was expected to reach, and did reach, the user without substantial change, and that it caused physical harm.6 The three parts below take clause (a), then clause (b), then the contract-law defenses (disclaimers, reliance, and notice) that the tort claim also refuses.
Care Is Irrelevant
Clause (a) answers the first question a seller’s lawyer asks: does evidence of careful design review, inspection, and testing defeat the claim? It does not. The rule applies although the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product, so proof of due care is no defense.7 A court applying Indiana law in Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co. marked the contrast with a negligence claim over a latent defect: under strict liability, “the care or lack of care of the manufacturer in causing a defect is irrelevant,” while the plaintiff-user’s conduct “is very much in question.”8
Two reasons explain why the loss lands on a manufacturer that did nothing careless. As between maker and victim, the manufacturer is better placed to find cost-effective ways of reducing manufacturing defects, ordinarily by reducing how often they occur. It is also better placed to spread the cost of the defects that are not cost-effective to eliminate.9
The manufacturing flaw shows the clause at full strength. Even the most careful supplier answers under § 402A for a stone in a can of peas, an air bubble in a tire, or a crossed wire in the electrical system of a punch press.10 The Third Restatement writes the rule into its definition: a product contains a manufacturing defect when it “departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product.”11 The maker’s own design is the yardstick, so the plaintiff proves the departure and the injury it caused, and how the departure came about does not matter. One formulation of the older principle points the same way. It places the wrong in delivering an article that lacks the qualities the manufacturer represented, whose absence the consumer could not readily detect, and that is not safe for ordinary use.12
Because strict liability dispenses with proof of negligence without displacing it, a plaintiff may plead both. In Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., the Iowa Supreme Court recalled its earlier decision in Hawkeye-Security: a plaintiff seeking to recover in strict liability need not prove the manufacturer’s negligence, and strict liability does not preclude liability on the alternative ground of negligence when negligence can be proved.13 Often the negligence count adds little, yet it can matter, because a statute of repose, a limitations period, or another defense may defeat one claim and leave the other alive.14 The practical gap is narrow in any event. Once a plaintiff proves a manufacturing defect, an inference of negligence takes very little more proof, and courts often presume that the failure to detect or remove the defect was careless, which led Dean Prosser to suppose that “there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery where negligence does not.”15
Food cases show where negligence can pick up the slack. Most courts, and the Restatement, treat an ingredient as a defect whenever a reasonable consumer would not expect it, foreign or natural. A few allow strict liability only for a foreign ingredient such as glass and send claims over a natural one such as a chicken bone to negligence.16
Dropping care from the analysis does not make the seller an insurer. A manufacturer or other seller is not an insurer of its product’s safety and need not supply only the very safest product.17 Courts have repeatedly refused absolute liability, meaning strict liability not limited by the requirement of defect: “No one wants absolute liability where all the article has to do is to cause injury.”18 The defect requirement keeps the claim tied to the product. In the older formulation, liability follows from delivering an article that lacks the represented qualities and is unsafe for ordinary use, which describes a condition of the article and not simply an injury.19
The no-fault rule is purest for manufacturing defects. A manufacturing defect is a departure from the maker’s own design, so a court can find it without asking what the maker should have done. A design or warning claim has no such departure to point to, and the Third Restatement defines those defects largely in terms of negligence principles, despite the strict-sounding word defective, while it defines manufacturing defects in truly strict terms.20 The consumer expectations test is arguably strict, because it considers the product sold and not the defendant’s conduct, but even that test can be conceptualized as negligence: the unreasonable choice to market a product that falls short of consumers’ safety expectations. Outside manufacturing defects, a strong case can be made that § 402A has become a negligence claim with a good many specialized rules.21 The next unit asks how much of the strict label survives.
Subsection (2)(a) speaks only to the seller’s conduct; the plaintiff’s remains in the case. One judge predicted that every defendant would assert that the plaintiff did something, anything, that conceivably could be deemed contributorily negligent, so that affirmative defenses of that kind would become boilerplate.22 When the question is what the plaintiff actually knew about a product hazard, the standard is subjective, but a jury need not accept the plaintiff’s account of his state of mind. It may test that account against what people with similar characteristics, such as age, experience, and intelligence, ordinarily understand about a similar hazard.23 The defenses units take up both ideas.
The two injuries are alike, and the fact that decides the outcome is whether the dangerous feature departs from the product line or belongs to it. That fact determines whether the maker’s care is irrelevant, as in the first scene, or whether the plaintiff must show that the danger was avoidable at reasonable cost, as in the second. A fact pattern that recites audits, certifications, and a low defect rate is testing whether you can tell which claim that evidence answers. Against negligence it is the heart of the defense; against a manufacturing defect it answers nothing; against a design claim it addresses the wrong target. Subsection (2)(a) speaks to what the defendant did, and subsection (2)(b) speaks to who the plaintiff is.
Privity Not Required
Clause (b) removes the contract as a condition of the claim. The rule applies although the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.26 A court therefore stops asking who sold the product to whom and asks what subsection (1) asks: was the product sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous, and did it cause physical harm?27
The clause follows from treating the claim as tort and not contract. One formulation of the principle says that the rule does not rest upon contractual obligations; it rests on the principle that delivering an article is wrong when the article lacks the qualities the manufacturer represented, the consumer could not readily detect that lack, and the article is not safe for ordinary use.28 A claim built on that principle has no reason to ask who contracted with whom. Henningsen adds the commercial reason that privity limits no longer fit. Dealers and ordinary buyers do not buy goods, whether foodstuffs or automobiles, exclusively for their own use, and makers know it and advertise and market on that assumption, as the family car and baby foods show. Privity limits took hold when marketing was simple, when maker and buyer often met face to face on an equal bargaining plane, and when products were uncomplicated and open to inspection by a competent buyer.29
Comment l spells out who may sue. The consumer need not have bought the product at all: “He may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a mere donee from the purchaser.”30 The same logic reaches up the chain of distribution. Manufacturers and intermediate sellers such as wholesalers are liable to consumers injured by the products they sell, along with the retailer who deals directly with the consumer; privity is not a requirement.31 A seller that never completed a sale to the plaintiff fares no better. The argument that the sale never transpired probably fails, as in Rivera-Emerling v. Fortunoffs of Westbury Corp., a New York appellate decision, and the Third Restatement’s definition of seller or distributor includes one who provides a car for a test drive.32
The harder question concerns a person who never used the product, and the source of the limit matters. Clause (b) cannot be what excludes a bystander, who has no contract with the seller just as the donee has none. Any limit comes from subsection (1), which describes the recoverable harm as physical harm to “the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property.”33 The Caveat to the section reserves the question: the Institute expresses no opinion on whether the rules apply to harm to persons other than users or consumers.34 The reservation tracks the section’s main rationale, an implied representation of safety that a distributor makes to consumers; a product transaction makes no such representation to a bystander who never used the product.35
Courts did not stay with that reservation. In one of the first cases to reach the issue, the drive shaft in a new automobile buckled, the driver lost control, and the car crashed into an oncoming automobile driven by the plaintiff. The California Supreme Court observed that “[a]n automobile with a defectively connected drive shaft constitutes a substantial hazard on the highway not only to the driver and passenger of the car but also to pedestrians and other drivers.” Because the defect foreseeably threatened consumers and bystanders alike, the court, like others that followed, found no essential difference between them and extended strict liability to bystanders.36 The bystander’s case is in one respect stronger, since she was hurt by a process in no sense of her making; she never used the product. Today the manufacturer’s or seller’s liability to the bystander is universally allowed, and current case law has gone beyond the Second Restatement by letting injured bystanders sue the original manufacturer.37
The absence of privity does not dissolve the harm requirement. All courts allow strict products recovery for personal injury and death, and the widely prevailing view allows it for property damage alone. A great majority of courts, following East River Steamship, apply the economic loss rule and deny recovery for pure economic loss.38
Neither plaintiff has a contract with the maker, so privity cannot explain the different results. The pedestrian suffered physical harm, the kind subsection (1) compensates, and the restaurant owner suffered commercial loss, which a great majority of courts leave outside strict products liability. A fact pattern that stresses how little the plaintiff dealt with the seller offers a distraction, because clause (b) makes that fact irrelevant.
Warranty keeps asking the question that tort stopped asking. Its privity issue splits into vertical privity, which concerns the sellers a warranty binds, and horizontal privity, which concerns the injured parties who obtain its benefits.39 In Henningsen, the court held that the implied warranty of merchantability chargeable to an automobile manufacturer or dealer extends to the purchaser, members of his family, and other persons occupying or using the car with his consent, because their use is within what the parties anticipate and they must be considered within the distributive chain.40 In Dean Prosser’s view, Henningsen marked the end of the privity defense in implied warranty, the “fall of the citadel of privity,” and many courts have since abandoned vertical privity for personal injury, some for property damage, and a few even for economic loss.41 Because implied warranty claims lie in contract, however, many courts still require vertical privity for economic loss claims,42 and some require it even for personal injuries, given the availability of tort claims.43
That is why plaintiffs often prefer tort. Unless a procedural matter, such as a relatively short limitations period for tort claims, stands in the way, the elements of a § 402A action make it unnecessary to show privity or the making of a warranty. Proof that the good was sold in a defective condition that made it unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect caused the injury, suffices.44
Disclaimers and Notice
Contract law handed sellers several defenses that the strict tort claim does not accept: a disclaimer in the sale papers, an express warranty inconsistent with the claim, a demand that the buyer have relied on the seller, and an objection that the buyer gave no prompt notice. Greeno rejects the whole set in a sentence. Recovery in strict liability “is not conditioned on privity of contract, or reliance or notice to the seller of a defect, and the seller cannot disclaim or by contract alter a duty which the law would impose upon him.” Nor can inconsistent express warranties dilute the seller’s duty to refrain from injecting into the stream of commerce goods in a “defective condition.”48
Comment m to § 402A makes the same point about the paper that travels with the product, and Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hospital reproduces it. The consumer is not required to give the seller notice of his injury within a reasonable time, as the Uniform Act provides, and his cause of action “does not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer’s hands.” The comment adds that “‘warranty’ must be given a new and different meaning if it is used in connection with this Section.”49
Both rules follow from the classification of the claim. The duty is one the law imposes and not one the parties assumed, so a contract term has nothing to operate on; the formulation quoted earlier says as much when it denies that the rule rests on contractual obligations.50 A structural reason points the same way. A bystander stands outside the chain of distribution and cannot waive or limit her tort rights by agreement in exchange for a better-priced product. If disclaimers bound purchasers, bystanders would still keep their cause of action, and two parallel regimes would have to develop, one for purchasers bound by a disclaimer and another for everyone else.51
The Third Restatement states the result in § 18. Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by sellers or other distributors, waivers by purchasers, and similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, “do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.” The section restates the prevailing rule that contractual disclaimers and limits have no effect on claims by plaintiffs injured in person by defective products.52 Its text marks two edges. It is limited to injury to persons, who have limited bargaining power, so corporate plaintiffs who sue for property damage may still be bound by their contracts. And it speaks of new products. Bauer, decided under Colorado law on facts virtually identical to those of Westlye, shows the rental setting: the court enforced the waiver and dismissed the suit against the rental agency.53
Notice is the second contract rule that drops out. After purchase and acceptance, a buyer injured by a breach of warranty must promptly notify the seller. That requirement has long been part of sales law, appeared in the Uniform Sales Act, and today comes from UCC § 2-607(3).54 In a case over a dangerously defective bicycle, the parents’ first notice to the retailer was the complaint they filed two years after the accident. The court held that delay unreasonable as a matter of law, and it barred the one claim against the retailer that surely would have succeeded on the merits.55 A strict tort plaintiff faces no such condition, because the consumer is not required to give the seller notice of the injury.56
Warranty has no comparable immunity from contract terms. In Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, a steering defect in a 14-month-old car sent it off a bridge and severely injured the plaintiff. His 12-month/12,000-mile express warranty had expired, the sale contract disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability in accordance with § 2-316(2), and a one-year limitations period barred his tort claims. The court held that the properly drawn disclaimer barred his warranty claim, so the law gave no redress to a consumer severely injured by a dangerous defect in a car that was nearly new. A disclaimer drafted to meet § 2-316 operates under the Code to prevent recovery for breach of warranty even if the consumer is killed or seriously injured by a dangerously defective product.57 The case also shows that tort is no automatic escape, because the tort claim there died of timing and not of the disclaimer.
These contract defenses apply with full force where strict tort liability does not. A buyer with a purely commercial loss has no strict tort claim in most courts, so its recovery runs through warranty, where a Code-compliant disclaimer and the notice rule can defeat it.58
Both buyers signed the same kind of paper, and the kind of harm and the theory that fits it decided the outcomes. A fact pattern that stresses a signed disclaimer or a late letter to the seller is aimed at warranty doctrine. Against a strict tort claim for bodily injury from a new product, those facts add nothing.