Concept
Who May Sue
Public nuisance and who may sue
Who May Sue
Section 821C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts decides who may sue for a public nuisance by asking what the plaintiff wants. A private plaintiff who seeks damages in an individual action must have suffered harm of a kind different from the harm other members of the public suffered while exercising the right that was interfered with.1 A plaintiff who seeks to enjoin or abate the nuisance has three routes: the damages right just described, authority as a public official or agency to represent the state or a political subdivision in the matter, or standing to sue as a representative of the general public, either as a citizen in a citizen's action or as a member of a class in a class action.2
| Remedy sought | Who may sue under § 821C |
|---|---|
| Damages | A private plaintiff whose harm differs in kind from the harm the public suffered |
| Injunction or abatement | (a) a plaintiff who holds the damages right; (b) a public official or agency authorized to represent the state or a political subdivision; or (c) a representative of the general public, in a citizen's action or a class action |
The earlier sections of this chapter asked whether a defendant's conduct is a public nuisance. This section assumes that it is and asks who may bring the case.
Public nuisance leads two lives. It can bring criminal liability, and public authorities may sue to have it abated or enjoined. A private individual may also seek a tort remedy, but only by showing a violation of a criminal statute, an interference with a public right, and a special injury that differs in kind, not just in degree, from the injury to the public; the chief remedies are damages and an injunction.3 A court surveying the tort observes that the distinction between public and private rights of action has been of particular interest to commentators, and it explains that distinction through § 821C.4
Tradition left the challenge to public officials and gave a private landowner a remedy only for special damage different from the damage the public as a whole suffered. One treatise reads the Restatement as letting any affected member of the public sue and sees the law trending that way.5 The text of § 821C is more particular, as the table shows: special harm remains the condition for damages and for one of the three injunction routes, and the other two routes sort plaintiffs by official or representative capacity.
These rules matter because a public nuisance will often continue unless some private person complains or sues.6 The sections below take the plaintiffs in turn: public officials first, then the private plaintiff who wants damages, then the plaintiffs who seek an injunction.
Public Officials
Section 821C(2)(b) lets a plaintiff maintain a proceeding to enjoin or abate a public nuisance if the plaintiff has “authority as a public official or public agency to represent the state or a political subdivision in the matter.”7 The clause is one of three alternatives, and it asks nothing about injury to the plaintiff.8 A political subdivision is a unit of local government such as a city or county, so the clause reaches an attorney general suing for the state as readily as a city attorney or county health agency suing for a locality. The official sues as the community's representative, and the different-harm requirement, which confines private plaintiffs, has no work to do.
The clause keeps the traditional pattern of enforcement. A public nuisance is an offense against the public and closely resembles a misdemeanor, so usually only a public official can sue to abate it.9 Traditionally, public officials alone could challenge a public nuisance, and a private landowner obtained a remedy only by showing special damage different from the damage the public as a whole suffered.10 The common law drew the line the same way: a public nuisance was one that damaged a large number of persons, and only the attorney general or a local prosecutor could sue to abate it unless a private individual showed special damage.11
Officials have used the power against places that threaten a community's peace and safety. In City of Miami v. Keshbro, Inc., a motel was closed for prostitution and drug use; in Bosarge v. State ex rel. Price, a club was closed for selling liquor to minors; and in State ex rel. Bowers v. Elida Road Video & Books, Inc., an adult bookstore was closed because of sexual activity. Some cities have also turned to public nuisance to abate the harms that follow when owners leave buildings or land vacant for long periods.12
The first question on a nuisance fact pattern is who is suing, because the same facts can produce different answers for different plaintiffs.
The resident loses on this route alone. A private plaintiff has two other ways in, special harm under § 821C(2)(a) and representative standing under § 821C(2)(c), and the sections below take them up.13
Authority to sue settles who may bring the claim and nothing more. What a public entity may obtain is a separate question. One court, quoting the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re Lead Paint Litigation, states that “a public entity which proceeds against the one in control of the nuisance may only seek to abate, at the expense of the one in control of the nuisance.”14 A defendant may also raise defenses that no standing rule disposes of. In Stone v. York Haven Power Co., for example, a statutory immunity tied to recreational areas reached a lake but not the dam that created it.15
Private Damages and Special Harm
A private plaintiff who wants money must have suffered “harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference.”17 That sentence bundles two questions. Is the plaintiff's harm different in kind, and not merely greater in degree?18 And did the plaintiff suffer it while exercising the public right that was interfered with? Later sections work through each question in practice. This one explains the rule and the reasons for it.
The second question defeated PECO's claim. A state agency had required PECO, as owner of a polluted site, to remove the sources of the pollution. The court held that PECO was specially harmed only in the exercise of its private property rights over the site, that it suffered no particular damage in the exercise of a right common to the general public, and that it therefore lacked standing to sue for public nuisance. The public right that was interfered with was the right to “pure water.” The court conceded that pecuniary harm, such as cleanup expense, may be harm of a different kind, but PECO had not suffered that harm while exercising the public right.19
The rule grows out of the way public nuisance began. The original remedies were criminal prosecutions and abatement actions brought by public officials. No private cause of action was recognized until 1536, and then only for a plaintiff who suffered harm over and above that suffered by other members of the community.20 Justice Fitzherbert's opinion in an early English case about a nuisance on the king's highway states the rule in classic form. A nuisance in the highway, he said, is punishable in the Leet and not by an action, unless one man has suffered greater hurt or inconvenience than the generality. A rider and horse thrown into a ditch dug across the highway at night have an action because they suffered more than anyone else, and the plaintiff before him likewise suffered more than others, because the blockage cut him off from his close.21 An opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, drawing on Blackstone, describes the same requirement: private plaintiffs suing over a public right had to allege “some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the [community].”22
Two justifications are usually offered for the rule: it protects the defendant from a multiplicity of actions, and it leaves redress of wrongs to the general public to public officials.23 The Spokeo opinion states the first concern in Blackstone's terms. An action over a public nuisance vindicates a public right, and without a limit “every subject in the kingdom” could “harass the offender with separate actions.”24 A third justification is administrative. When the harms are special, private actions may be maintained “as in all ordinary tort situations, for now the administrative burdens are far smaller relative to the size of the stakes.”25 The converse follows: when a harm is spread across the public, each private suit carries the same burdens with a much smaller stake behind it, and enforcement fits better in the hands of an official.
Critics have pressed hard on each justification. Could class actions, or a limit confining private plaintiffs to abatement, meet the multiplicity concern without barring damages? And the assertion that harm shared by the public at large is minor, petty, and trivial for each individual is, one source says, dubious.26 Environmentalists in particular have attacked the special-injury restriction, and the law has been liberalized by statute, judicial decision, and the Restatement.27 The standing limit has also made nuisance law inadequate to control widespread pollution.28 Prosser traced the confusion in this area to the moment courts began to allow a tort action for a purely public nuisance on proof of “particular damage.”29
Exam fact patterns usually place one plaintiff among many who share a complaint. Dynamiting throws a large boulder onto a public highway. Travelers who use the road, even those who use it much more often than most, have no action for the inconvenience of the obstruction. A motorist who collides with the boulder has sustained harm of a different kind and may sue for his personal injuries.30 The plaintiff who succeeds suffered a bodily injury that others did not, and the plaintiff who fails lost only a convenience that others lost too.
Degree does not substitute for kind. In a pollution case, shop owners near a fouled coast lost customers. The court held that, unlike the commercial fishermen and clam diggers, they asserted no interference with their direct exercise of a public right. They complained only of loss of customers resulting indirectly from pollution of waters and beaches in which they had no property interest. Their damage might be greater in degree in some instances, but it was derivative of the public's and common to all businesses and residents of the area.31 A later section takes up what else counts as a different kind of harm.
A plaintiff who fails under § 821C(1) may still have another claim. A public nuisance may also be a private one when it interferes with private land.32 Because a private nuisance arises from interference with the use and enjoyment of land, only owners of interests in land can sue for it.33 In Spur Industries, the feedlot was both a public and a private nuisance as to the citizens of Sun City, who could therefore have maintained an action to abate it.34 Noise from a saloon, or noise and unsightliness from wind turbines coupled with falling property values, illustrates the kind of land-use interference on which such claims rest.35 A later section returns to private nuisance as an alternative.
Injunctions and Representative Suits
Damages have one door, harm different in kind from the public's, but injunctions and abatement have three, and a private plaintiff can use two of them. Under § 821C(2)(a), a person who holds the damages right may also seek an injunction or abatement.37 Under § 821C(2)(c), a person with standing to sue as a representative of the general public, either as a citizen in a citizen's action or as a member of a class in a class action, may do so as well.38 The third door, authority as a public official, was covered above.
The first door carries the damages test with it. A plaintiff who enters through (2)(a) must show harm different in kind from the public's, and courts require that showing for injunctions as they do for damages. PECO's court stated that “the same requirements apply to individual plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief,” and it held PECO without standing because its loss came from owning the site and not from exercising the public right to pure water.39 The developer in Spur Industries, Del Webb, passed through this door. Its loss of sales was a special injury, and that injury gave it standing to sue to enjoin the feedlot.40
Special harm is a narrow door, and the other private door exists because of that. Suits for damages may be brought only by persons suffering special injury, and the law governing who may seek abatement has been liberalized by statute, judicial decision, and the Restatement.41 Section 821C(2)(c) names a capacity that a plaintiff must acquire from somewhere. A citizen's action usually rests on a statute: statutes may authorize individuals to bring claims to abate public nuisances.42 A class action rests on the rules of class litigation. Critics of the special-injury rule have noted that the multiplicity worry behind it is the concern a class action is built to handle.43 The clause speaks only to injunctions and abatement, so an individual who wants damages must still satisfy subsection (1).44
Standing opens only the courtroom door. Once the standards for entitlement are met, the court also considers whether the threatened harm is immediate, whether the injury is irreparable, whether an adequate remedy at law exists, and whether the balance of hardships favors equitable intervention. It weighs how far damages would redress the injury and whether public-interest factors bear on the case.45
An exam fact pattern usually asks which of the three doors a private plaintiff can use, and a plaintiff who has only the harm the public shares fails at every one.
A citizen's action changes that result without changing the harm. In Kellner v. Capelini, a New York court applied an ordinance giving citizens the right to sue to shut down a public nuisance and granted an injunction ordering a landlord to evict tenants who used the property for illegal crack cocaine sales.46 If the boater's town had a comparable ordinance, she could sue in the capacity it gives her. Del Webb needed no ordinance in Spur Industries, because its lost sales supplied the damages right under (2)(a). The three plaintiffs suffer different harms and hold different routes, yet each is measured against the same list of alternatives.