Concept
Special Harm in Practice
Public nuisance and who may sue
Special Harm in Practice
A private plaintiff who sues for damages over a public nuisance must satisfy one sentence of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C(1): the plaintiff must have “suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference.”1 The sentence contains two tests, and a plaintiff can fail either one. The harm must differ in kind from the public’s, and the plaintiff must have suffered it while exercising the public right the defendant interfered with.
Private damages claims for public nuisance often turn on these two tests. A plaintiff can prove a right common to the public and an unreasonable interference with it and still recover nothing, because the plaintiff’s own injury is the one the whole community shares. That injury is left to public enforcement: general damages from a public nuisance are controlled exclusively by direct public action, usually administrative regulation or criminal prosecution.2
The same hurdle faces modern suits over harms that fall on whole communities. Claims aimed at sea level rise, for example, must find plaintiffs who can allege a harm distinct from the general harm to the community, and owners of property that rising seas might submerge are one category.3 The requirement has also caused confusion from the start. Prosser located the seeds of that confusion in the moment courts began to hold that a tort action would lie even for a purely public nuisance if the plaintiff had suffered “particular damage.”4
The three subsections below take the questions in order: whether the harm differs in kind or only in degree, whether the plaintiff suffered it while exercising the public right, and whether a plaintiff who fails can fall back on private nuisance because the interference reached the plaintiff’s land.
Different in Kind, Not Degree
The operative word in § 821C(1) is kind. The test sets what the plaintiff lost beside what the rest of the public lost and asks whether the two losses belong to the same category; the size of the plaintiff’s loss does not answer that question. A private citizen has no civil remedy for harm of the same kind the general public suffered, even if she was harmed to a greater degree than others, and criminal prosecution is the exclusive remedy. A plaintiff who has sustained damage particular to her, different in kind from the public’s, may maintain a tort action for it.5 (See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm § 8.)
The line rests on administration more than on justice. General damages from a public nuisance are of low intensity and diffused across an extended population, so private actions for admitted grievances would simply cost too much to maintain.6 A test built on degree would reopen what the rule closes. Almost any plaintiff can say the nuisance hurt more than it hurt someone else, because people depend on roads, waters, and air to different extents; the commuter who crosses a blocked road twice a day could make that claim against the traveler who crosses it once a month. A test of kind supplies a boundary. A bodily injury, or the loss of access to one’s own land, marks a plaintiff with a stake the community does not share.
The obstructed highway shows the difference most clearly. When dynamiting throws a large boulder onto a public highway, motorists who use the road, even those who use it far more often than most, have no action for the inconvenience of the obstruction. A motorist who collides with the boulder has sustained damage of a different kind and may sue for his personal injuries.7 Both were on the same road, and the obstruction wronged both. What separates them is the character of the loss: an inconvenience every traveler shares, against a bodily injury no other traveler suffered. No amount of added inconvenience turns the first into the second.
Loss of access to one’s own land is a second harm of a different kind. The street-obstruction cases are ordinarily brought by abutting owners, whose land adjoins the road and whose access to the public way is cut off or substantially burdened. An owner whose access is merely inconvenienced, because a remote street is blocked, has only the travel inconvenience everyone else shares, and the claim fails.8 The owner who has lost ingress and egress and the owner who must drive a few blocks out of the way stand on opposite sides of the line.
Bodily injury is not enough by itself, because the comparison is always with what the public suffered. If pollution causes respiratory problems for everyone in town, one resident’s respiratory harm does not differ in kind from her neighbors’, and she cannot recover on a public nuisance theory. If the pollution makes only a few people ill, those few have harm of a different kind and may sue.9
Money losses are not excluded, but they tend to be widely shared. In 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., businesses in a heavily populated part of Manhattan sued over the economic loss they suffered while the surrounding area was closed after an industrial accident. Every business and resident in that area faced a similar loss, so the plaintiffs showed no special injury beyond the community’s.10 The court did not doubt the hardship. Its reasoning was that extending tort law’s scope indefinitely does not best serve society, and that meaningful limits on liability are crucial to the functioning of the economy and the courts.11
Direct users of a public resource stand differently. When a defendant contaminates public waters, commercial fishers who earn their living from the waters recover for harm suffered in exercising the public right. Pleasure users, who suffer in common with the public, and owners of nearby businesses whose revenue falls when pollution reduces tourism, do not.12 Union Oil Co. v. Oppen is an example on the fishers’ side: commercial fishermen sued over lost catch after pollution of the Santa Barbara Channel.13
Fact patterns invite the inference that a plaintiff who was hurt more, more often, or at greater expense was hurt differently. Each of those is the public’s harm in a heavier dose, and none satisfies the rule.
Harm in Exercising the Public Right
Section 821C(1) also asks in what capacity the plaintiff was hurt. The harm must be of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public “exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference.”15 Every public nuisance interferes with an identifiable public right, such as the right to fish in coastal waters or to have pure water in a river, and the plaintiff’s special loss must have come from taking part in that right. A plaintiff whose loss reached it by another route has not met the rule, however large or unusual the loss.
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc. shows a plaintiff with a real and unusual loss who still fails. PECO owned the Chester site, and the site was a source of pollution of the Delaware River. A state regulator, DER, required PECO, as owner, to remove the sources of the pollution, and PECO sued Hercules. The Third Circuit held that PECO lacked standing to sue for public nuisance, because PECO “has been specially harmed only in the exercise of its private property rights over the Chester site” and “has suffered no ‘particular damage’ in the exercise of a right common to the general public.”16
The direction of the harm explains the result. The condition of the Chester site was the cause of the river’s pollution, not the result of it. Had PECO, as a riparian landowner, suffered damage to its land or its operations as a result of the pollution of the Delaware, it would possibly have had a claim.17 A footnote shows how independent the two tests are: even if PECO’s harm were both different in kind and greater in degree than the public’s, it would still fail, because PECO did not suffer it in the exercise of a right common to the public.18
The decision does not leave the polluter answerable to no one. The court vacated the injunction against Hercules and reversed the judgment on PECO’s claims, but it noted that Hercules could be liable to neighboring landowners in private nuisance or to users of the Delaware’s waters in public nuisance, and that DER or the federal Environmental Protection Agency might proceed directly against it.19 The holding concerns the capacity in which PECO was hurt.
Burgess v. M/V Tamano applies both sides of the line in one decision. After a spill polluted coastal waters and beaches, commercial fishermen, clam diggers, and Old Orchard Beach businessmen sued. The court denied the motions to dismiss the fishermen’s and clam diggers’ claims and granted those directed at the businessmen, except for owners of shore property the spill physically injured.20 The fishermen and clam diggers asserted interference with their direct exercise of a public right. The businessmen did not. They complained only of lost customers, a loss that came indirectly from pollution of waters and beaches in which they had no property interest. Their injury, the court said, derived from the public’s and was common to all businesses and residents of the area, even though some of them may have lost more than others.21
Each side of the line has its own logic. A public nuisance wrongs the community by interfering with a shared resource, and the people hurt in a concrete way are those using the resource when the interference occurred. A commercial fisher’s income depends on the very thing the spill fouled, so the fisher’s stake is distinct from the community’s general interest in clean water. A beach-town motel’s loss comes instead from what the public does after the nuisance: it stays away. Every motel, restaurant, and supplier in the area can point to the same falling sales, and a harm shared that widely and at that low intensity is the kind the law leaves to public enforcement.22
The line between direct and indirect users is harder to draw at the margins. In Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., a federal district court allowed suits by commercial fishermen and by marina, boat, tackle, and bait shop owners when kepone was spilled into the James River and the Chesapeake Bay, but rejected the suits of seafood wholesalers, retailers, and distributors who bought and marketed the catch, because their harm was too indirect.23 The question is whether the business itself made commercial use of the public resource or merely depends on those who did. The beach-town businesses in Burgess fall on the dependent side.
Exercising the right is therefore necessary for special harm and never sufficient, because the harm must also differ in kind from what other users suffered.
PECO and the Old Orchard Beach businessmen end at the second step. The recreational angler passes the second and fails the third, and the commercial fisher passes both.
Private Nuisance as an Alternative
Special harm is not the only route to damages. A public nuisance may also be a private one when it interferes with private land,25 and a plaintiff whose use and enjoyment of land is interfered with may sue under either theory.26 The private claim has its own requirement. As one court states it, “A nuisance may be both public and private, but to proceed on a private nuisance theory the plaintiff must prove an injury specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The injury, however, need not be different in kind from that suffered by the general public.”27 The special-harm screen drops out, and an interest in land takes its place.
The screen is unnecessary because the land requirement already does its work. A private nuisance plaintiff must tie the injury to the plaintiff’s own land, so a hundred neighbors whose yards are fouled by one odor hold a hundred claims, each attached to a different parcel. A homeowner whose yard is unusable because of odors and flies from a neighboring feedlot that is also a public nuisance needs only that interference with the enjoyment of her home; she need not show she was hurt in some way her neighbors were not. Noise and similar intrusions are common sources of such claims, as in cases involving noise from a saloon (Biglane v. Under the Hill Corp.) or from wind turbines, with their unsightliness and effect on property values (Burch v. Nedpower Mount Storm, LLC).28
The land requirement also marks the limit of the route. Because a private nuisance arises from interference with the use and enjoyment of land, only owners of interests in land can sue. Because a public nuisance arises from interference with public rights, any member of the affected public can sue, but usually only on a showing of special injury, meaning injury of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public.29 Burgess illustrates the split. The one group of businessmen who survived dismissal were those who owned shore property that the spill physically injured, while their neighbors who lost only customers did not.30
Special harm also supports a different remedy. In Spur Industries, Del Webb showed a special injury in the loss of sales, and that gave it standing to sue to enjoin the nuisance.31 Standing is only the first step. Once the standards for entitlement are met, the court also considers whether the threatened harm is immediate, whether the injury is irreparable, whether an adequate remedy at law exists, and whether the balance of hardships favors equitable intervention, along with the extent to which damages would redress the injury and any public interest factors.32
A plaintiff harmed in the use of land may sue for damages under either theory, and it is usually preferable to rely on public nuisance, because certain defenses, namely prescriptive rights, laches, and the statute of limitations, are not available against it.33 The two claims fit together most easily when the interference reaches the land itself or personal injury to those who occupy it. Such a plaintiff will ordinarily qualify for private nuisance and can also show harm different in kind from the public’s.34
A plaintiff whose loss reached a livelihood and not a parcel is shut out of the private route.
The fisher and the shore owner suffered from the same spill and differ only in the interest each lost, which is why the land requirement sorts them. The fisher must proceed in public nuisance and satisfy § 821C(1), which a commercial fisher exercising the public right to fish may be able to do. A large number of affected nonowners adds no land interest to any of them.
The two claims ask different things of the plaintiff, so the order of analysis matters on an exam. When the plaintiff holds an interest in land that the interference reaches, begin with private nuisance, the easier claim on standing: the plaintiff needs only an injury referable to the land, with no special-harm showing, and the number of other people affected is irrelevant. If the plaintiff has no interest in land, or the harm does not run through land, turn to public nuisance and test the plaintiff against § 821C(1). Where the facts raise a prescriptive-right, laches, or limitations defense, note that a public nuisance theory may avoid it. Two errors recur: demanding special harm from a landowner who sues in private nuisance, and letting a nonowner sue in private nuisance because many people were affected. Both errors blur the earlier distinction between public and private nuisance, which turns on the interest invaded and not on headcount.