Concept
Private Nuisance Defined
Private nuisance: elements, protected interest, and significant harm
Elements of Private Nuisance
Private Nuisance Defined
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a private nuisance as a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.1 Read the definition for what it omits. It never asks whether the defendant meant harm, took care, or ran a dangerous operation. It describes only the plaintiff's side of the dispute, an invasion of an interest in land. Private nuisance therefore names a kind of harm, impaired use and enjoyment, and the defendant's conduct is characterized separately.
Defining the tort by its harm fits the way the harm arises. Smoke may cross a boundary because an owner knows of it and does nothing, because a worker maintained a furnace carelessly, or because the process is inherently dangerous. The neighbor loses the same use of the yard in every case. The nuisance label attaches to all three, and later sections sort out responsibility under the grounds for liability: intentional invasion, unreasonable invasion, negligent or reckless conduct, and abnormally dangerous activity. That sorting follows the general pattern of tort law, in which fault remains the most common basis for liability and strict liability appears only in certain kinds of cases.2
The definition also leaves room for ordinary friction between neighbors. Adjoining uses of land will often be somewhat incompatible, and once the incompatibility is more than modest, a court must make a judgment call, which courts express by saying that they "balance the equities." Whether an interference is substantial depends on all the circumstances, including the nature of the neighborhood in which the plaintiff and defendant use their properties.3 Those limits come later in the chapter. The definition itself identifies only the interest at stake.
The invasion that impairs that interest is usually intangible. Noise, smoke, vibration, dust, fumes, and odors produced on the defendant's land can all qualify when they impair the use and enjoyment of neighboring land, and whether a given activity amounts to a nuisance is generally a question of fact.4 Courts have applied the definition to interferences that nobody can see. In Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative, the court held that nuisance law applies to stray voltage claims, because excessive levels of stray voltage may invade a person's private use and enjoyment of land. It did not hold that stray voltage is a nuisance in every circumstance, and it left the question whether the voltage unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff's use of the land to the trier of fact.5
The word nontrespassory separates nuisance from trespass, the neighboring tort that the next section develops in full. An interference that simply enters the plaintiff's land belongs to trespass. The definition reaches invasions that impair use and enjoyment without that kind of entry.
The fumes and noise in that scene satisfy the definition even though nothing crossed the boundary in a way that could be photographed. The reason is the breadth of the phrase "interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." The commentary to Restatement § 821D reads it to cover three things: the actual present use of land for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and other purposes; the present use value of the land, unimpaired by changes in its physical condition; and the pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment that a person normally derives from occupying the land.6 The comment adds that destroying trees on vacant land invades the owner's interest as much as destroying growing crops does. It also says that freedom from discomfort and annoyance while using land is often as important to a person as freedom from physical interruption or from detrimental change in the land itself.7 A rule limited to physical damage would leave smell, noise, and light unprotected, even though those are the interferences that most often make a home hard to live in.
The decided cases reach across that range. In Dobbs v. Wiggins, the trial court heard enough evidence to conclude that 69 or more dogs kenneled on the defendant's property caused an unreasonable noise invasion that interfered with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their nearby land. The appellate court affirmed the nuisance finding, because whether an activity is a nuisance is generally a question of fact and a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment on facts fairly tried.8 The invasion there was sound, and nothing physical had to remain on the plaintiffs' land.
At the far end of the range, the interest includes plain comfort and convenience. A private nuisance may consist of a disturbance of the occupant's comfort by unpleasant odors, smoke, dust or gas, loud noises, excessive light, high temperatures, or even repeated telephone calls, and the remedy lies with the individual whose rights have been disturbed.9 A neighbor's obstruction of the plaintiff's access to sunlight, for instance, appears to fall within the Restatement's broad concept of a private nuisance, even though the defendant there argued that he could develop his property in compliance with statutes, ordinances, and private covenants without regard to the effect on the plaintiff.10 An exam fact pattern that involves only smell, noise, or light, with nothing crossing the boundary and no physical damage, therefore satisfies this first step. Whether the harm is significant and whether the defendant is answerable remain separate questions.
Public nuisance is a different wrong. It is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public, and this chapter does not cover it.11 The rest of the chapter takes the elements of private nuisance in turn: who holds a land interest that can support a claim, what kind of harm counts, and what makes the defendant answerable for it.