Concept
Applying the Elements
Private nuisance: elements, protected interest, and significant harm
Applying the Elements
A private nuisance claim is assembled from four provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 821D defines the wrong as a nontrespassory invasion of an interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.1 Section 821E confines recovery to those with property rights in the land affected.2 Section 821F requires significant harm, measured by a normal person in the community or by property in normal condition put to a normal use.3 Section 822 makes the defendant liable only on a recognized ground, such as an invasion that is intentional and unreasonable.4
The earlier sections took these one at a time. An exam problem presents them together, and a well-built problem turns on a single one. The skill is to run the elements in a fixed order and to name the one on which the facts turn.
The order follows what each question needs. Steps one through three concern the plaintiff's land and what the invasion did to it, so a claim that fails there fails before anyone examines the defendant's business. Steps four and five bring in the defendant, and only step five counts the defendant's usefulness. A valuable, lawful operation does not shrink the harm the plaintiff suffers, which is why a problem can clear step three and still be lost at step five. A kennel dispute in which every step is met shows the full sequence.
Each household occupies its home, so step one is met. Constant barking is a nontrespassory invasion of use and enjoyment, because nothing physical crosses the lot line, so step two is met. A normal person in the community would find round-the-clock barking seriously annoying or intolerable, and lost sleep and lost use of porches and yards are harm to the enjoyment of land, so step three is met. That five separate households report the same loss also shows the harm does not rest on one person's sensitivity. The owner's remark that the barking never wakes him is no defense at step four, because an invasion is intentional when the defendant knows it is resulting or is substantially certain to result, and ill will is not required. Steady barking that carries to homes fifty yards away is an invasion the owner can hardly have missed. At step five the weighing favors the neighbors. Their harm is serious disruption of sleep and social life, the owner's use is a hobby, and a sixteen-dog kennel suits the locality poorly, so the invasion is both intentional and unreasonable, the first listed ground of liability.5 A court would likely enjoin the owner and limit him to a reasonable number of dogs, perhaps two.6
Dobbs v. Wiggins applied step three to a real kennel. The trial court asked what the barking would do to a normal person of ordinary habits and sensibilities, found that the plaintiffs were not “unduly sensitive” and not “delicate, fastidious, [or] pursuing a dainty way of life,” and held the noise substantial. The reviewing court held that the plaintiffs had offered enough evidence of substantial noise and that the finding of no undue sensitivity was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.7 The standard cuts both ways, because a plaintiff who is unusually sensitive loses at the same step.
The sinus sufferer occupies his home and the fumes invade it, so steps one and two are met. The claim fails at step three. The harm is real to him, but the measure is what a normal person in the community would suffer, and nothing in anyone else's reaction suggests that normal residents are seriously troubled. Dobbs shows the kind of plaintiff the standard requires, one who is not unduly sensitive. A court never reaches the factory's utility or its knowledge.
The instinct on a noise problem is to call any audible interference a nuisance, and the basketball problem punishes that instinct.
Steps one and two are met, since the neighbor occupies the house and sound is an invasion of use and enjoyment, so the problem turns on step three and, if that step is conceded, on step five. Significance is doubtful. A spouse's nervousness and interrupted naps are personal reactions, and short daytime games under the municipal limit probably would not seriously disturb a normal person.8
Suppose the neighbor wins step three. The weighing still runs against her. Basketball is good exercise and builds family cohesion. The homeowner stiffened the pole and padded the backboard, and the noise was no greater than expected for reasonable use. The games happened in daylight, when such noise normally occurs, and the neighbor can remove much of what remains by closing a window. The engineer's finding favors the homeowner but does not end the inquiry, because the municipal limit is one circumstance in the weighing, and the reasonable use doctrine judges the defendant's conduct on all of them.9 What separates the kennel from the backyard court is not the kind of invasion but how much a normal person loses and how cheaply the loss can be avoided: the kennel's neighbors lost their sleep, while the neighbor of the court can shut a window. A good answer says that significance is doubtful and that unreasonableness defeats the claim even on the neighbor's best assumption.
A different question arises when the harm is undeniable and the defendant is valuable to the community.
The households occupy their land, the odors, dust, and noise are nontrespassory invasions, and harm on this scale would trouble any normal person, so the first three steps are quickly met. The fight is at step five. A court applying the Restatement weighs the gravity of the harm against the social utility of the feedlot, and a feedlot that is central to the local economy puts real weight on its side of the scale. The kennel lost on the same weighing because the owner's side held a hobby. Here it holds an enterprise whose value is shared across the region.
Even so, the plaintiffs are not necessarily left empty-handed. The Restatement envisions cases in which an injunction is inappropriate but damages are in order, either because the harm is severe and greater than the plaintiffs should bear without compensation, or because the harm is serious and paying damages would not make the activity infeasible. Otherwise the feedlot could externalize its cost onto its neighbors. A few jurisdictions look only at the interference with use and enjoyment and would order the feedlot to cease.10 The lesson for the problem is that clear proof of significant harm does not resolve the dispute, which stays where it started, at unreasonableness.
The fuel-tank problem moves the dispute back to the harm element, because nothing has yet entered the plaintiffs' land.
The result depends on the jurisdiction, and an answer should say so. Some jurisdictions refuse to let a nuisance claim rest solely on fear of a future injury, and in those the park and its tenants lose.11 Others require no invasion and treat a condition on the defendant's land that unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment as enough, so above-ground fuel tanks can support a claim.12 Even there, tenants who merely fear for their lives and property may fail to show a substantial interference. Many of these courts treat the interference as substantial to the normal person in the community only when the fear is reflected in a decline in fair market value.13 If the park proves that decline, it stands on firmer ground at step three than its tenants do.
Step one adds a wrinkle. The tenants occupy the premises and are possessors. A park that has leased out its buildings holds a reversion, a nonpossessory estate, and may sue only to the extent the interference detrimentally affects that estate, which a proven drop in market value would show.14 If a court does find the tanks a nuisance, an injunction would reach only the above-ground tanks, leaving the airport and underground storage in place.15
The interest that steps two and three protect is not a closed list of harms. In Prah v. Maretti, a landowner claimed that a neighbor's home under construction would obstruct the sunlight reaching his property. The Restatement defines the interest in the private use and enjoyment of land broadly, to include any disturbance of the enjoyment of property.16 The court held that the plaintiff had stated a claim and that the defendant's conduct had to be judged by the reasonable use doctrine, but it did not decide whether he would win. It sent the case back because the record said too little about the extent of the harm, the suitability of solar heat in that neighborhood, the availability of remedies, and the cost to the defendant of avoiding the harm.17 A novel harm such as lost sunlight therefore clears step two by fitting within the broad interest in use and enjoyment, and the plaintiff must still prove the remaining elements of an actionable nuisance.
Placed side by side, the problems show where a claim usually lives or dies. Only the kennel satisfies every step. The sinus claim ends at step three, and the basketball claim is doubtful at step three and lost at step five. The feedlot claim is contested at step five, and the tank claim splits by jurisdiction over what counts as significant harm. The sunlight claim shows that step two reaches beyond noise, odor, and fumes.