Concept
Intentional Invasion
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
Unreasonable Intentional Invasions
Intentional Invasion
Section 826 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states when an intentional invasion of another’s use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable: when the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct, or when the harm is serious and the financial burden of compensating for it and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of the conduct infeasible.1 Those tests apply to intentional invasions, so a court has to classify the invasion before it weighs anything.
“Intentional” is a term of art, and it does not require ill will. Section 825 defines it by what the defendant sought or knew.2 Few operators run a plant in order to injure a neighbor, so a plaintiff usually proves intent by showing knowledge: the operator learns that smoke, odor, or noise is crossing the boundary and keeps going.
Two questions therefore come before any weighing. The first concerns conduct, meaning what the defendant must have done, or failed to do, before nuisance liability can attach. The second concerns mental state, meaning what the defendant must have sought or known for the resulting invasion to count as intentional. The unit takes them in that order.
Act or Omission
Section 824 identifies the conduct that can make an actor liable for either a public or a private nuisance: an act, or a failure to act under circumstances in which the actor is under a duty to take positive action to prevent or abate the interference with the public interest or the invasion of the private interest.3 Each form has its own reach, and the reach decides which defendants a neighbor can pursue.
The act is the ordinary case.4 The refinery in Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co. is the familiar picture: the plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show that its operation sent nauseating gases and odors across their land and the surrounding lands for some hours on two or three days of each week.5 The person who runs an activity decides whether it runs and how, so the invasion traces to that person’s choices, and attributing it to the actor takes no further step.
The omission branch is narrower. A failure to act counts as conduct only when the actor is under a duty to take positive action to prevent or abate the interference.6 That requirement keeps the branch from reaching every owner of land on which something unwelcome is happening. Inaction without a duty supplies no conduct, and inaction under a duty does.
The conduct requirement also marks a limit where nature, not the owner, produces the condition. In general, an owner is not liable in nuisance for natural conditions on her land unless she somehow contributed to their existence, a rule that cases such as Belhumeur v. Zilm apply.7 In Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v. Corts, land in its natural condition blocked a view and caused erosion, and the court found no liability for nuisance.8 Nothing the owner did produced such a condition, so there is no act to point to, and the owner’s failure to clear it does not, without more, make the owner liable. The protection lasts only while the owner stays out of the condition’s making.
Purpose or Knowledge
Section 825 offers two routes to an intentional invasion. An invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is intentional if the actor acts for the purpose of causing it, or knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from the conduct.10 Both routes look to what the defendant sought or knew, and neither asks whether the defendant disliked the neighbor.
The first route applies when the actor acts for the purpose of causing the invasion.11 It is the narrow route, because the interference with the neighbor’s land must be the very thing the actor is after.
The second route asks what the actor knows instead of what the actor wants.12 The actor may know that the invasion is already resulting from the conduct, as the operator does who sees or hears that the activity is reaching the neighboring land. Or the actor may know that the invasion is substantially certain to result, even though nothing has yet crossed the line. Clause (b) speaks of what the actor knows, so an operator with no awareness of the invasion falls outside it, however obvious the invasion might have been to a more attentive operator.
Because the test turns on knowledge, a defendant can act intentionally while wishing the neighbors well. A person mowing a lawn knows that noise and exhaust will pass over the property line. He regards those effects as the normal, acceptable consequences of mowing, and he means his neighbor no harm. His invasions are nonetheless “intentional,” although they are probably not unreasonable, or even substantial, interferences with the neighbors’ use and enjoyment.13 The lawn mower shows why intent and liability are separate questions. Intent classifies the defendant’s choice to go ahead despite a known spillover onto the neighbors. Whether the neighbors must bear that spillover is the work of the balancing tests that follow.
Morgan shows the knowledge route in an industrial setting. The plaintiffs’ evidence tended to show that the refinery emitted nauseating gases and odors in great quantities for some hours on two or three days of each week, that the gases invaded the plaintiffs’ land and other lands within a mile and three-quarters or two miles, and that they did so in amounts and densities that made persons of ordinary sensitiveness uncomfortable.14 Emissions that recur week after week from an operation that goes on are the setting in which the knowledge route does its work.
A complaint is the plainest way to supply knowledge. Suppose Kelly tells the operator of an adult shop next door that the shop is driving away her customers and scaring the children. If the operator continues as before, it acts with knowledge to a substantial certainty that its conduct is interfering with Kelly’s use and enjoyment of her property, and the intent requirement is satisfied.15
Because intent is a matter of purpose or knowledge, the care taken in running an operation cannot make an intentional invasion unintentional. A person who intentionally creates or maintains a private nuisance is liable for the resulting injury to others regardless of the degree of care or skill exercised to avoid it.16 Intent, for its part, does not decide liability. It sends the claim to the Section 826 tests, which ask whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the conduct or whether the harm is serious and compensation would not make continuation infeasible.17
The knowledge must be knowledge of the invasion itself. In Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Electric Cooperative, the utility used a multi-grounded delivery system with interconnecting neutrals, and the court agreed that the mere interconnection of the systems did not create an intentional invasion. It is the unreasonable levels of stray voltage that may give rise to liability for an intentional invasion, not the use of such a system, and the plaintiffs identified no evidence that the utility knew, before March of 1986, that its system was imposing unreasonable levels on their farm.18