Concept
Intent Is Not Enough
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
Intent Is Not Enough
An intentional invasion of a neighbor's land is not yet a nuisance. Section 826 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts adds a second question, whether the invasion is unreasonable, and answers it with two alternative tests. The invasion is unreasonable if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct, or if the harm is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm would not make continuing the conduct infeasible.1 The sections that follow take each test in turn. This one asks why intent cannot settle the case and what “unreasonable” looks at.
The two requirements stay separate. A finding that the defendant acted for the purpose of causing the invasion, or knew it was resulting or substantially certain to result, shows only that the invasion is intentional. Courts treat unreasonableness as an additional, “analytically distinct” element: “The interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable.”2 Whether the harm is substantial is a different requirement. This section concerns only the second.
If intent were enough, a defendant's knowledge that an activity bothered a neighbor would end the inquiry. The reasonableness question prevents that by letting the court weigh the interests on both sides. A court may conclude that some level of interference with the quiet enjoyment of adjoining property is reasonable, in view of the value of the activity that creates it, and then it will not allow recovery.3 The effect is a privilege. The defendant may cause substantial harm to an interest that nuisance law would otherwise protect, if the trier of fact finds on balance that the interference is not enough to be actionable.4
Trespass shows what the filter does. Nuisance weighs the interest of the party creating the interference against the interest of the party who suffers from it; trespass, which protects against physical invasion, calls for no such weighing.5 The law therefore treats two knowing releases differently. A defendant who intentionally sends contaminated water onto neighboring land is in trespass, and one who intentionally releases polluting gases is in nuisance. Some torts scholars saw no sense in that distinction, and at their urging the Restatement added the alternative test of § 826(b), under which a serious harm is unreasonable if the cost of compensating for it and similar harm would not make continuing the conduct infeasible.6
What the court examines is the plaintiff's side of the ledger. For intentional nuisances, the reasonableness inquiry focuses on the impact of the defendant's conduct on the plaintiff. It asks whether the conduct creates consequences that a typical landowner should not be expected to bear, consequences that exceed the reasonable threshold beyond which a court will find a nuisance.7 The standard is objective. The question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable, but “whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable.”8 A normal-occupant measure follows: there is no nuisance unless the invasion would substantially and unreasonably affect normal persons and normal land uses, so a plaintiff who devotes land to an unusually sensitive use cannot turn tolerable conduct into a nuisance.9
No formula resolves the judgment in advance. “[T]he unreasonableness of intentional invasions is a problem of relative values to be determined by the trier of fact in each case in the light of all the circumstances of that case.”10 The § 826 tests give that judgment structure without taking it away from the trier of fact.
Two decisions show opposite outcomes. In the High Penn Oil Company case, the evidence, read in the plaintiffs' favor, showed a refinery intentionally and unreasonably sending noxious gases and odors onto the plaintiffs' nine acres to a degree that substantially impaired their use and enjoyment of the land. The court held that evidence sufficient to establish an actionable private nuisance and to support temporary damages.11 In Ken Cowden Chevrolet, Inc. v. Corts, a Michigan appellate court found no nuisance liability where land in its natural condition blocked a view and caused erosion.12 The facts there involved land in its natural condition rather than an operating enterprise, so the case shows only that harm to a neighbor does not make liability automatic.