Concept
The Section 826 Tests
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
The Section 826 Tests
Section 826 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives two alternative tests for deciding when an intentional invasion of another's use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable.1 Under clause (a), the invasion is unreasonable if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct.2 Under clause (b), it is unreasonable if the harm is serious and the financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make continuing the conduct infeasible.3 Satisfying either clause is enough.
The clauses ask different questions. Clause (a) compares two things, the harm and the value of what the defendant is doing, and asks which weighs more. Clause (b) asks about money: could the defendant keep operating while paying for the damage the operation causes? The difference matters most when the defendant's activity is valuable. Valuable conduct adds weight to the utility side of clause (a), and a neighbor with a serious harm may lose the comparison. Clause (b) gives that neighbor a second route, because it makes the invasion unreasonable whenever the harm is serious and compensation would not make the conduct infeasible, whatever the balance under clause (a).
Clause (b) also moves intentional nuisance toward intentional trespass, although differences remain, and an occasional court goes the other way and treats an intentional trespass like an intentional nuisance.4
This section starts with clause (a), because Sections 827 and 828 supply the factors that measure its two sides.5 The compensation-based clause and the more specific rules in Sections 829, 829A, and 830 each make an intentional invasion unreasonable without a full balance of harm and utility, and they follow once the balancing material is in place.6 Not every jurisdiction follows the Restatement's structure: some courts recognize only the balancing route, and a few look solely at how severe the interference is.7 The next subsection takes up the balancing rule, and the one after it shows how the states depart from it.
The Balancing Rule
Clause (a) is the Restatement's primary test: an intentional invasion is unreasonable if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct.8 The rule sets the harm to the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land, which the Restatement calls its gravity, against the value of what the defendant is doing, which it calls the utility of the conduct. The trier of fact compares the two. Because the comparison turns on the particular facts of each dispute, no fixed quantity of smoke, noise, or odor creates liability by itself.9
The test weighs both sides because neither owner's interest wins by default. In Prah v. Maretti, the Wisconsin Supreme Court described private nuisance as the doctrine that balances the conflicting rights of landowners, and it adopted the Restatement's analysis of the tort.10 That balance rests on the view, drawn from Prosser, that an owner's use of land and a neighbor's enjoyment of theirs are correlative and interdependent, so that neither is entitled to prevail entirely at the expense of the other.11 Dropping either side of the scale shows why. If only the gravity of the harm counted, any valuable activity that troubled a neighbor could be stopped, and since nearly every productive use of land sends something across the boundary, owners would be discouraged from the activities a society wants. If only utility counted, a valuable activity could impose unlimited costs on the people next door, because the owner of a profitable plant could always point to what the plant produces. Weighing both sides lets useful activities continue while keeping them from imposing a burden out of proportion to their value.
Two features of the weighing follow from that reciprocity. It is relative: neither the harm nor the conduct carries a fixed value apart from the other, so the same odor may be a small price for a vital industry in one setting and an intolerable burden from a minor business in another. It is also objective, because the court makes a comparative evaluation of the conflicting interests according to objective legal standards.12 Since the answer depends on all the circumstances, reasonableness is a question of fact for the trier.13 The balance resembles the one used to decide whether conduct is negligent, although here it operates on an invasion already classified as intentional.14
Because the rule weighs two sides, it is easy to misread as favoring whichever activity is worth more in economic terms. A coal-fired power plant that complies with every environmental regulation, yet whose emissions make it impossible for a neighbor to raise orchids commercially, shows the utility side winning. The plant's importance to the regional economy likely means the grower's nuisance claim fails.15 The harm is real, but it falls on one neighbor's use of land, while the value of the conduct is spread across a whole region.
The scale can tip the other way. In Dobbs v. Wiggins, where the plaintiff sought only injunctive relief, the court affirmed the finding that the barking of dogs kenneled on the defendant's property was a private nuisance.16 The contrast with the power plant lies in how the two sides compare, not in whether the activity has value. The plant's value reaches a whole region and the grower's loss is confined to one use, whereas a kennel's value is ordinarily narrower and its barking falls directly on the neighbors.
A socially valuable activity is therefore weighty without being automatically protected. A defendant whose conduct benefits the community gets more room to impose costs on neighbors, but the inquiry stays focused on what the invasion does to the plaintiff, and the value of the conduct does not by itself end it.17
The scale in these examples compares unlike things. A neighbor's lost quiet is measured one way, jobs and goods another, and no common unit converts one into the other. The comparison has an apples-to-oranges quality, and courts following the Restatement may find themselves balancing the social value of the use invaded against the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the harm.18 The Restatement structures the judgment by sorting the considerations into named factors: Section 827 lists five that measure the gravity of the harm, and Section 828 lists three that measure the utility of the conduct.19 A trier who works through the factors one at a time, asking how each bears on its own side of the scale, reaches a judgment grounded in specific facts instead of an impression that one activity seems more important. The harm factors and the utility factors each get a section below.
Competing State Approaches
Section 826(a) is the Restatement's primary test, but the states have not all adopted it.21 They disagree on one question: how much the defendant's social value counts when a court decides whether a neighbor's harm is actionable. At one end, a few courts look solely at the severity of the interference and give that value no weight. In the middle, multi-factor tests treat it as one input among several. At the other end, the Restatement makes it half of a comparison.22
Many states still follow the pre-Restatement approach, which takes two forms. Some equate unreasonableness with serious injury to the plaintiff, which returns the inquiry to the gravity of the harm. Others use a multi-factor test whose contents vary widely from state to state, with sample factors such as the character of the neighborhood, the nature of the wrongful conduct, its proximity to the plaintiff's property, its frequency, continuity, and duration, and the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injury. A number of these states count the utility of the defendant's conduct as one factor among the rest.23 The Restatement differs less in the considerations it names than in how it arranges them. A multi-factor list asks the trier for an overall judgment, while the Restatement sorts the considerations into two columns, harm and utility, and asks which column is heavier.
Courts that adopt the Restatement treat the balance as the primary test, and about a third of the states have adopted the basic approach.24 California describes the standard as objective and the answer as a question of fact, so that the question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable but "whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable."25 North Carolina's Pendergrast v. Aiken weighs the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct and lists considerations on each side. On the harm side it names the extent and character of the harm, the social value of the use invaded, the suitability of the locality, and the plaintiff's burden to minimize the harm. On the utility side it names the purpose of the conduct, the social value of that purpose, and the suitability of the locality for the defendant's use.26
Adopting the balance does not settle whether a state accepts the Restatement's other routes. In an Idaho feedlot suit brought by neighboring homeowners, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial because the trial court had not instructed on Section 826(b), which allows a finding of nuisance even when utility outweighs harm, so long as the harm is serious and damages can be paid without closing the business. The Idaho Supreme Court set that decision aside. It held that Section 826(b) does not represent Idaho law and that in a damages action the interests of the community, including the utility of the conduct, are weighed in deciding whether a nuisance exists. It reasoned that the state's economy depends on agriculture, lumber, mining, and industry, and that removing utility from the inquiry would place an unreasonable burden on them.27 The result fits a recognized pattern in which some courts limit the Restatement to situation (a) and deny relief under its other routes.28
At the far end of the range, Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative kept the defendant's utility out of the case altogether. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of evidence that a power cooperative offered to show that the utility of its operations outweighed the gravity of the harm to the plaintiffs, and it said: "Whether its economic or social importance dwarfed the claim of a small farmer is of no consequence in this lawsuit."29 On that view the court asks whether the interference crosses a threshold that marks the point of liability, and it does not set social benefits against costs. A large enterprise therefore cannot buy an exemption from liability by being large. The Restatement balance makes the opposite choice, since a valuable defendant can escape liability when the harm is outweighed, and that is why the same facts can come out differently in the two kinds of state.
For exam purposes the Restatement balance is the default analysis, and a fact pattern that calls for a different approach will usually say so, for instance by telling you that the court looks only to the severity of the interference or that the state follows a multi-factor test. When the stem is silent, weigh the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct under Section 826(a). When the stem names the approach, follow it, because the jurisdictions genuinely differ.
One more distinction keeps the balance from being misread. Every nuisance dispute presents two questions: whether the defendant's use is a nuisance, and what remedy to award, whether an injunction or damages.30 Utility can enter at both stages, but it does different work at each. In deciding whether conduct is a nuisance, a court weighs utility in the defendant's favor, so a socially beneficial defendant gets more room to impose costs on neighbors, yet the focus stays on what the conduct does to the plaintiff and the defendant's value is not decisive. At the remedy stage the costs and benefits of the defendant's conduct are a central consideration.31 The remedy stage also raises its own questions. A court may find damages inadequate when the activity is ongoing and the landowners would otherwise have to bring repeated suits, and it will likely enjoin an interference that is particularly hazardous to human health or the environment.32
Section 826(a) can blur the two stages. It defines a use as unreasonable when the harm outweighs the utility, which resembles the cost-benefit comparison that belongs to the remedy, and in a case such as Dobbs v. Wiggins, where the plaintiff sought only an injunction, the two stages can seem to collapse into one.33 The danger is that a court treats the liability balance as a plain contest between the values of the two uses. If it does, any socially valuable defendant could impose enormous costs on its neighbors simply because its use is valuable. Keeping the stages apart lets utility count in the defendant's favor on liability without deciding the case, and it leaves the cost-benefit questions to the remedy stage.