Concept
Weighing the Factors Together
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
Weighing the Factors Together
Section 826(a) makes an intentional invasion unreasonable when the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct, and Sections 827 and 828 supply the factors for that comparison: five on the harm side and three on the utility side.1 Each section introduces its list as factors that are important in the determination. None is an element a party must separately prove, and none carries a fixed weight.
A court therefore cannot finish by counting which side has more factors. The eight measure unlike interests, such as a family's sleep, a plant's payroll, the character of a district, and the price of a precaution, and a tally would treat them as interchangeable units. The trier of fact instead sorts the evidence under the factors, decides how much each fact weighs in the particular setting, and judges which side is heavier. The standard is objective. The question is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion unreasonable but whether reasonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable. The answer is a question of fact, a problem of relative values decided case by case in light of all the circumstances.2
A record on which every factor points the same way shows the method most plainly.3 A cement factory in a rural, uninhabited area releases dust that no available technology prevents. The owner of the adjoining tract later buys it, builds a home, plants a flower garden, and finds that the dust stunts one variety of flower. On the harm side, the extent of the loss is minor, because the owner can grow other flowers and keeps almost all use and enjoyment of the property. The character of the harm is physical damage, but it is almost trivial. The area appears unsuitable for a residential flower garden, and the owner could grow the variety indoors or in a small greenhouse, so the burden of avoiding the harm is light. On the utility side, the factory's conduct has high utility, its location suits it, and prevention is not possible. With the harm low on every factor and the utility high, the interference is not unreasonable.
A record this one-sided is uncommon, and its main value is to show how facts sort under the factors. The harder work begins when the factors divide, as they did in a poultry case that went the other way. In Woods v. Khan, the plaintiffs complained that a poultry facility in rural Godfrey produced bad odors and swarms of flies, and that both varied in intensity from day to day.4 Some plaintiffs had to seal their houses at the worst times, some cut back on outdoor activities and stopped inviting guests, and some suffered breathing difficulties, sore throats, and nausea.5 The court framed the weighing as five questions, and because each one lines up with a factor, together they work as a checklist for any fact pattern of this kind.
The questions are built around the defendant's side and the locality, so the harm facts, the sealed houses, the abandoned outdoor life, and the breathing trouble, have to be set beside the answers. The court concluded that the poultry facility was a vital industry but was also the newcomer to the area and sat too close to several residences, and it upheld injunctive relief.7 Both defendants therefore ran useful enterprises. The results differ because of the other answers. The cement factory was there first and cost its neighbor one replaceable crop that could be avoided by growing it indoors. The poultry facility arrived second, stood close to homes, and took from its neighbors the ordinary use of their houses and yards.
The weighing is also hard to disturb on appeal. In Dobbs v. Wiggins, the circuit court found that barking from dogs kenneled on the defendant's property was a private nuisance, and the reviewing court affirmed. An appellate court may not substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from evidence that did not greatly preponderate either way, and the balance of harm against utility is such a question.8
A court must also resist letting one consideration do the whole job. In Prah v. Maretti, the circuit court granted summary judgment, a ruling that ends a case before trial because no genuine factual dispute remains, to a neighbor whose proposed house would affect the plaintiff's solar heating. It reasoned that the house met zoning rules and that the plaintiff could have avoided any harm by locating his own house in a better place.9 The state supreme court treated each point as relevant but not conclusive.10 The reason is easy to see. A zoning classification is set in advance for a whole district and says little about how much a particular operation puts on a particular neighbor, and almost any harm can be avoided in theory by someone willing to rearrange a life. If either point were decisive, it would cancel every other factor on the scale.
Prah also supplies the procedural lesson. The reasonable use standard normally requires a full exposition of all the underlying facts and circumstances, and the record there left too little known about the extent of the harm to the plaintiff, the suitability of solar heat in that neighborhood, the availability of remedies to the plaintiff, and the costs to the defendant of avoiding the harm.11 Three of those gaps are gaps in specific factors: extent belongs to Section 827(a), suitability to Section 827(d), and the defendant's cost of avoidance to Section 828(c). The fourth, availability of remedies, goes to the separate remedy question. A factor cannot be weighed until evidence of its facts is in the record, so a court cannot strike the balance on summary judgment when it would have to weigh evidence not yet presented.
A scale that compares unlike things leaves room for honest disagreement. Courts following the Restatement may find themselves setting the social value of the use invaded against the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the harm, which is something of an apples-to-oranges comparison. Even so, the provisions give a one-step calculus for weighing the cost to society of stopping a beneficial activity against the unfairness to affected neighbors of denying them compensation.12 The materials on Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz show how a set of numbers can support competing readings. They ask whether the numbers show that the utility of the defendant's conduct outweighed the gravity of the harm, or whether the apartment building simply should not have been built in that neighborhood, and whether the answer would change if the area were zoned for apartments.13 Outcomes therefore depend on the facts proved.
The balance also settles only whether the invasion is unreasonable, which is the question of entitlement. The choice of a remedy is a separate question.14 An answer built on this section sorts the facts under all eight factors, says which way each points and why, identifies the facts that carry the most weight, and reaches a conclusion on the balance. A bare list of factors, or a single decisive factor, skips the weighing the doctrine requires.