Concept
Other Routes to Unreasonableness
Unreasonableness: intentional invasion and balancing gravity of harm against utility of conduct
Other Routes to Unreasonableness
Two more sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts let a court find an intentional invasion unreasonable without weighing harm against utility. Section 829 reaches conduct done for the sole purpose of causing harm and conduct contrary to common standards of decency, so long as the harm is significant.1 Section 830 reaches significant harm that the actor could practicably avoid, in whole or in part, without undue hardship.2 With the compensation-based tests of Sections 826(b) and 829A from the last section, these three routes complete the alternatives to the balance in Section 826(a). Each pairs a threshold of significant harm with one further fact about the defendant's conduct, and that fact does the work the balance would otherwise do.
The routes can skip the balance because each applies where one side of the scale is weak or the cost of relief is small. Section 826(a) sets the gravity of the harm against the utility of the actor's conduct, and Section 828 divides utility into the value of the conduct's primary purpose, its fit with the locality, and the impracticability of preventing the invasion.3 Conduct whose sole purpose is to injure a neighbor has no purpose the law can value.4 Conduct that offends common standards of decency is conduct the community itself declines to credit, which weakens the case for asking the neighbor to absorb it. And when the actor can avoid the harm without undue hardship, the impracticability factor gives the defendant nothing to put on the scale.5
All three routes begin with significant harm. A route that bypasses the balance denies the defendant the usual chance to show the activity is worth tolerating, so another device must screen out trivial claims. Neighbors send small burdens across the boundary line all the time; without a threshold, a petty act of spite or a minor annoyance that a simple precaution could have prevented would support a lawsuit while costing the plaintiff almost nothing. Match the word to the provision: Sections 829 and 830 say significant, Section 826(b) says serious, and Section 829A says severe.6 We start with the route that turns on motive.
Spite and Malice
Section 829(a) makes an intentional invasion of another's use and enjoyment of land unreasonable when the harm is significant and the actor's conduct is for the sole purpose of causing harm to the other.7 The route has two conditions, significant harm and a motive of pure malice, and each explains why the route is both short and narrow.
Malice can end the inquiry because it empties the utility side of the scale. Section 826(a) weighs the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct, and the first utility factor in Section 828(a) is the social value the law attaches to the conduct's primary purpose.8 Conduct whose only purpose is to hurt a neighbor has no such purpose, so any significant harm outweighs nothing. Section 829(a) lets a court say so directly instead of performing an empty comparison. The word sole marks the rule's edge. A defendant with some real use for the conduct has put something on the utility side; the malice route then no longer applies, and the claim goes to the balance, where that use counts for the defendant.
The significance condition guards against the opposite error. A rule that made every ill-motivated act actionable would turn petty spite that costs the plaintiff almost nothing into a lawsuit. Requiring significant harm keeps the route aimed at conduct that is both malicious and damaging, so a hedge planted only to irritate a neighbor who loses nothing beyond irritation fails this condition even though the motive is plain. Keep the malice route apart from the purpose branch of Section 825(a) as well. Acting for the purpose of causing an invasion makes the invasion intentional, which only places the claim in the category where unreasonableness must still be decided.9 Section 829(a) answers the question that classification leaves open, and it asks for more: the harm must be the actor's sole purpose and must be significant.
Malice can convert an otherwise legitimate activity into a nuisance, and the spite fence is the classic illustration. Building a fence on one's own land is an ordinary use, yet a tall fence built solely to interfere with the flow of light and air to a neighbor's property is a nuisance.10 The doctrine reflects the view, put in Burke v. Smith (Mich. 1888), that "no man has a legal right to make a malicious use of his property, not for any benefit or advantage to himself, but for the avowed purpose of damaging his neighbor."11 Several spite fence decisions have also recognized the owner's interest in sunlight.12
A fence that serves a purpose of its own falls outside the rule.
Purpose separates the two fences, since height and lost light can be identical. Knowledge that an invasion will result satisfies Section 825(b) and makes the invasion intentional, but it does not show that causing the harm was the owner's sole purpose.13 A problem that supplies feuding neighbors, a structure, and an account of why it went up usually tests whether the structure has any use other than harm.
States do not treat spite fences uniformly. Many courts will enjoin a fence built for the sole purpose of blocking a neighbor's light and air, and some will order it torn down, with courts in California, Connecticut, and Indiana applying statutes in Wilson v. Handley, DeCecco v. Beach, and Gertz v. Estes.14 Some states prohibit spite fences by statute, as in Alberino v. Balch, a Vermont decision.15 Pennsylvania went the other way in Maioriello v. Arlotta, where the court refused to enjoin a spite fence.16 If a problem names a spite fence statute or an injunction rule, apply it; if the facts say nothing, Section 829(a) supplies the default analysis of significant harm plus sole purpose.
Common Standards of Decency
Section 829(b) makes an intentional invasion of another's use and enjoyment of land unreasonable when the harm is significant and the actor's conduct is "contrary to common standards of decency."18 Like the spite clause, it skips the comparison of harm and utility, and both of its conditions must be met: significant harm, and conduct that offends the community's standards. The clause defines decency no further, so learn it from its words and from the standard examples, a funeral parlor and a brothel, and do not stretch it to conduct they do not resemble.
Under Section 826(a) the gravity of the harm is weighed against the utility of the conduct, and Section 828(a) counts the social value the law attaches to the conduct's primary purpose.19 A court can skip that weighing here because conduct that violates the community's basic standards is conduct the community declines to credit, so the value that ordinarily supports a defendant is missing. The word common does a second job. Fear and moral indignation vary from person to person, and a court that credited them on the plaintiff's say-so would let the most easily offended owner set the standard for the street. Tying the clause to common standards makes the community's shared judgment the test and keeps the inquiry objective.
The standard examples mark the clause's territory. An activity that causes fear, such as a funeral parlor, or moral indignation, such as a brothel, may be an actionable nuisance, although an activity that is merely visually offensive generally is not.20 The difference lies in what the neighbors experience. An unsightly structure displeases the eye; these activities provoke a reaction rooted in the community's view of the conduct itself. A brothel next door is the model case: where its operation causes the neighbors significant harm, the clause makes the invasion unreasonable without any weighing of what the operator gains.21
The funeral parlor also appears in a decision framed differently. In Powell v. Taylor, an Arkansas court found a neighborhood so residential in character that converting a home into a funeral parlor would be a nuisance.22 That ruling rests on locality, so the funeral parlor became a nuisance because of where it stood. Section 829(b) asks instead about the conduct and its offense to community standards. The two inquiries can reach the same result without being the same inquiry.
Clause (b) also looks at something different from clause (a). Clause (a) examines the actor's purpose and applies only when causing harm to the neighbor is the sole reason for the conduct.23 Clause (b) says nothing of purpose, so an operator who wishes no one any injury and means only to run a business can still fall within it if the business offends common standards of decency. The question moves from the operator's motive to the nature of the activity.
The harm must still be significant, and that condition keeps the clause from turning distaste into liability. The harm in these cases is often moral or emotional, and without a threshold a neighbor's objection to what an owner does with lawful property could support a suit even though the objector's own use of the land is untouched.
A familiar problem shows how this clause fits with intent. Kelly complains to XXX that its porn shop is driving away her customers and scaring the children. If XXX keeps operating after the complaint, it acts with knowledge to a substantial certainty that it is interfering with Kelly's use and enjoyment of her property, and that satisfies the intent requirement.24 Intent settles only that the invasion is intentional. Whether it is unreasonable is a separate question, and Section 829(b) is one place to look: Kelly must show significant harm and that the shop's operation offends common standards of decency, and XXX will contest each point.
On an exam, treat the clause as a narrow route. First ask whether the facts describe conduct the community regards as indecent, as the funeral parlor and brothel examples do. Then ask whether the plaintiff has shown significant harm. If the facts supply only visual displeasure or distaste, the clause is not met, and the analysis returns to the balance of gravity against utility.
Avoidable Harm
Section 830 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts rests unreasonableness on one question about the defendant. An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if the harm is significant and it would be practicable for the actor to avoid the harm in whole or in part without undue hardship.26 As in Section 829, a threshold of significant harm screens out trivial claims, and a second fact stands in for the weighing of harm against utility. Neighbors send small burdens across the boundary constantly, and a rule demanding a precaution against each would cost defendants a great deal and return almost nothing to plaintiffs. The second condition, practicable avoidance, carries two qualifiers that decide most disputes: avoiding the harm in part is enough, and the avoidance must be possible without undue hardship.
Practicable avoidance can end the inquiry because of what a defendant's utility consists of. The social value of an activity attaches to what the activity produces, while the invasion is a by-product of the particular way the activity is carried on. When the actor can produce the same output with the invasion removed or reduced at modest cost, the harmful manner of operating adds nothing the community values, and the neighbor's loss buys nothing in return. The route thus reaches directly a conclusion that the balance in Section 826(a) would often reach only after weighing, and it denies the defendant the argument that the activity as a whole is worth having. Lowest-cost-avoider reasoning points the same way: ask which party can more cheaply avoid the harm, and consider putting the cost of avoiding it on that party.27 The undue-hardship limit protects the other end of the range. An activity that cannot be modified without disproportionate expense is not asked to modify, because the change would cripple or end the very activity whose value the law otherwise respects.
In Highview North Apartments v. County of Ramsey, a county's sewer system, a socially useful facility, could have been placed so as to avoid the sewage backup that harmed the plaintiff, and the decision is cited as an illustration of this route.28 Nobody doubts the value of a sewer. The route asks whether the harm could have been avoided by placing the system differently, and the usefulness of the service does not answer that question, because the service would have been delivered either way and only the placement produced the backup. A useful defendant that could have prevented significant harm by a practicable alternative therefore cannot rest on its utility. Undue hardship remains the live issue in any problem built on these facts, and the answer would depend on what the alternative placement would have cost the county.
The cement factory sits at the opposite pole. A plant in a rural area regularly releases large quantities of dust, and no technological method of preventing the emissions exists.29 If no technology prevents the dust, avoiding it means ending the activity, which is the undue hardship the clause excuses. The standard illustration fails the first condition as well, since the adjoining owner's loss is a single stunted variety of flower and the owner keeps almost all use of the land. Either failure takes the case outside the route, and the two are independent. A neighbor whose entire crop was destroyed by the same unpreventable dust would satisfy the harm condition and still fail the avoidability condition, and would have to proceed through the balance, where the plant's utility counts against the claim, or through Section 826(b) in a jurisdiction that recognizes it.
Between those poles the undue-hardship limit takes judgment, because it asks how heavy the cost of avoidance is and the text supplies no figure. The alternative does not have to cost nothing, since the clause excuses only hardship that is undue, meaning out of proportion to what the change accomplishes. Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz supplies the kind of numbers an argument would turn on. The defendant had tried, without success, to abate the air-conditioning noise from its apartment building. A quiet system, with separate air-conditioning units for each apartment, would have cost an additional $40,000 if installed when the building was constructed, and changing to such a system later would cost at least $150,000.30 The added cost at the design stage looks like a modest price for quiet, while a retrofit that costs nearly four times as much after the building stands is easier to call undue. The text of Section 830 does not say whether practicability is measured when the choice was made or when the claim is tried, so an answer built on facts like these should state the measure it adopts and show how the result changes under the other.
Keep this route apart from Section 828(c), where the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion is one of three inputs on the defendant's side of the balance.31 A cheap precaution lightens that side, but the factor then sits on the scale with the value of the conduct's purpose, its fit with the locality, and all five harm factors, so a defendant whose activity is valuable and whose neighbor's harm is modest can still win. Under Section 830 avoidability is weighed against nothing: when the harm is significant and avoidance is practicable without undue hardship, the invasion is unreasonable, and a useful defendant cannot rely on utility. The cost of avoiding an invasion also differs from the cost of compensating for it, the quantity Section 826(b) tests.32
The third step does the real work, because a defendant will argue hardship there and the facts decide the case. Because these routes come from the Restatement, check which rule the jurisdiction in the problem follows before relying on them.