Concept
Contributory Negligence
Defenses and limits on nuisance liability
Defenses to Nuisance Liability
Contributory Negligence
A nuisance plaintiff can nearly always name something he might have done to avoid the harm: cover the trees, shut the windows, move the equipment, stay off the road. Contributory negligence is that failure, a lack of reasonable care for his own protection that helps bring about the injury. Whether it counts against him depends on how the defendant is at fault, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840B gives a different answer for each basis of liability.
- When the nuisance results from the defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a defense to the same extent as in other negligence actions.1
- When the harm is intentional or the result of recklessness, contributory negligence is not a defense.2
- When the nuisance results from an abnormally dangerous condition or activity, contributory negligence is a defense only if the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably subjected himself to the risk of harm.3
The rule sorts by the defendant's fault because “nuisance” names an interest and not a kind of conduct. Private nuisance is a field of tort liability unified by the interest invaded, the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of land, and any substantial nontrespassory invasion of that interest by liability-forming conduct qualifies. The invasion may be intentional, in which case the defendant is liable when his conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances, or unintentional, in which case he is liable when his conduct is negligent, reckless, or ultrahazardous.4 The label tells you what was harmed and not how the defendant was at fault. You cannot say what the plaintiff's carelessness does to the claim until you know which kind of fault the plaintiff is proving.
The older vocabulary does not answer that question. A nuisance per se is an activity or condition that is a nuisance in itself and not permissible under any circumstances, a category that consists mainly of uses prohibited by statute or regulation.5 The ordinary private nuisance, called a nuisance in fact or per accidens, is an activity or condition that is out of place or is a nuisance because of the particular way it is carried on.6 Neither label says whether the defendant was careless, knowing, or engaged in a strict liability activity. Contemporary rules recognize negligent, intentional, and strict liability nuisances instead, and the per se label can be dropped.7
The three rules follow a pattern. Weighing the plaintiff's carelessness against the defendant's makes sense when the defendant's fault is carelessness of the same kind. Reckless conduct differs from negligence not only in degree but in kind,8 and a defendant who deliberately creates an abnormal risk answers for the harm even without negligence.9 The plaintiff's conduct is accordingly a full or partial defense in the first setting, no defense in the second, and a defense in a narrow form in the third. Each is taken in turn below, beginning with claims grounded in the defendant's negligence.
Negligent Nuisance Claims
When a nuisance results from the defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is a defense to the same extent as in other actions founded on negligence.10 That is § 840B(1). When an invasion of use and enjoyment results from negligent conduct, the usual negligence rules govern the claim, defenses included, and calling the harm a nuisance gives the plaintiff no immunity from them. Contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and avoidable consequences all defend a nuisance action to the same extent as in other tort actions.11
Both parties are measured by the same yardstick. The defendant is liable because he failed to use reasonable care, and a plaintiff who failed to use reasonable care to protect his own land is judged by the same standard.
What the defense does to the claim depends on the jurisdiction's fault system. When a nuisance arises out of negligence, most courts hold that contributory negligence eliminates or reduces recovery, and McFarlane v. Niagara Falls is the leading case.12 “Eliminates or reduces” tracks two systems. Under the traditional contributory-negligence rule, the plaintiff recovers nothing. Most states have since adopted comparative negligence, which reduces the plaintiff's damages by his percentage of negligence.13 A good answer says which system the jurisdiction uses, or states both when the facts are silent.
Because the defense applies on the same terms as in any negligence action, the plaintiff's carelessness must also have helped cause the loss he claims.14 Carelessness that contributed nothing gives the court no reason to shift the loss off the defendant. On an exam, first spot what the plaintiff failed to do, then ask whether that failure contributed to the damages claimed.
The defense is at its fullest in this setting. Intentional and reckless nuisances remove it, and abnormally dangerous conditions narrow it.
Intentional or Reckless Nuisance
When the harm is intentional or the result of recklessness, contributory negligence is not a defense.16 That is § 840B(2), and because it reaches most nuisance claims, applying it depends on what “intentional” means in this field. The word does not mean what it means in everyday speech.
An invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is intentional when the defendant acts for the purpose of causing it, knows that it is resulting from his conduct, or knows that it is substantially certain to result.17 Only the first alternative requires any wish to interfere with the neighbor. The second and third reach a defendant who regrets the smell and would prefer that his neighbor felt nothing, but who goes on operating while knowing the neighbor bears the effects or will bear them. In Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co. neighbors showed that a refinery was sending noxious gases and odors onto their nine acres to a degree that substantially impaired their use of the land. The court held that this evidence supported a finding that the refinery caused the interference intentionally and unreasonably, enough to establish an actionable private nuisance and entitle the neighbors to damages.18
Knowledge most often arrives as a complaint. An operation may begin with no idea what it does next door, and at that stage the interference may be unintended. Once the neighbor tells the operator what is happening and the operator carries on, the operator acts with “knowledge to a substantial certainty” that its conduct interferes with the neighbor's use and enjoyment, and the intent requirement is met.19 A refinery that keeps running after three letters about scorched trees cannot say it failed to expect the next release to do harm. The care the refinery takes does not rescue it, because a person who intentionally creates or maintains a private nuisance is liable regardless of the degree of care or skill he uses to avoid the injury.20 One caution: this rule removes a defense and does not make every intentional invasion actionable, since a defendant is liable for an intentional invasion only when his conduct is unreasonable under the circumstances.21
Most private nuisances in fact are intentionally created or maintained, and courts redress them without allegation or proof of negligence.22 The typical complaint resembles the one homeowners made against a cattle feedlot expanded to feed about 9,000 cattle: manure, odor, insects, and birds.23 The plaintiff's claim in such a case does not rest on the defendant's want of care, so no carelessness on the defendant's side offsets the plaintiff's, and courts hold that contributory negligence does not apply to an intentional private nuisance.24
Recklessness gets the same treatment. Contributory negligence is not a defense to an intentional tort, and one cannot defend a battery by arguing that the plaintiff negligently failed to duck. Almost every jurisdiction extends that rule to wanton and willful or reckless conduct, which is said to differ from negligence not only in degree but also in kind.25
Two reasons support the rule. Contributory negligence compares one party's carelessness with another's, so it needs carelessness on both sides, and a defendant who knew of the invasion and kept it going made a choice, which differs in kind from a lapse of attention. Allowing the defense would also reach most nuisance claims, since most are intentional, and it would cut recovery in exactly the cases where the defendant, not the neighbor, controlled whether the harm continued.
An exam stem usually describes the neighbor's conduct first: a grower left trees uncovered, a homeowner kept windows open, a tenant stored goods in a basement known to flood. Before weighing any of that conduct, ask what the defendant knew when the harm occurred.
The orchard owner's conduct in that scene matches the next one. Only the defendant's knowledge differs.
Change the ditch facts from the last section and the answer changes the same way. Suppose the neighbor had written the landowner after an earlier backup and the landowner left the ditch clogged. The next flood would be one the landowner knew was substantially certain to occur, the claim would rest on an intentional invasion, and the neighbor's choice to store equipment in a flood-prone basement would no longer reduce recovery under § 840B(2). Contributory negligence is the defense this rule removes. Assumption of risk is separate: § 840C makes it a defense to the same extent as in other tort actions, and the next section takes it up.26
Abnormally Dangerous Conditions
When a nuisance results from an abnormally dangerous condition or activity, contributory negligence is a defense only if the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably subjected himself to the risk of harm.29 This is § 840B(3), the narrowest of the three rules. Strict liability for an activity such as blasting rests on the deliberate creation of an abnormal risk and requires no showing of carelessness,30 so the plaintiff's want of care cannot be set against the defendant's in the way § 840B(1) allows for negligent nuisances. Everything turns on what the plaintiff knew.
The defense is narrow because of how the defendant came to be liable. Inherent in the deliberate creation of an abnormal risk is the possibility that others will fail to anticipate it or guard against it.31 A passerby's inattention is therefore part of what the defendant took on in running the activity, and letting it reduce recovery would hand the defendant part of the cost of a danger of his own making. Knowledge changes the picture. A plaintiff who knows of the danger and deliberately goes into it has acted much like one who consents to the risk, which is why the Restatement's defense is one form of assumption of the risk.32
Casebook notes press an obvious objection. The Restatement (Second) applies the rule to strict liability for wild animals as well as for abnormally dangerous activities, and if ordinary contributory negligence defends against a negligent defendant, why does it not defend against one who is not even negligent?33 The answer is the one just given. The defendant who creates the risk takes on the plaintiff's inattention, and only the plaintiff's own knowing, unreasonable choice returns part of the loss to him.
Blasting near a highway shows the line. A driver who negligently fails to observe a warning sign, drives past it, and is hurt by the blast may recover. A driver who sees the sign or a flagman, is warned not to proceed, and insists on going ahead cannot.34 (See Worth v. Dunn; Wells v. Knight.) Both drivers were careless in the loose sense, but only the second knew of the risk and chose to meet it.
Compare § 840B(1), where the plaintiff's failure to use reasonable care is itself the defense. Here a plaintiff whose contributory negligence consists of failing to discover the danger is not barred. The defense requires that he discover the danger and deliberately proceed to encounter it.35 Even knowledge does not finish the inquiry, because the encounter must also be unreasonable. A defendant who creates a patently dangerous condition may not unreasonably limit the plaintiff's freedom of action or restrict the use of neighboring land, and in some settings, a circus for example, the plaintiff may reasonably assume the defendant will guard against the obvious risks.36
A voluntary, unreasonable encounter with a known risk is itself one form of assumption of risk, so the facts that satisfy § 840B(3) will often raise § 840C as well, a defense the next section develops.37
Jurisdictions that have adopted comparative fault may treat the same facts differently. The Restatement Third directs the fact finder to assign shares of responsibility to each party in physical-injury cases regardless of the legal theory of liability, which lets a negligent plaintiff bear a share of fault even when the defendant's liability is strict.38 Under that approach a plaintiff's foolishness in encountering a known risk is usually treated as ordinary negligence that reduces recovery, though some cases may remain where the conduct shows implied consent and relieves the defendant entirely. An exam answer should state the § 840B(3) rule and note that a comparative-fault jurisdiction may reduce recovery instead of barring it.