Concept
Damages in Lieu of Injunction
Remedies: damages and injunction
Damages in Lieu of Injunction
A court that has found a nuisance still must choose a remedy, and the choice is wider than an injunction or nothing. The Restatement (Second) of Torts directs the court to compare the probable consequences of granting an injunction with the probable consequences of the alternative remedies if those are used instead.1 That comparison runs through the factors listed in § 936, which include the relative hardship to the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied, and the interests of third persons and the public.2 When closing the defendant’s operation would cost far more than the operation costs its neighbors, those factors can lead a court to find the nuisance, leave the activity running, and compensate the plaintiff with a permanent award in place of the order.
That outcome changes who decides whether the activity continues. An injunction leaves the plaintiff holding the right to be free of the interference, so the defendant can go on only by persuading the plaintiff to sell at a price the plaintiff accepts. Damages in lieu of an injunction let the defendant take rights in the plaintiff’s land at a value set by a judge or jury, and even an accurate estimate of market value may differ from the price at which the owner would voluntarily sell.3 The effect is a power much like eminent domain, the government’s power to take private property for public use on payment of compensation, and that is why courts treat denial of an injunction as a serious matter.4
This section follows the leading decision, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., through its reasoning and its remedy. It then states the limits that keep the case from reaching every defendant that is large, useful, or expensive to stop.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., decided in 1970, is the standard example of a court that finds a nuisance, declines to let an injunction close the defendant, and orders permanent damages instead. Some courts had already adopted a “balance of equities” standard, but New York still treated an injunction as automatic when a nuisance caused substantial continuing harm. In Boomer the New York Court of Appeals adopted the emerging modern rule, and the decision greatly influenced the evolution of nuisance law in other jurisdictions.5
The trial court found that the cement plant was a private nuisance but refused to issue an injunction. It awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages for their injuries to date, authorized them to sue again as further injury occurred, and, for the parties’ guidance, fixed their total permanent damages at $185,000. The plaintiffs appealed.6 On the other side of the ledger, the plant was a $45,000,000 investment that employed more than 300 people, and no known technology could control its dust and other by-products. The only way to obey an order to abate the emissions was to stop operating altogether.7 The court announced, with little analysis, that it was “fully agreed” to avoid the “drastic remedy” of closing the plant. It apparently reached that result by balancing the equities, although its opinion on the point is remarkably vague.8
The ground for denying the injunction was, in the court’s words, “the large disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction.”9 That ground could not stand without overruling a New York doctrine: once a nuisance was found and the plaintiff showed any substantial damage, an injunction would be granted despite a marked disparity between the effect of the injunction and the effect of the nuisance.10 Most courts took the opposite approach at the remedy stage. They balanced the equities and denied an injunction when the hardship to the defendant and the community would exceed the harm suffered by plaintiffs left to their damage remedies.11 Boomer disavowed the New York rule.12
With that rule set aside, the court weighed four responses, and its reasons for rejecting three of them explain the fourth.
- An unconditional injunction closing the plant was the “drastic remedy” the court wished to avoid, because it would eliminate most of the value of a $45,000,000 plant and put more than 300 employees out of work.13
- An injunction postponed to allow research on emission controls was rejected because the technology was unlikely to arrive soon, Atlantic could not control the pace of research, and the plaintiffs would gain unfair leverage to extract far more than their actual damages if the research failed.14 The court also doubted that one company could achieve such advances, which it saw as the responsibility of the entire cement industry.15
- Using the suit to promote the general public welfare was declined. The court asked whether to resolve the litigation between the parties as equitably as possible or to channel private litigation into broad public objectives, and it chose to resolve the dispute before it.16 Effective control of air pollution was far from solved even with the full powers of government, and the state’s regulatory scheme was a better mechanism than a nuisance action.17
- An injunction conditioned on payment was the compromise the court chose: the injunction issues but is vacated when Atlantic pays permanent damages that compensate the plaintiffs for the total economic loss to their properties, present and future.18
The fourth response awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages in lieu of an injunction.19 The permanent measure fits because a plant that will keep running produces a harm that can be priced once, past and future together.
The case for conditioning the injunction on payment lies in what an unconditional order would have done to the bargaining between the parties. Suppose an injunction issued against a defendant whose property is worth $2 million, at the suit of a plaintiff whose lot is worth $1,000. Any bargain to dissolve the injunction that paid the plaintiff more than $1,000 but less than $2 million would leave both sides better off, and that bargaining range of $1,999,000 invites the plaintiff to hold out for a large share of the gain.20 Boomer had the same shape, with a $45,000,000 plant on one side and about $185,000 of permanent damage on the other, and with several neighbors, so the plant might never have obtained voluntary consent from all of them because of strategic holdouts and transaction costs.21 A failure to deal would have been inefficient and might also have injured the public, which benefited from cement made nearby, since cement does not travel well over long distances and is expensive to move.22 By valuing the plaintiffs’ damages itself instead of letting the parties set the value, the court gave the neighbors liability rule protection.23 On the efficiency view, this was the cheapest way to resolve the conflict. Permanent damages estimated at $185,000 cost far less than an injunction that would shut the factory at the price of the $45,000,000 plant, the 300 jobs, and higher cement prices for the public.24
Before Boomer, a court in many jurisdictions confronting this scenario could choose only between finding no nuisance, which let the factory go on harming the plaintiffs, and enjoining the nuisance, which either closed a socially valuable factory or, more likely, forced its owner to pay a windfall settlement to lift the order. Neither outcome was palatable. Boomer supplied a third, permanent damages in lieu of an injunction, and it influenced other jurisdictions to adopt the same approach.25 The decision also broke with earlier case law that had treated an injunction as the proper remedy for protecting adjacent owners, as in Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., where a California court enjoined a cement factory. Boomer refused to enjoin the plant because of its social utility and the economic hardship to its investors and employees, and it awarded damages to the adjacent landowners instead.26
The principal objection came from a dissenting judge, who said the decision was in effect “licensing a continuing wrong [by] saying to the cement company, you may continue to do harm to your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it.” The dissenter likened the result to giving a private corporation the power of eminent domain, the power to condemn an easement, for private gain rather than public use.27 The objection has the same root as the general concern about denying injunctions: the court prices the plaintiffs’ rights, and its price may fall short of what they would accept.28
The figure the court used drew criticism of its own. Atlantic’s total liability, including settlements, ultimately came to $710,000, some four times the amount mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision.29 A structural objection goes further. The balancing doctrine compares the general loss to the public, such as lost jobs, with only the specific money damage to the private landowner, although the owner may be harmed in many general ways that cannot be translated into specific damages.30 Casebook commentary calls the decision highly controversial and asks why a court should eschew an injunction, how the parties would bargain once one was granted, and how operators like Atlantic would behave before building a plant if injunctions were routinely awarded.31 The long view cuts both ways. Courts once issued injunctions as a matter of course, and protecting the local economy in the short run can harm the community in the long run when the defendant’s activity goes unconstrained, yet an inflexible rule of automatic injunctions may not protect the environment over time either.32
On an exam, a stem that pairs a proven nuisance with a large employer, an investment far above the neighbors’ damages, and no technology that can cure the harm points to damages in lieu of an injunction. A jurisdiction that treats the injunction as automatic, as pre-Boomer New York did, reaches the opposite result. The usual error is to read Boomer as holding that a defendant’s economic importance defeats any injunction, and the next subsection explains why it does not.
Limits on Denying Injunctions
Boomer does not make damages in lieu of an injunction a routine outcome. Courts do not follow an inflexible rule requiring an immediate injunction in every case, but they are typically cautious in denying one.35 The traditional baseline still favors the order for an ongoing nuisance: equity will not enjoin a completed act, but it may halt clearly continuous invasions of an important interest where the remedy at law is inadequate.36 Because denial gives the defendant a power much like eminent domain, a court needs a reason that necessity supplies, namely that some cost has to fall somewhere and that ending the activity would destroy more than it saves. Two limits mark the places where that necessity is missing. One concerns how the defendant came to cause the harm, and the other concerns whose loss stopping the activity would produce.
The first limit is that an injunction is definitely granted when the defendant harms the plaintiff willfully or could reasonably avoid doing so.37 Both conditions defeat the necessity argument. A defendant that chooses to inflict harm has no claim on the court’s indulgence, and a defendant that could prevent the harm at reasonable cost shows that the loss is not an unavoidable price of the activity. An order requiring the precaution takes from the defendant only what it should already have spent. Without the limit, a defendant that found a court-set damages award cheaper than the precaution could externalize its costs onto its neighbors and keep the savings.38 Even where an order closing the whole operation would go too far, courts may find a middle ground. They can order the defendant to minimize or eliminate the nuisance without closing down, for example by reducing the amount of dynamite in any one quarry explosion or by reducing nighttime activities, and they can order the defendant to experiment with alternative processes that might minimize the harm.39
Boomer sits on the other side of that line. The court observed that effective control of air pollution was far from solved, that adequate technical procedures were yet to be developed, and that some that appeared possible might be economically impracticable.40 Atlantic had no inexpensive precaution like the orchard’s enclosure, and the only way to obey an injunction was to stop operating.41
The second limit asks whose loss stopping the activity would cause, and two cases with large cost disparities show it deciding in opposite directions. In Estancias Dallas Corp. v. Schultz, a witness testified that the apartments could not be rented without air conditioning and that changing to separate units would now cost $150,000 to $200,000.42 The court nevertheless awarded an injunction. It found little or no testimony of benefit to the public generally and no evidence of a shortage of apartments in Houston that would leave the public with no place to live.43 The critical comparison, the court held, was between the harm to the plaintiff and the harm to the public, and not the harm to the defendant, of the activity stopping.44 In Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. the plaintiffs owned “thin mountain lands, of little agricultural value,” and sought to shut down two large copper smelting plants. The court refused to close plants worth nearly $2 million in order to protect property worth $1,000, because the injunction would ultimately “destroy half of the taxable values of a county, and drive more than 10,000 people from their homes.”45
The remedies diverge because of who would absorb the loss from stopping the activity. In Estancias the loss would land on the defendant, whose expense was real but private. In Madison it would land on thousands of people who had no part in the lawsuit. Balancing the equities protects the public from the effects of injunctive relief; it does not protect an activity merely because stopping it would cost more than the costs the activity imposes.46 The distinction also follows from who controls the numbers. A defendant decides how much to invest in its operation, so if its own cost of compliance were the measure, a large enough investment would buy immunity from any injunction, and the owner of a small parcel beside a large plant could never stop it. The defendant’s own hardship still enters the appraisal as one of the § 936 factors, but it cannot stand in for harm to the public.47
Two further considerations make courts cautious. An injunction proves valuable whenever there is a serious risk of the defendant’s insolvency, since a damages judgment is worth only what the defendant can pay, and whenever innocent third parties need protection from nontrivial losses.48 When a court does withhold the injunction, damages remain available where the harm to the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment is severe and greater than they should bear without compensation, or where the harm is serious and the defendant’s paying damages would not make its activity infeasible. A few jurisdictions look only to the interference with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment and order the activity to cease.49 The same balancing reaches beyond nuisance labels. Air pollution physically invades land through smoke particles but has usually been treated as a nuisance rather than a trespass, and courts have sometimes used nuisance principles to decide whether an injunction suits repeated, low-grade trespasses.50
An exam stem that pairs a proven nuisance with a large employer, a heavy investment, and a compliance cost many times the plaintiff’s loss describes only part of Boomer’s reasoning. The stem must also show that no reasonable means of avoiding the harm exists and that stopping the activity would hurt people beyond the defendant, as it would in Madison. If the only large figure is the defendant’s own expense, as in Estancias, or if a cheap fix was available and ignored, the stem points to the injunction.