Concept
Defamatory Meaning
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Defamatory Meaning
A defamation claim starts with a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, as Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(a) puts it.1 The word defamatory links the tort to the interest it protects, which is the plaintiff’s good name with other people.2 Section 559 defines the word: a communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with the plaintiff.3 The definition looks to what a statement does to an audience’s opinion and conduct. A remark that wounds the plaintiff without that tendency does not qualify, and the plaintiff must prove the communication’s defamatory character when the issue is properly raised.4
Two questions follow, one for each subsection below. The first asks what the § 559 test requires of a statement. The second asks whose opinion the test measures, since the same words can damage the plaintiff’s standing with one audience and leave it intact with another. Falsity, fact versus opinion, and whether the statement refers to this plaintiff are separate inquiries that later sections take up.
The Section 559 Test
The § 559 definition offers two routes to the same injury. Words can lower other people’s opinion of the plaintiff, or they can give other people a reason to keep their distance, and either effect is enough.5 The classic English formula asked whether words exposed the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and courts widened it because it was too narrow.6 The wider rule reaches the plaintiff who is shunned or avoided without being discredited or disgraced, and courts have generally come to adopt the Restatement’s wording in place of the old formula.7
The word tends fixes the level of proof. The test asks what a statement is capable of doing to an audience, so the plaintiff need not produce listeners who admit they thought less of her. The tendency is an estimate that judges and jurors make from their experience of how people react to words like these.8 The same focus on the audience explains why the plaintiff’s own hurt feelings do not satisfy the test. Defamation protects the plaintiff’s relationships with others, and a statement that stings only the plaintiff, without altering anyone else’s view or conduct, does not tend to harm them.9
The first route covers the familiar kinds of discrediting content. Examples include statements that expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, that reflect unfavorably on the plaintiff’s morality or integrity, and that impair the plaintiff’s financial reputation.10 The second route reaches statements that imply no deficiency in the plaintiff’s morality or integrity but could cause people to avoid the plaintiff. The principal example is an imputation of mental illness or impairment, and an imputation of a serious contagious disease is another.11
The first route operated on an implication in Raffensberger v. Moran. A relay manager for a trucking company sent a telex to terminals in seven states implying that drivers were “breakdown artists,” and the court found the message capable of a defamatory meaning because it could be read to say that drivers contrived equipment failures and exploited minor malfunctions to collect extra pay at the company’s expense.12 A jury could find that a driver with that reputation would be held in low esteem by owners and other drivers and would have more trouble finding work.13 The telex never accused anyone outright of dishonesty, yet the implication carried both effects the test names: lower esteem and fewer dealings.
Wilkow v. Forbes, Inc. shows a statement whose effect divides by audience. A magazine article observed that a real estate entrepreneur had used every opening the courts allowed in dealing with his lenders. The court reasoned that his current and potential partners would read the article as an endorsement, because they want a general partner who drives the hardest possible bargain with lenders, although the article surely did not help his standing with the lenders themselves.14 Whatever its net effect, the court held, the article was not defamatory under Illinois law.15 The two decisions differ in what the words invited the audience to do. The telex imputed dishonesty that owners and fellow drivers would hold against the plaintiffs, whereas the article described hard bargaining that the people who deal with the plaintiff’s business may admire. Which audience’s reaction counts when readers split this way is the question for the next subsection.
Many statements fall between those poles, and the result often turns on what the words say about this plaintiff. Words suggesting that a person cannot repay debts are generally not defamatory when the plaintiff runs no business, but they generally are when the plaintiff does, because an imputation of that kind tends to harm a business.16 Reports of a firing or removal show the same sensitivity. Denny v. Mertz treated the question whether a termination was defamatory as one for the jury, Nichols v. Item Publishers, Inc. held a removal from office not defamatory, and a report that a dentist had been sued over negligent dental work was held not libelous without an implication of general unskillfulness.17 Each result asks the same question: do these words, aimed at this plaintiff, tend to lower esteem or discourage dealings? The dentist report suggests that an imputation of one isolated shortcoming can fall short where an imputation of general incompetence would not.
Two actors decide that question, and each has a distinct task. The court decides whether the communication is capable of the defamatory meaning the plaintiff alleges, and the jury decides whether the recipients actually understood it in that sense.18 The first decision screens out words that no reasonable person could read as discrediting. The second depends on context and on who the listeners were. Suppose a speaker says a doctor “took advantage” of patients. The court asks whether a reasonable listener could have heard an accusation of financial or sexual impropriety, and if so, the jury decides whether these listeners did.
The plaintiff carries the burden on this element. Section 613(1)(a) requires the plaintiff to prove the defamatory character of the communication when the issue is properly raised.19 That is the defamatory half of the § 558(a) requirement, whose other half is falsity, and the two halves are separate inquiries.20 To call someone an embezzler is defamatory whether the accusation is true or false, and truth enters through the falsity requirement taken up later in this chapter.21 The common exam slip is to answer the defamatory-meaning question by asking whether the statement was true.
Whose Esteem Counts
The § 559 test measures a statement’s effect on “the community,” but no community has one opinion, and the same words may repel some listeners and leave others unmoved.24 Wilkow shows the split: the entrepreneur’s partners would read the article as an endorsement, and his lenders would not.25 The law therefore needs a rule for which group’s reaction counts.
The Restatement’s comment on the standard supplies that rule. A communication need not tend to prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of everyone in the community, of all the plaintiff’s associates, or even of a majority of them. It is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of a substantial and respectable minority, and that it is made to one or more of them or in a manner that makes it proper to assume it will reach them.26 The last clause matters in practice, because a statement that never reaches the group whose opinion it would damage has done nothing to the plaintiff’s standing with that group.
Two words in that standard do separate work. Substantial requires a real group. Defamation is not a question of majority opinion, but neither does it turn on the existence of some individual with views peculiar enough to find derogatory what the vast majority regard as innocent.27 Respectable asks courts to decide whose disapproval the law will recognize, because a minority’s views can be so antisocial or extreme that it would not be proper for courts to recognize them.28 The rule does not demand a majority, since the audience that matters most to a plaintiff is often a smaller circle, such as a profession, whose opinion controls the plaintiff’s standing even though most of the town has never heard of the plaintiff.
The Restatement’s own illustration shows respectability at work. A, a member of a gang of hoodlums, writes to a fellow bandit that C, another member, has reformed and is no longer to be trusted with the loot, and A has not defamed C.29 The audience is a real group, and its opinion may matter a great deal to C, yet courts decline to treat its disapproval as reputational injury. The same reasoning explains why calling a person a “civil rights activist” is not defamatory, even though a substantial minority of the community in which the person lives would regard the label unfavorably.30
Political labels show how the line falls in ordinary cases. Courts have usually found no defamation in attributing to a plaintiff political views, or views on social issues, that many in the community strongly oppose, as with the labels extremist and John Birch Society member in Washburn v. Wright, or labor agitator and radical in other decisions.31 A charge that the plaintiff was a Communist or a supporter of Communism was regarded as defamatory, however, at a time when the Soviet Union was an adversary of the United States, as in Utah State Farm Bureau Federation v. National Farmers Union Service Corp.32 The label carried reputational force because opposition to Communism in that period was held by a substantial and respectable part of the community, and the plaintiff stood to be shunned by mainstream people.
Statements that the plaintiff informed on others to law enforcement have drawn the same screening. In Clawson v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, L.L.C., a journalist and private investigator was said to be an FBI informer. In Rose v. Borenstein, a diamond broker and cutter was accused of telling customs authorities that others illegally possessed diamonds, and he lost employment as a result. In Michtavi v. New York Daily News, newspapers reported that an inmate planned to cooperate with prosecutors against an organized crime figure.33 Each court denied the defamation action. The courts accepted that many people disapprove of informers and that the plaintiffs’ associates might withdraw, yet concluded that this disapproval was not the view of right-thinking or respectable persons.34 Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc. went the other way, holding that a report that the plaintiffs spied on their political-activist neighbors as paid informants could be found defamatory.35 An answer on this issue should therefore note that most courts reject informer claims and that a minority, Westby among them, lets the plaintiff reach the jury.
The informer decisions show courts judging which groups count, and the Restatement’s wording does not hide that judgment. It lodges the judgment in the word respectable. A student who finds that some audience disapproves of the plaintiff has answered only half the question and must still ask whether a court would credit that audience.
Current community standards supply the measure, so a charge once treated as defamatory may no longer be. A false accusation that someone was other than heterosexual could once be found slander per se, but that is no longer so.36 The imputation that a plaintiff was illegitimate, born outside marriage, is another example that is now out of date.37 The reason follows from what the test measures. Defamation compensates for a tendency to change what an audience thinks and does, and an audience’s attitudes in the past are a poor guide to its attitudes when the statement is published. The Communist-label decisions belong to their period in the same way, and an older case that finds defamation, or finds none, must be read with its era in mind.