Concept
How Meaning Is Determined
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
How Meaning Is Determined
A statement defames only if it carries a meaning that harms reputation, and the law looks for that meaning in the audience. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 provides that the meaning of a communication is what the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands it was intended to express.1 The placement follows from what the tort protects. Reputation changes only when listeners or readers form an impression, and the impression a reasonable recipient takes from the words is the one that can lower the plaintiff in anyone’s esteem.
The rule has two consequences. The speaker’s undisclosed purpose does not control, because a defendant who could escape by announcing a harmless private meaning after the fact would defeat the tort; whether the speaker was at fault for conveying the damaging meaning is a separate question for the fault requirement. And the recipient’s understanding must be reasonable, so a reader who strains to find an accusation in a plain remark does not create a defamatory meaning. This unit first examines how a reasonable recipient reads words in their setting, then how facts the recipient already knows can change what harmless-looking words say.
Recipient's Understanding
Section 563 asks two things of the recipient: that the recipient understood the communication in a defamatory sense, and that the recipient understood it was so intended. If the recipient reasonably understands it that way, it does not matter that the recipient is mistaken, and in deciding how the recipient understood it, the context of the statement counts.2 The word correctly covers the ordinary case, in which listeners grasp what the speaker meant. The phrase mistakenly but reasonably covers the case in which the speaker meant something innocent and the listeners reasonably heard something else. The harm to the plaintiff’s standing is the same whichever meaning the speaker privately held.
Because the audience’s reaction decides the issue, the plaintiff must prove it. Restatement § 613(1)(d) lists the recipient’s understanding of the communication’s defamatory meaning among the matters on which the plaintiff bears the burden when the issue is properly raised.3
Judge and jury share the work in a set order. The court decides first whether the communication could reasonably have been understood in the defamatory sense the plaintiff alleges, and only if it could does the trier of fact decide whether recipients actually understood it that way.4 The order follows from the word reasonably in § 563. A plaintiff cannot reach a jury by showing that one listener drew an accusation from a plain remark, because no speaker can foresee or guard against every idiosyncratic reading. The screen limits liability at the front end.
A defamatory meaning need not be stated outright. Anything that conveys a meaning harmful to reputation can be defamatory, whether it consists of words, pictures, physical conduct, or some combination of them.5 When the charge is only implied, the recipient’s understanding depends on what the publication itself signals. In White v. Fraternal Order of Police, the D.C. Circuit looked to whether the publication gave a clear signal from which a reader could conclude, rightly or wrongly, that the defamatory inference was intended or endorsed.6 Punctuation can carry the signal. In Wildstein v. New York Post Corp., a New York court found that a report that police questioned the plaintiff as one of the women “associated” with a murdered man may imply a meretricious relationship, because the word appeared in quotation marks.7 The need for a signal matches the second half of § 563, which asks the recipient to understand that the speaker was expressing the damaging idea.
A recipient reads a whole publication, so meaning comes from the whole and not from the words a plaintiff underlines. A phrase that looks defamatory alone may carry no such meaning when read with the full story. In Clawson v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, LLC, the terms “informer” and “FBI informer” were held not defamatory when read in light of the entire story.8
Headlines test the principle hardest, because a headline stands apart from the story it introduces. A newspaper headline can be defamatory, but it is actionable or not depending on whether the story as a whole negates the defamatory implication.9 Courts have usually read a headline together with its accompanying story.10 The practice is not mechanical. In Kaelin v. Globe Communications Corp., a headline implied that the plaintiff was suspected of murdering Nicole Brown Simpson, and the story appeared seventeen pages away. The Ninth Circuit concluded that a jury could find the headline libelous, because text so far removed would not cure it.11 What separates Kaelin from Clawson is whether recipients are likely to reach the part of the publication that fixes the meaning. In Clawson the story supplied the setting for the words a reader met in it. In Kaelin the headline was what many readers would absorb, and the correcting text sat where many would never read it.12
The third step filters, and the fourth puts the plaintiff’s proof where the injury occurs, in the audience. Students commonly build the analysis around what the speaker meant, when the controlling facts are what a reasonable audience took from the whole publication. Facts outside the publication shape that understanding too, because recipients bring what they already know to the words. The next subsection takes up statements that look harmless on their face and become defamatory for that reason.
Extrinsic Facts and Innuendo
Section 563 makes the recipient’s understanding the measure of meaning, and a recipient never reads words in a vacuum.16 What the recipient already knows about the people, places, and events a statement mentions enters the meaning the recipient takes away. Facts that lie outside the communication but are known to the recipient are called extrinsic facts, and they can turn a harmless-looking sentence into a stinging one. In the standard illustration, the statement “John Smith resides in Pleasantville” may be defamatory if one or more recipients know that Pleasantville is a state mental hospital.17 A reader who has never heard of the town takes the sentence as an address. A reader who knows what the town is takes it as an imputation of mental illness, a meaning that can lead people to avoid the plaintiff even though it implies no failing of morality or integrity.18
The law counts what recipients know because reputation lives in the minds of the people who receive a statement. A recipient who knows the extrinsic fact, and therefore thinks less of the plaintiff or avoids the plaintiff, has been affected exactly as the tort contemplates, however innocent the sentence looks to someone without the fact. The reasoning also runs the other way. If no one who read the Pleasantville sentence knew what Pleasantville was, every recipient understood only an address, nothing lowered the plaintiff in anyone’s esteem, and the statement has no defamatory meaning. That is why the plaintiff, who must prove the recipient’s understanding of the defamatory meaning, must also show that some recipients knew the extrinsic fact and drew the inference.19
Facts about the plaintiff’s own situation can change what words do in a similar way. A communication that the plaintiff cannot or may not be able to repay debts is generally not defamatory when the plaintiff does not conduct a business, but it generally is defamatory when the plaintiff does conduct one.20 In both settings the words are identical, and a fact outside them decides the outcome.
The reported cases show the pattern in several settings. Morrison v. Ritchie & Co. is the classic example of a publication that was defamatory only because of extrinsic facts: a newspaper announced that Mrs. Morrison had given birth to twins when she had been married for less than two months, which implied that she had conceived them before the marriage.21 In Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., a newspaper printed a photograph of Mr. M. Corrigan, a race horse owner, with a caption identifying him and a woman whose engagement to him had been announced. Corrigan was married to another woman at the time, and the woman in the photograph sued, claiming that people who knew her would read the caption as saying she lived with Corrigan without being married to him. The Court of Appeal upheld a judgment in her favor and rejected the argument that the publisher could not be liable without knowing the extrinsic facts.22 An American case, Smith v. Smith, involved a woman who sued her former husband because his marriage-license application stated that the marriage would be his first, implying to those who knew of her that she had never been his wife and had lived with him as his mistress.23 The two cases differ in the source of the words. In Smith the statement came from the man who knew the relationship, while the publisher in Cassidy argued that it lacked knowledge of the facts and lost. Religious practice can supply extrinsic facts as well: a statement that a butcher shop sells bacon says nothing discreditable on its face, but if the butcher is an Orthodox Jew it implies a violation of religious practice, and the court in Braun v. Armour & Co. found a cause of action stated.
At common law, a plaintiff whose statement was not defamatory on its face had to plead the extrinsic circumstances that gave it a defamatory meaning, set out the communication verbatim, and then explain the defamatory meaning claimed. A few jurisdictions still follow these requirements.24 Three terms name the parts of such a complaint:
- Inducement is the pleading of the extrinsic facts that give the communication a defamatory meaning.
- Colloquium is the pleading of the extrinsic facts that lead recipients to understand the communication as referring to the plaintiff.
- Innuendo is the statement of the defamatory meaning the plaintiff claims recipients took from the communication.
In the Morrison announcement, the inducement is that Mrs. Morrison had been married less than two months when the twins were born, and the innuendo is that she had conceived them before the marriage. Today the word innuendo is also used loosely for any implied defamatory meaning, even one that rests on no extrinsic fact.25 The label matters less than the question beneath it, which is what recipients who had the facts took the words to say.
Judge and jury divide the work as they did for ordinary meaning, with one adjustment. The court decides whether the communication could reasonably have been understood, by recipients aware of the extrinsic facts, to carry the defamatory meaning the plaintiff alleges, and if so, the trier decides whether it was in fact understood that way.26 The reasonable recipient the court imagines is one who has the facts, because the claim concerns the people who know them. Knowing a fact does not by itself carry a plaintiff past the court, however.
In the Pleasantville example, the words name a place, and the recipient’s knowledge about that place completes the statement. In the zoning item, the knowledge concerns the plaintiff’s past, and the words never touch it. A court therefore asks whether the words as written, read together with what knowing recipients know, say the defamatory thing.
The number of recipients who hold the extrinsic fact seems at first to conflict with the community-standard rule from the earlier discussion of whose esteem counts. A statement that would harm the plaintiff’s reputation with only a small proportion of the population is not defamatory, yet a defendant can be liable when only a few people knew the extrinsic facts that gave a communication its defamatory meaning, as in Bindrim v. Mitchell.27 The two rules measure different things. The community-standard rule asks whether the group whose disapproval is invoked is one the law will credit. The knowing-recipients rule recognizes that the audience able to read the sting may be small, and may be exactly the audience whose opinion governs the plaintiff’s standing. A small group does not excuse the plaintiff from showing that its reaction is one the law credits, but its size is no obstacle by itself.
Two questions remain for later sections. Cassidy’s rejection of the publisher’s lack-of-knowledge argument states the common-law starting point, and whether a publisher had reason to know that its words carried a damaging connotation is a question of fault. Whether cases that depend on extrinsic facts require proof of special damages is a question for the sections on actionability and harm. A complete analysis of an innocent-looking statement therefore asks first whether any recipient knew facts that changed the meaning of the words, and then whether the publisher can invoke the fault requirement.