Concept
Unprivileged Publication
Defamation prima facie case: defamatory statement of and concerning the plaintiff
Unprivileged Publication
The second requirement of a defamation claim is “an unprivileged publication to a third party.”1 The publication element asked whether the defendant communicated the matter to someone other than the plaintiff. This element asks whether the law protected the defendant in doing so. A privilege permits a speaker to say what would otherwise be actionable. The statement may be false, defamatory, and delivered to a third person, and the plaintiff can still recover nothing, because the requirements are cumulative and a privilege defeats the claim at the second of them.2
Privileges exist because some communications are worth more than the injuries the law leaves unremedied. A speaker who had to answer for every error would withhold information that listeners need, and the silence would cost more than the occasional damaged reputation. The law therefore grades its protection by how hard it is to lose. An absolute privilege protects certain speakers in certain functions, whatever the truth of what they say and whatever their motive. A conditional privilege protects good-faith communications that serve a legitimate interest, and the speaker loses it by abusing the occasion.
The burdens follow the same split. At common law the defendant had to prove defenses and privileges, so the defendant must first establish an occasion that qualifies.3 For a conditional privilege, the plaintiff must then prove its abuse.4 Privilege and truth are separate inquiries. Falsity belongs to the first requirement and privilege to the second, so a defendant who cannot prove truth may still be protected, and a protected defendant has no need to prove it. This chapter treats privilege only as far as needed to place it within the prima facie case; the full study of defenses belongs elsewhere.
Absolute Privileges
An absolute privilege is the strongest protection the law gives a speaker. A person performing a protected function may publish defamatory matter related to that function without liability, whether or not the statement is false and whether or not the speaker acted from malice. Only one question remains open: whether the speech belongs to the protected function. If it does, the privilege defeats the claim even though the matter was defamatory and reached an audience.5
The protected functions work by people saying things about other people. A lawyer alleges wrongdoing in a pleading, a witness describes what a neighbor did, a legislator criticizes an official, and an agency head reports on a subordinate. If each could be sued whenever the target denied the charge, each would ask before speaking whether a jury might later find the statement false, and the safe answer would usually be to say less. The court, the legislature, or the agency would then receive less information than it needs, a cost the law treats as greater than the injury one plaintiff goes without remedy for. The protection is absolute rather than conditional for a related reason. A privilege that a plaintiff could defeat by proving bad motive would still expose the speaker to a trial about state of mind, and the prospect of that trial is what would hold the speaker back.
The recognized absolute privileges track those functions, and each has its own Restatement provision.
- Judicial proceedings: judges and other judicial officers, attorneys, parties, witnesses, and jurors are absolutely privileged, while performing their functions, to publish defamatory matter that has some relation to the proceeding (Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 585 to 589).6
- Legislative proceedings: a member of Congress or of a state or local legislative body is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter in performing legislative functions, and a witness holds the same protection when testifying or communicating before the proceeding, if the matter relates to it (§§ 590 and 590A).7
- Executive and administrative officers: federal executive and administrative officers, and governors and other high-level state executives, are absolutely privileged for communications within the scope of their official duties and discretion, while lower-level state officers may or may not hold the privilege, depending on the jurisdiction (§ 591).8
- Spouses: a spouse is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter to the other spouse (§ 592).9
- Publications required by law: a person required by law to publish defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it, as when a newspaper must print an official notice (§ 592A).10
Two items on the list rest on reasons other than candor in a public process. The spousal privilege shields confidences inside a marriage from later scrutiny of truth and motive. The privilege for publications required by law exists because a newspaper that must print an official notice has no choice about publishing it, and liability would punish compliance with the law.
Each privilege reaches only what falls within its function. The judicial privilege covers matter that has some relation to the proceeding, and the legislative privilege for witnesses carries the same relation requirement, so the protection follows the function and cannot grow into a general license to defame.11
The same boundary appears in employment disputes. In Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., an employer gave a truck driver a warning letter, and when the employer refused to withdraw it he filed a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement. The letter and his protest went through the grievance procedure to the union business agent and the manager of labor relations. The court held that the employer was absolutely privileged to publish the letter to the parties entitled to receive it, which formed a protective circle around the communication.12 When the driver returned from vacation, though, other drivers questioned him about the warning, and it was discussed over the citizens band radio. Only a handful of employer sources could have started that talk, so the driver was entitled to try to prove an unprivileged publication through circumstantial evidence.13 Inside the circle the privilege applied. Outside it, the privilege was gone, as it was for the witness who left the courtroom.
Conditional Privileges and Abuse
A conditional privilege protects a defamatory communication made in good faith on an occasion when someone has a legitimate interest in the information. Unlike an absolute privilege, it survives only if the speaker meets conditions, and the chief condition is a belief that the statement is true.15 The doctrine sits between strict liability and complete immunity. A speaker who makes an honest mistake on a proper occasion is safe, and a speaker who exploits the occasion is not.
Society wants certain information to move. A former employer answering a prospective employer's inquiry, a brother telling his sister what he knows about her fiancé, and a citizen reporting a suspected crime all serve interests the law values, and each would hesitate to speak if forced to guarantee accuracy against every later denial. The protection is conditional because its justification fails when the speaker knows the statement is false or uses the occasion to injure, since that speaker no longer serves the interest that earned the protection. The allocation of burdens reflects this. The defendant must show an occasion that qualifies, which makes the communication presumptively proper.16 The plaintiff must then prove abuse when the issue is properly raised, and the facts that prove it, such as what the speaker believed and why the speaker spoke, are the plaintiff's only way around a privilege already established.17
The Restatement sorts the protected occasions by whose interest the communication serves. These groups are the ones most often tested:
- The publisher's interest: information affecting a sufficiently important interest of the speaker, such as a lawful business or pecuniary interest, bodily security, property, family, or the speaker's own reputation, that will help the recipient protect that interest (§ 594).18
- The recipient's or a third person's interest: information affecting a sufficiently important interest of the recipient or another, given to a person to whom the speaker owes a legal duty or whom generally accepted standards of decent conduct permit the speaker to tell, as in an employer's report on an employee or a reply to a request (§ 595).19
- A common interest: information that another person who shares an interest with the speaker, such as a business partner, a co-owner, or a member of a fraternal or charitable organization, is entitled to know (§ 596).20
- Family relationships: information that will help protect the well-being of a member of the speaker's immediate family, or of the recipient's immediate family where the recipient asked or decent conduct otherwise allows the telling (§ 597).21
- The public interest: information that a sufficiently important public interest requires the speaker to give to a public officer or other person authorized to act, as in a report of a crime or of misconduct by a public official (§ 598).22
- Inferior state officers: communications required or permitted in the performance of duty by lower-level government employees who lack an absolute privilege (§ 598A).23
Each category depends on what the speaker correctly or reasonably believes about the circumstances. The occasion fixes only what the speaker may do. Whether the speaker did only that is the question of abuse, and four kinds of abuse defeat the privilege.
The first and most basic is knowledge of falsity. A speaker who knows a defamatory statement is false, or does not believe it, cannot claim the privilege, because the privilege protects an interest in information and a knowing falsehood supplies none.24 Courts disagree about how much less than knowledge forfeits the privilege. Before Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., a majority asked objectively whether the speaker had reasonable grounds for believing the statement true, while a sizeable minority, following the English rule, asked only whether the speaker acted in good faith and without reckless disregard of its falsity.25 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600 adopts the reckless-disregard test.26
Gertz sharpened the question. Where it applies, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was at fault, so the issue is whether a defendant proved negligent may still invoke a conditional privilege. Maryland said yes in Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, holding the malice needed to defeat the privilege stricter than negligence and requiring at least reckless disregard for the truth. Virginia, in Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, adopted the Gertz negligence standard and still maintained the privilege.27 The logic is plain. If abuse meant only that the speaker lacked reasonable grounds, a plaintiff who proved Gertz negligence would prove abuse in the same stroke, and the privilege would protect no one. The belief requirement has one narrow exception. A speaker may be privileged to publish a defamatory rumor or suspicion even while believing it untrue, provided the speaker states it as a rumor or suspicion and not as fact and the publication is reasonable given the relation of the parties, the importance of the interests, and the harm likely to follow.28 A recipient told only that a rumor exists is not misled about what the speaker knows.
The second kind of abuse is a purpose other than protecting the interest that gave rise to the privilege. There is no conditional privilege unless the speaker publishes to protect that interest and reasonably believes the publication necessary to that end.29 The privilege licenses one thing, which is protecting an interest by informing someone who can help. A speaker who uses the same words to pursue a grievance or a rivalry is doing something else with the occasion.
The third and fourth kinds concern scope. There is no conditional privilege to the extent the speaker knowingly publishes the matter to a person outside the privilege's scope, unless the speaker reasonably believes that publication a proper way of reaching the proper person.30 The privilege is likewise lost to the extent the speaker adds unprivileged matter, and if the added matter cannot be separated from the rest, the whole privilege is lost.31 Both rules follow from the way the privilege is justified. It covers the audience that has the corresponding interest and the content that serves that interest. Each extra listener with no stake, and each extra accusation unrelated to the interest, adds reputational harm without adding anything the law wanted communicated.
Employment disputes generate many of the scope questions. Employers generally hold a qualified privilege when they discuss employment matters with people who share a corresponding interest or duty, and the privilege can be pierced if the employer acted recklessly or with malice, as in Lyons v. National Car Rental System, Inc.32 Courts that treat a report between company officers as a publication send the dispute into the same framework. In Hagebak v. Stone, the court held that intra-corporate communications are subject only to a qualified privilege that the plaintiff can rebut.33
The constitutional rules change how much work the privilege does. Suppose a public official sues over a false news report about official conduct and the newspaper pleads a common-law conditional privilege. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan required that makers of statements about public officials be afforded a conditional privilege that the official can defeat only by proving actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.34 The official already carries that burden as part of the case, so a common-law privilege lost only through recklessness offers the newspaper nothing beyond what the Constitution supplies. Gertz works the same way for a private plaintiff suing over a matter of public interest, because states may choose their own standard so long as it demands at least negligence, which in effect lets a state adopt a conditional privilege defeated by negligence or, if the state prefers, only by actual malice.35 Where New York Times or Gertz applies, then, the conditional privilege is partly or wholly irrelevant, because the plaintiff must prove fault anyway.36 The Restatement's own commentary says that when a publisher should answer for failing to use due care, a conditional privilege is not needed and should not apply, and some courts hold that none exists when the plaintiff is already subject to the New York Times standard.37
The common-law privilege keeps real force where the constitutional rules do not reach. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court allowed states to continue imposing strict liability, and apparently presumed damages, when the speech does not involve a matter of public interest.38 Where purely private concern is involved, the common-law rules stand and the plaintiff need prove no fault, so the privilege and the abuse rules above can decide the case.39 An employer's reference about a former worker, which touches no public issue, is the typical setting. On an exam, spend the time on privilege there, and treat it briefly when the plaintiff is a public official and the fault burden has already absorbed the question.