Concept
Special Harm and Libel
Libel versus slander and when special harm is required
Special Harm and Libel
Classifying a statement as libel decides what the plaintiff must prove. One who falsely publishes defamatory matter in a manner that makes the publication a libel is liable although no special harm results.1 The libel plaintiff needs a false, defamatory publication, and the claim never asks whether the statement cost the plaintiff money.
Special harm means pecuniary loss. Where slander requires proof of special damages, they must be of a pecuniary character, and mental distress and physical illness, however serious, do not substitute for them.2 Slander that is not actionable per se supports liability only if it is the legal cause of special harm.3 The slander sections develop that requirement in full. Here it is enough to hold the contrast: a slander plaintiff usually must point to a lost job or a lost customer, and a libel plaintiff may stop at the publication.
Two subsections follow. The first teaches the majority rule that libel needs no special harm and explains why the law presumes injury. The second takes up a minority of states that exempt one kind of libel from that rule, an exception the Restatement's text does not contain.4
Libel Needs No Special Harm
The common-law rule works through presumption. Once the plaintiff showed publication of defamatory material about her, courts presumed that the publication was made with malice, that the words were false, and that she had suffered damages. Proof of three elements therefore supported substantial damages: publication of defamatory material, of and concerning the plaintiff, to a third person. Because the plaintiff did not have to prove the defendant's fault, these rules amounted to prima facie strict liability.5
The presumption directs the inquiry to the statement and away from its effects. The question is whether the publication is of a defamatory nature, not how much harm it did, so the plaintiff recovers even when no actual harm is demonstrable.6 Nor must the plaintiff show that anyone believed the statement. It is enough that the statement would lead a substantial number in the community to reduce dealings with the plaintiff or to hold her in lower esteem.7 Evidence of actual injury remains available to a plaintiff who has it, but the claim does not depend on it.
Two justifications support the presumption, and the first answers a problem of proof. A dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. described the traditional scheme this way: general damages for loss of reputation were granted without special proof because the content of the publication was itself so likely to cause injury, and because the effect of defamatory statements is often so subtle and indirect that no one can trace it directly to a loss suffered by the person defamed.8 Readers who think less of a plaintiff seldom announce it. They stop returning calls, and the plaintiff cannot tie that quiet withdrawal to the publication.
The second justification is vindication. Restatement commentary describes the rule as serving a vindicatory function by enabling the plaintiff publicly to brand the publication false, and it adds that the rule often permits a defamed person to expose the groundless character of a rumor before harm to reputation has resulted.9 The first justification explains why the law presumes injury, and the second explains why a plaintiff with no losses to count would sue at all. The price is that a jury may award substantial sums untethered to proven loss, which is why the constitutional limits discussed below matter.
The bookkeeper's case shows why classification is the first move in a defamation problem. A plaintiff who proves nothing beyond the libel still wins something, because one who is liable for a libel is liable for at least nominal damages.10 The rule matters most to plaintiffs with no salary at risk, such as a retiree, who are the least able to show pecuniary loss.
The phrase per se causes trouble because courts use it in two senses. In one, a statement is actionable per se when the plaintiff need not prove special harm. The slander per se categories use the word this way, and in this sense every libel is actionable per se. In the other, a statement is defamatory per se when its defamatory meaning is apparent on its face, in contrast to per quod, meaning defamatory only through extrinsic facts. A statement that John Smith resides in Pleasantville looks harmless on its face, yet it is defamatory to recipients who know that Pleasantville is a state mental hospital.11 Printed and circulated, that statement is a libel, and under the Restatement rule the plaintiff proves the extrinsic fact to show the meaning without proving any pecuniary loss.12 Running the two senses together led many American courts to demand special damages whenever a libel, like a slander, needed an innuendo to reveal its defamatory meaning.13 A minority of states still follow that approach, and the next subsection examines it.14
The common-law presumption is the majority rule, and the Constitution now limits it in part. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., the Court ruled that states may continue to impose strict liability, and apparently to award presumed damages, in cases that do not involve matters of public interest. That rule clearly covers private plaintiffs suing non-media defendants.15 Where the matter is one of public concern, Gertz limits the presumption. Absent actual malice, a plaintiff who has shown only negligence cannot recover presumed damages and must prove actual injury, a category that includes reputational harm and emotional distress as well as economic loss. The section on constitutional limits takes up that rule in detail. For now, hold two points: section 569 survives as a rule that no pecuniary loss is needed, and the constitutional rule decides whether a jury may presume the rest.
Libel Per Quod Minority Rule
In a minority of jurisdictions, a libel that is not defamatory on its face and needs reference to extrinsic facts to establish its defamatory meaning is not actionable without proof of special harm. Courts call this libel per quod.17 The Restatement takes the opposite view and requires no special harm for any libel.18 The label therefore marks an exception that some states apply and others reject, and an answer must say which approach governs.
The per quod rule sits awkwardly beside the slander rules. A spoken accusation of a crime punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution, or one that public opinion regards as involving moral turpitude, is actionable without special harm.19 In a per quod state, the same accusation made in print by implication may receive less help than the spoken version, even though print is the form that makes libel the more dangerous.
Extrinsic facts do work in every jurisdiction, but the work differs. A communication is defamatory only if the recipient understands it in a defamatory sense, and facts the recipient knows are taken into account in deciding what it meant. At common law, a plaintiff whose statement was not defamatory on its face had to plead the extrinsic circumstances that gave it its defamatory meaning, called the inducement, then set out the communication verbatim and explain the meaning claimed for it, called the innuendo. A few jurisdictions still require this.20 In a section 569 state, the plaintiff proves the extrinsic facts to establish what the words meant and stops there. In a per quod state, the plaintiff proves the same facts and then carries a second burden, pecuniary loss, that the need for extrinsic facts triggered. The common error is to treat the first burden as if it were the second.
Deciding what the words say on their own is a judgment call, and in a per quod state it decides which side of the line the plaintiff stands on. In Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., the Fifth Circuit called it a close question whether a publication was so clearly defamatory that the case should not go to the jury. It held that the publication itself, without reference to extrinsic facts, was capable of carrying a defamatory meaning, and that a jury should decide whether the common mind understood it that way.21 A holding of that kind keeps a plaintiff on the side of the line where the special-harm requirement never arises, so the plaintiff's first argument in a per quod state is often that the words defame without outside help.
The per quod doctrine owes part of its survival to confusion over the phrase per se. A treatise on damages observed that using per se both for slander that is actionable without special damage and for defamation that needs no innuendo produced confusion, and that many American courts began requiring special damages whenever the defamation, slander or libel, needed an innuendo to reveal its meaning.22 A dissent in Gertz, describing a 1965 draft of the Restatement (Second), reported that all courts except Virginia agreed that libel defamatory on its face is actionable without proof of damage. It counted ten jurisdictions that kept the older rule for libel not defamatory on its face, and twenty-four that treated such libel like slander.23 That tally is a half-century-old snapshot, and later sources describe the per quod rule as a minority position.24 Treat the figures as evidence that the rule has been contested, and check the jurisdiction instead of relying on a count.
Two justifications have been offered for the rule, and both are weak. The first concerns fault. A publisher who does not know the facts that make a statement defamatory is unlikely to be at fault, so liability without any provable loss seemed harsh.25 The Constitution now polices fault directly, since Gertz forbids liability without fault at least on matters of public concern, and that development has eroded the rule's advantage. The second justification assumes that a statement needing outside facts to be understood does little damage. The assumption fails for the readers who matter. A reader who knows the extrinsic fact understands the accusation as fully as one who reads it in plain words, so the injury to that reader's opinion of the plaintiff can be the same. The doctrine therefore denies redress to some people who were in fact libeled, which is the problem the presumption of harm in libel exists to solve.
The second step does the real work. A section 569 answer applied in a per quod state overstates the plaintiff's case, and a per quod answer applied in a section 569 state wrongly demands proof of lost money. Because sources disagree about how many states follow each rule, an essay should name the approach, say what the facts show about extrinsic meaning, and give the result under both approaches when the jurisdiction is unidentified.