Concept
Liability for Another's Repetition
Publication, republication, and the single publication rule
Liability for Another's Repetition
A defamatory remark rarely stays where it lands. The listener tells a friend, a reporter runs the story, a customer hears of it, and the plaintiff's loss arrives through someone other than the defendant. Section 576 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts decides when the original speaker answers for that loss. It provides that the publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, (a) the third person was privileged to repeat it, (b) the original defamer authorized or intended the repetition, or (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected.1
Each term in that rule does work. Legal cause means that the law attributes the harm to the original publication, so the original defamer answers for it although someone else's act was its immediate source. The words "if, but only if" make the list exclusive: a repetition that fits none of the three conditions leaves the original defamer without responsibility for what it caused. Special harm is the specific loss, ordinarily pecuniary, that a plaintiff must plead and prove when slander is not actionable without it, such as a lost job or a lost customer.2 The matter repeated must also be defamatory in the first place, which means that it tends so to harm the plaintiff's reputation as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.3
Section 576 answers one question only: whether the original speaker is responsible for harm that flows from someone else's repetition. Whether the repeater is liable in his own right is a separate question, taken up in the next section, and an exam answer should keep the two apart. Under § 576 the plaintiff must prove that a repetition caused special harm and that one of the three conditions ties that repetition back to the original speaker. The conditions are best taken in turn, beginning with the one that surprises students most: the repeater's privilege.
Privileged Repetition
The first condition applies when the third person was privileged to repeat the defamatory matter, and under it the original defamer remains answerable for the special harm the repetition causes.4 A privilege in this setting is a legal excuse that lets a person pass defamatory matter along without liability when the occasion warrants, as when someone reports a suspicion to a person who has a duty or a legitimate interest in hearing it. The result looks backward at first. If the repeater did nothing wrong, what is left for the original speaker to answer for?
The answer is that two questions are being asked about two different people, and the repeater's privilege settles only one of them. Whether the repeater may be sued turns on the repeater's own occasion: what was said, to whom, and why. Whether the original defamer is responsible for the harm that followed turns on causation, meaning whether the original publication set in motion the chain that ended in the plaintiff's loss. A privilege excuses the repeater's act but leaves untouched the fact that the repetition occurred only because the original speaker supplied the matter. Section 576 is a causation provision, which is why it can say that the original publication remains a legal cause of the special harm although the person who carried the matter forward acted within a privilege.5 The privilege that counts under this prong is the repeater's. Whether the original communication was itself privileged is a separate question.
Consider what the law would look like without the rule. If the repeater's privilege also freed the original speaker, a defamer could hand a falsehood to someone with a duty to pass it on and let the privileged retelling carry the damage. The repeater could not be sued because of the privilege, and the source could not be sued because the harm arrived through the repeater, so a plaintiff who lost a job would have a loss and no defendant. Section 576(a) closes that gap by keeping the original speaker in the chain of responsibility. The privilege continues to do its own work: it lets people with a legitimate stake in the matter speak without fear of suit, and it has no need to shelter the person who started the matter on its way.
Privilege is only one of three routes by which a repetition can be tied back to the original speaker. A repetition that was neither privileged, authorized, intended, nor reasonably to be expected meets none of the conditions, and the original speaker is not responsible for what it caused.6 Because the conditions are alternatives, a privileged repetition satisfies the section by itself, and the plaintiff need not also show authorization or foreseeability. The plaintiff must still prove that special harm resulted from the repetition, since § 576 supplies the causal link and leaves the proof of damages where it was. An exam answer should resolve the repeater's privilege and the original speaker's responsibility in separate sentences, because a student who treats the privilege as a defense for both people has merged the two questions.
Authorized or Intended Repetition
The second condition makes the original defamer responsible for special harm when the defamer authorized or intended the repetition.8 The first condition looked to the repeater's occasion, and this one looks to the defamer's purpose. A defamer authorizes a repetition by approving or requesting it and intends one by setting out to bring it about, whether or not the repeater was ever asked. Either way, the retelling is the result the defamer was working toward.
The reason appears once the repeater's role is described accurately. A defamer who hands matter to a person so that the person will spread it uses the repeater as an instrument, much as a speaker uses a loudspeaker, and the wider damage follows from the defamer's own purpose. The question the other conditions must ask, whether a stranger's independent decision to repeat should be charged to the original speaker, does not arise here, because the speaker made the decision.
Brown v. First National Bank illustrates the point. A bank investigated missing funds and terminated the plaintiff after she failed a polygraph test. The bank manager then relayed information about the situation to a newspaper for two articles. Neither article mentioned the plaintiff herself, but she claimed that they accused her of embezzlement, and the court held the bank liable for libel for republication of the information given to the reporter.9 The manager wrote none of the articles, and the newspaper chose its own words. Even so, the manager had supplied the information in order that it be published, and the bank answered for what the paper printed.
The defamer's purpose is therefore the fact that decides this condition. When the defamer neither authorized nor intended the repetition, the inquiry does not end, because the plaintiff may still reach the third condition, taken up next. A plaintiff who relies on § 576(b) must also prove that special harm resulted from the repetition, since the condition supplies the link back to the original defamer and leaves the proof of damages where it was.10
Reasonably Expected Repetition
The third condition reaches the repetition that neither a privilege nor the defamer's own purpose accounts for. The original publication is a legal cause of special harm resulting from a third person's repetition if the repetition was reasonably to be expected.12 The first two conditions looked to the repeater's excuse and the defamer's aim, and this one looks to the foreseeable course of events. A speaker who never wanted the matter passed along, and who gave no instruction to pass it along, can still answer for what a retelling costs the plaintiff. Because the conditions are alternatives, the plaintiff needs only one, so a foreseeable repetition satisfies the section without any showing of privilege or authorization.
Tying responsibility to foreseeability avoids two opposite failures. A rule confined to the speaker's own communications would leave a plaintiff without recovery for most of the harm, because a damaging accusation seldom stays with its first audience. A rule with no limit would charge the speaker with the independent choices of strangers he could not have anticipated, and the chain of liability would have no end. Foreseeability marks the stopping point: the speaker answers for the consequences his own act made predictable and escapes responsibility for the unforeseeable decisions of others. Later decisions moved toward that line, holding the original publisher liable for damages due to a repetition that might reasonably have been anticipated.13
The inquiry looks at the speaker's circumstances at the moment of speaking, so it is forward-looking, as every foreseeability question is. Facts that naturally bear on it include who received the matter and what role that person plays, the medium used, whether the speaker asked for confidence or invited sharing, and whether passing such information along is routine in the setting. A communication to someone whose role is to pass such matters along carries onward travel with it, while a confidence shared in a closed room does not. Students most often go wrong by reasoning backward from the fact that the repetition happened and the plaintiff was hurt. A retelling that occurred is not thereby one that was reasonably to be expected. The question is what a person in the speaker's position would have anticipated when the words left the speaker.
The general rule asks whether the republication was reasonably foreseeable, as in Hickey v. St. Martin's Press, Inc.14 Courts agree on the question and disagree about how demanding it is. The standard may be applied strictly, as in Geraci v. Probst, or liberally so as to reach any repetition that is reasonably foreseeable, as in Tunca v. Painter.15 The disagreement is real enough that majority and dissenting justices on a single court have divided over it, as in Weaver v. Beneficial Finance Co.16 For an exam answer, the logic of the two readings gives a practical rule: facts that satisfy the strict approach satisfy the liberal one automatically, while the reverse is not true. When the jurisdiction's approach is unknown, state both readings and apply each.
The self-publication cases rest on a similar intuition. A defamation communicated directly only to the plaintiff is ordinarily not publication, but if the defendant can foresee that the plaintiff will feel compelled to pass it on to others, the defendant is himself a publisher. A defendant who hands a written defamation to an unsighted person, for example, can expect that the recipient will have others read it.17 Those cases belong to the earlier discussion of publication by the plaintiff, but they show foreseeable onward travel doing there the same work it does here.
Online forums raise the same question in a newer setting. Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., which concerns reader comments in a newspaper's online forum, belongs with the chapter's later treatment of online publication. Two limits carry over from the earlier conditions. The plaintiff must still prove special harm that resulted from the repetition, since § 576 supplies only the causal link.18 And nothing in § 576(c) decides whether the repeater is liable in his own right.