Concept
Republisher's Liability
Publication, republication, and the single publication rule
Republisher's Liability
One who repeats another's defamation answers for it as though he had made it up. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578, a person who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it, unless he only delivers or transmits defamation published by a third person.1 A republisher is a publisher like any other: he communicates the matter to a third person. That the matter began with someone else changes nothing, because the republisher chose to carry it to a new audience, and § 578 gives that choice the same legal weight as the original one.
Section 578 answers a different question from § 576. Section 576 asks when the original speaker is legally responsible for special harm caused by a third person's repetition, and it makes him responsible if, but only if, the third person was privileged to repeat the matter, the original speaker authorized or intended the repetition, or the repetition was reasonably to be expected.2 Later decisions tend to hold the original publisher liable for damages due to a repetition that might reasonably have been anticipated.3 Section 578 asks about the repeater instead. The retelling is the repeater's own communication to a third person, so it is a publication in its own right, and his liability does not depend on what the first speaker authorized, intended, or expected. A plaintiff hurt by a rumor that passed through several mouths may therefore sue the source under § 576 and each repeater under § 578, and each claim is analyzed on its own.
Each repetition injures reputation anew. A communication is defamatory if it tends to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him,4 and a new audience that hears the charge is a new audience whose estimation may fall. If naming a source could excuse the repeater, a charge could pass through any number of mouths, each safe behind the one before, while the first mouth stayed anonymous or out of reach. Holding every repeater to account puts the cost of spreading a charge on the person who chooses to spread it, and a repeater who doubts the charge can decline to pass it on.
Repeaters most often reach for three devices: naming the source, repeating the charge accurately, and disclaiming belief in it. None of them works. One is not ordinarily relieved of liability for repeating a defamatory charge even if he indicates the source and repeats it accurately, and even if he adds that he does not believe it.5 Courts have applied the rule to a repeater who named the source, as in Haines v. Campbell, and to one who professed disbelief, as in Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co. The three devices fail for the same reason. Defamatory meaning turns on how the recipient reasonably understands the communication in its context,6 and an attribution or a stated doubt is only part of that context. A listener who hears the charge with the hedge attached ordinarily still receives the charge, and the speaker's private doubt changes nothing about what the listener took away. A fact pattern that stresses how faithfully the defendant quoted his source therefore points to a fact that does not decide the question.
Do not confuse republication with the self-publication cases, in which the defendant speaks only to the plaintiff. That is ordinarily not publication, and the defendant becomes a publisher only if he can foresee that the plaintiff will feel compelled to pass the matter to others, as when he hands a written defamation to an unsighted person who will have others read it.7 The repeater needs no foreseeability argument of that kind, because he himself communicated the charge to a third person.
The rule reaches more than gossip. A newspaper that prints a defamatory report taken from another source republishes it, and those who put the report into print answer as republishers. A broadcaster stands in the same position: one who broadcasts defamatory matter by radio or television is subject to the same liability as an original publisher.8 The section on broadcasters develops that point.
The opening clause of § 578 keeps the rule from reaching everyone who touches the matter. Under § 581(1), one who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is liable if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.9 A newsstand operator who sells a paper without reason to know of a defamatory story in it falls on that side of the line. The editor who chose to print the story does not, because the editor did more than deliver it. The next section develops the knowledge standard and the groups it covers.
Two further limits come from outside the deliverer exception. A federal law protects internet service providers from liability for republication, and some states recognize a neutral-reporting privilege that shields the media when they republish a defamatory statement made by a responsible, prominent organization against a public figure, if the reporting is accurate and disinterested.10 Each operates as an exception to a baseline of republisher liability. The default answer on an exam is therefore that the repeater is liable unless one of these limits, or the exception for those who only deliver or transmit, is made out.