Concept
Distributors and Broadcasters
Publication, republication, and the single publication rule
Distributors and Broadcasters
A repeater of defamation ordinarily answers as though he had originated it, but one group escapes that rule: defendants who only deliver or transmit what a third person published.1 The law sorts the defendants around that exception into three tiers, according to how far each one chooses and controls what reaches the audience.
- Publishers, including newspaper and book publishers, answer for the defamation in their works, and the plaintiff need not prove that the publisher knew of it.2 Broadcasters belong in this tier.3
- Distributors, also called secondary publishers, answer only if they know or have reason to know of the defamatory character of what they deliver.4
- Conduits, the common-carrier type of defendant, are generally not liable, because they have no ability to screen or control defamatory material.5
This unit starts with the middle tier, the ordinary distributor. It then turns to the pure carrier and the Internet intermediary, and it ends with the broadcaster, whom the distributor’s exception expressly leaves out.6
Secondary Publishers
Section 581(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule: one who only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.7 Courts call these defendants distributors or secondary publishers, and the standard examples are news dealers and delivery persons, bookstores, libraries, telephone companies, and mail or message deliverers.8 The rule has a shelter and a limit, and each rests on its own reasoning.
The shelter exists because of what these businesses do. A bookstore stocks thousands of titles, a library lends them in bulk, and a newsstand takes in fresh bundles daily, so examining every item for defamatory content is usually impractical, and the risk of liability could deter such businesses from operating at all.9 If every dealer carried the author’s liability, it would have to read everything it handled, which the volume forbids, or refuse anything that might draw a claim, which would narrow the channels through which printed and recorded matter reaches the public. The limit works in the opposite direction. Once a dealer knows or has reason to know that a particular item is defamatory, the volume argument no longer helps, because the dealer faces one identifiable item and continuing to circulate it is a choice. A knowledge standard therefore leaves the innocent dealer alone and holds the informed one to account.
Knowledge and reason to know are separate routes to liability. Actual knowledge is the simple case: the dealer has read the item or has been told what it says. Reason to know is harder, and the comments to § 581 illustrate it with a track record. A dealer who knows that an author, publisher, newspaper, or magazine has a history of publishing “scandalous” items has reason to suspect the next one, and a federal district court in Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. read “scandalous” to mean defamatory.10 A dealer’s failure to read what it stocks supplies no reason to know, because distributors have no general duty to examine items for defamatory content before making them available.11 A rule that treated non-inspection as notice would impose that duty through the back door. The Restatement does not say who bears the burden of proof on reason to know, and it does not define the phrase further, so an exam answer should flag that gap and argue the facts instead of treating one allocation as settled.12
The decided cases involve exactly these businesses. A secondary publisher with no knowledge or reason to know of libelous matter is not liable, as in Balabanoff v. Fossani, which concerned a newspaper vendor, Vizetelly v. Mudie’s Select Library Ltd., which concerned a lending library, and Grisham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., where the telegram was innocent on its face.13 In the telegram case, nothing in the message put the carrier on guard. Notice is the fact that moves a dealer from the protected column to the liable one: a bookstore without notice does not answer for the defamatory statements in the books it sells, but a bookstore with notice of defamatory content can be liable as a distributor.14
Those who do more than deliver stand outside the shelter. Printers, and those who repeat or republish defamatory matter that others created, are not secondary publishers, so the knowledge standard does not protect them.15 A newspaper or book publishing company is liable even when it took the material innocently from someone else and had no reason for suspicion.16 The rationale for the shelter explains why. A publisher chooses what goes into its work and prepares it for readers, so it can examine a manuscript before multiplying it, while a vendor receives finished copies in volume with no comparable chance. The word “only” in § 581(1) carries the line: handing over or relaying another’s product is delivery, and selecting, preparing, printing, or repeating it is participation. One business can stand on both sides of the line, since a bookstore that sells a book delivers it, while a bookstore that prints its own flyer repeating the book’s accusation has republished the charge.17
Constitutional law narrows the common-law result for both kinds of defendant. Primary and secondary publishers alike now receive some protection from the constitutional rule against liability without fault, so a publisher’s exposure for innocent error is smaller than the common-law statement alone suggests.18
Carriers and Internet Intermediaries
A communications carrier or Internet service that only provides the means for transmitting messages is not a publisher at all, so it is not liable for transmitting or delivering defamatory messages in its system.20 Anderson v. New York Telephone Co. applied that rule to a telephone company, and Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co. applied it to an Internet service.21 The result goes a step beyond § 581(1), which speaks only of a knowledge standard and lists telephone companies and message deliverers among the defendants it covers.22 For a pure carrier, the question whether it knew or had reason to know never arises, because it is not a publisher to begin with.
The three tiers from the start of this unit explain the difference. Courts sort these defendants into publishers such as a book publisher, distributors such as a bookstore, and conduits such as a telephone company, and they hold distributors to an intermediate standard between the other two.23 Conduits are generally not liable because they have no ability to screen or control defamatory content.24 A telephone company carries each call as it is spoken and chooses nothing about what callers say. A newspaper editor made a selection that can be examined, and a bookseller can read the one title that a lawyer’s letter identifies, but a carrier has no comparable item to inspect and no editorial act to answer for. Older cases sometimes reached the same result through the knowledge standard, as in the Grisham telegram case, where the message was innocent on its face and the telegraph company escaped liability.25
The defendant’s role in the communication decides the classification. Anyone who actively takes part in communicating defamatory content is treated as having published it.26 That covers the printer and the broadcaster, and it covers the library that lends the material, although the library earns the knowledge-based shelter described above. A carrier’s role stops at supplying the means of transmission.
Internet intermediaries began in the same territory and ended somewhere else. Before Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Internet service providers were classified as secondary publishers, so their exposure turned on the knowledge standard.27 The statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), now provides: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”28 For a site that hosts a user’s post, the question is therefore no longer whether it knew or had reason to know of the defamation. The question is whether the claim treats it as the publisher or speaker of information that someone else provided. The text reaches only information provided by another, so a service that writes the accusation itself speaks its own words and remains an original publisher. Online republication comes up again later on this page.
Broadcasters
Section 581(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts takes one group out of the shelter: one who broadcasts defamatory matter by means of radio or television is subject to the same liability as an original publisher.31 The knowledge standard in § 581(1) is expressly made subject to subsection (2), so the broadcaster stands on the publisher’s side of the line even though, like a vendor, it carries words that others wrote.32 Section 578 excepts deliverers from the rule that a republisher answers as an original publisher, § 581(1) gives those deliverers a knowledge standard, and § 581(2) puts the broadcaster back where a newspaper publisher stands.33
The reason lies in what a station does. A library receives finished books in bulk, and a telephone company chooses nothing about what its callers say. A station selects what goes out over its own facilities and delivers it to its own audience, so deciding to put a program on the air is the kind of participation that makes a publisher, whoever wrote the program. The knowledge standard was built for defendants whose handling of the matter is passive. The station therefore gets nothing from the distributor’s usual argument that it neither knew nor had reason to know of the defamation: the exception does not apply to broadcasters, and the knowledge inquiry never begins.34 A newsstand operator who sells a paper carrying a defamatory story is protected if it had no reason to know of the story, while a station that broadcasts the same story with the same ignorance answers as an original publisher.
The harder question arises when the station did not originate the program. Under the Restatement, radio and television broadcasting is primary publication, but the law is divided on whether a station that carries a broadcast coming from a network or another station is a secondary publisher.35 Some courts hold that such a station is a primary publisher, as in Sorensen v. Wood and Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., while others treat it as a secondary publisher, as in Kelly v. Hoffman, Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., and Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes.”36 The two lines answer one situation in opposite ways. A station that takes a network feed may have no chance to screen the program beforehand. A court that stresses that inability sees a defendant resembling the vendor of a book it cannot read, while a court that stresses the station’s own decision to air the program sees the participation that makes a publisher. Legislatures have also taken up the question, and a number of states have enacted statutes, supported by broadcasters, that protect a station unless it failed to use due care.37 The Restatement takes the stricter position and treats the broadcasting station as an original publisher.38
On an exam, a fact pattern that stresses that the station merely aired a network feed is signaling this split. State the Restatement result first, note that some courts and statutes protect the station, and then apply whichever rule the jurisdiction in the problem follows.