Concept
Common Law Meets the First Amendment
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Constitutional Limits on Defamation
Common Law Meets the First Amendment
Until 1964, constitutional law left defamation to the states. Apart from the right to trial by jury, it did not touch liability, and the First Amendment was generally considered irrelevant to libel law.1 The Supreme Court had endorsed that view. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire placed libel in the class of utterance that is "no essential part in the exposition of ideas," and Beauharnais v. Illinois upheld a group libel law because libelous utterances are not "within the area of constitutionally protected speech."2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan overturned that premise, and the rest of this chapter builds on what it did. To see how much it changed, begin with the state common law it displaced.
The common-law plaintiff's task was light. She had to prove only that the defendant published a defamatory statement concerning her.3 The law supplied the rest by presuming fault, falsity, and damage.4 Liability turned on the meaning that readers or listeners took from the communication, not on what the defendant intended. A defendant could therefore be liable without meaning to defame anyone, without meaning to convey anything false, and even without meaning to refer to the plaintiff.5 Truth mattered, but only as a defense that the defendant had to plead and prove.6 The system put the risk on the speaker. Anyone who considered making a statement damaging to another's reputation was exposing himself to liability, and as between reputation and free speech, the common law plainly favored reputation.7
Consider a local newspaper that, relying on a source it reasonably trusts, reports that the county treasurer took a bribe. The report is false. At common law the treasurer's case is easy to state: the paper published a defamatory statement about him. Falsity, fault, and damage are presumed, the reporter's honest belief and reasonable care do not matter, and the paper escapes liability only by proving the story true.8 After Sullivan, the treasurer, as a public official, must prove with clear and convincing evidence that the statement was false and that the paper acted with actual malice, meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.9 An honest, reasonably careful reporter has done neither.
The fair-comment privilege gave such a paper little help. About three-quarters of the courts that considered the question held that the privilege covered only the expression of opinion and did not extend to misstatements of fact. Alabama's Supreme Court took that position, and the United States Supreme Court reversed it two years later in Sullivan.10
Sullivan itself presented the common-law structure at full strength. A Montgomery commissioner sued the New York Times and four Black clergymen over a full-page fundraising advertisement. The ad never mentioned him by name. It contained statements, some inaccurate, that criticized the police handling of student demonstrations in Montgomery.11 The trial judge told the jury that the statements were libelous per se and not privileged, so the defendants could be held liable if the jury found that they published the advertisement and that the statements were made "of and concerning" the commissioner. The jury also heard that "falsity and malice are presumed," that general damages "are presumed," and that punitive damages could be awarded even though actual damages were "neither found nor shown."12 The jury returned $500,000, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the verdict, and the United States Supreme Court unanimously overturned it.13
The Court first cleared away two reasons it might have stayed out. The case was a civil suit between private parties, and Alabama's rule was common law supplemented by statute, yet neither point mattered, because the test is not the form in which state power has been applied but whether such power has in fact been exercised.14 Nor could libel claim exemption by category. Like the other kinds of expression the Court had measured against the Constitution, it "can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations" and "must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."15 The Court then held that the First Amendment's guarantees of speech and press, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, require a limit on liability for defamatory statements.16 For a public official or a candidate, that limit means recovery only on clear and convincing proof that the statements were false and that the defendant acted with actual malice.17
Beneath the holding lies a tension, not hostility to reputation. The Court must balance the need to protect reputation, the obvious central concern of defamation law, against the desire to safeguard expression, which tort liability can chill and limit.18 The balance matters because liability rules help decide whether speakers are willing to take part in public discourse in good faith.19
Sullivan did not replace the common law; it added constitutional rules on top of it. Since 1964, constitutional decisions have reversed all three common-law presumptions, fault, falsity, and damages, in a substantial number of cases.20 Which cases depends on who the plaintiff is and what the speech concerns. The result is four categories: a public official or candidate; a public figure; a private figure on a matter of public concern; and a private figure on a matter not of public concern. The limits reach slander as well as libel.21 Most of the constitutional rules apply in addition to the common-law rules, not in substitution for them, and they operate separately from the common law of liability and defenses.22 In many reported cases the dispositive issue is constitutional rather than common law, and courts often rule for the defendant on constitutional grounds without deciding how the common law applies.23
The private-figure cases show how the layers fit together. Under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., there is no liability without fault, and damages are limited to compensation for actual injury, with no punitive or presumed damages unless knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity is proved.24 The Gertz Court reasoned that private figures have less access to media channels for counteracting false statements and have not voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye. States may therefore set their own standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster, so long as they do not impose liability without fault.25 Gertz held the New York Times standard inapplicable to its private plaintiff. It nonetheless ordered a new trial, because the jury had been allowed to impose liability without fault and to presume damages without proof of injury.26 The damages limit has its own boundary. It does not apply when the defamatory statement did not involve a matter of public concern, and in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. the Court ruled that in that category presumed and punitive damages do not require proof of actual malice.27
Later sections develop other limits. The major exception to the separateness of constitutional and common-law rules concerns the burden of proving whether the statement was true or false.28 In Hepps, for example, the trial court concluded that a Pennsylvania statute giving the defendant the burden of proving truth violated the Federal Constitution, and it instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity.29 The Court has also held that even intentional fabrication of quotations does not, by itself, prove actual malice if the statements were substantially accurate in reflecting what was said.30 And a statement on a matter of public concern must be provable as false before it can support liability, so an opinion that carries no provably false factual connotation receives full constitutional protection.31
On an exam, sort the claim by the plaintiff and the subject, never by the defendant's identity. Five Justices in Dun & Bradstreet, in separate opinions, expressly rejected any distinction between media and nonmedia defendants, and Justice White wrote that the First Amendment gives no more protection to the press in defamation suits than to others exercising their freedom of speech.32 Actual malice does not govern every plaintiff, either: for a private figure, the Court lets states define the standard of fault, short of liability without fault.33