Concept
Altered Quotations
Constitutional limits: public officials, public figures, and private plaintiffs
Altered Quotations
A writer who sets words inside quotation marks knows whether the subject spoke them, which makes it tempting to treat every knowing misquotation as a knowing falsehood. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. rejects that shortcut. Actual malice means publishing a defamatory statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,” and a public-figure plaintiff must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.1 The Court held that a deliberate alteration of the words a plaintiff spoke does not equate with knowledge of falsity unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement.2 Even intentional fabrication of a quotation is not enough, standing alone, if the quoted statements were substantially accurate in reflecting what was said.3
Masson, a public figure, claimed that Malcolm, with full knowledge of the inaccuracy, used quotation marks to attribute to him comments he had not made.4 The stakes were high because readers of In the Freud Archives may have found Malcolm’s portrait of him especially damning, so much of it appearing to be a self-portrait told in his own words.5 The district court analyzed each passage and held that the alleged inaccuracies did not raise a jury question, because the quotations were either substantially true or “one of a number of possible rational interpretations” of a conversation that “bristled with ambiguities.”6 The Court of Appeals applied a substantial truth test and then went one step further.7 The Supreme Court had to decide what kind of falsity in a quotation can support a finding of actual malice.8
A fabricated quotation can hurt reputation in two ways. It may put an untrue factual assertion in the speaker’s mouth. Or, regardless of the truth or falsity of the facts asserted within the quoted statement, the manner of expression, or even the fact that the statement was made, may indicate a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not hold. John Lennon, quoted as saying of the Beatles, “We’re more popular than Jesus Christ now,” fits the second category.9 Either injury gains force from the quotation marks, because a self-condemnatory quotation may carry more force than criticism by another. It is against self-interest to admit one’s own criminal liability, arrogance, or lack of integrity, and so all the more easy to credit when it happens.10 Attributing a fabricated quotation to a plaintiff may accordingly be defamatory.11
An absolute definition of falsity in the quotation context, under which any departure from the speaker’s exact words is false, is too stringent, and Masson conceded the point. He acknowledged that minor changes to correct grammar or syntax do not amount to falsity.12 Once that concession is made, the Court saw no workable place to stop. It could think of no method by which courts or juries could draw the line between cleaning up and other changes except by reference to the meaning a statement conveys to a reasonable reader. Narrower technical distinctions would depart from First Amendment principles of general applicability and from the purposes of the libel tort as understood since the latter half of the 16th century.13
Meaning therefore becomes the measure, and it is the measure libel law already uses. The common law takes one approach to falsity regardless of the form of the communication: it overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates on substantial truth. California law, like that of other jurisdictions, absolves a defendant who proves the substance of the charge true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.14 That is the substantial truth doctrine of the preceding section, applied to quotations without a separate body of law. An author who alters a speaker’s words but effects no material change in meaning, including any meaning conveyed by the manner or fact of expression, inflicts no injury to reputation that is compensable as defamation.15
Deliberate or reckless falsification turns on words and punctuation only because they express meaning, and “[m]eaning is the life of language.” Quotations can be a devastating instrument for conveying false meaning, so attributing words never spoken bears in a most important way on the inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case.16
Exam questions on this rule usually describe a writer who admits changing a public figure’s words and ask whether the admission establishes actual malice. The answer depends on what the change did to the meaning a reader would take from the page.
Both writers changed a public figure’s words on purpose, and the only difference that counts is whether the meaning moved. The governor’s hesitations carried nothing a reader could miss; the senator’s reversal carries the whole sting. A knowing, material alteration can satisfy the knowledge-of-falsity requirement, but the public figure must still prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and mere negligence does not suffice.17
The Court framed its holding for purposes of both New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.18 The second reference matters beyond public-figure suits. A private plaintiff needs fault to recover at all, and cannot recover presumed or punitive damages without proof of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity, though that damages limit does not apply when the statement did not involve a matter of public concern.19 Where that proof is required, the material-change test measures whether a deliberate alteration shows knowledge of falsity.
The Court of Appeals had gone a step past substantial truth, and the Supreme Court refused to follow. It held that an altered quotation is protected so long as it is a rational interpretation of an actual statement, a standard drawn from Time, Inc. v. Pape and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. Applying a protection for rational interpretation in this context finds no support in general principles of defamation law or in First Amendment jurisprudence.20 Quotation marks change the author’s role. When a reasonable reader would conclude that a quotation purports to be a verbatim repetition of the speaker’s statement, the marks indicate that the author is not interpreting an ambiguous statement but attempting to convey what the speaker said. That orthodox use is the quintessential “direct account of events that speak for themselves,” and it allows the subject to speak for himself. The distinction the Court draws is between interpreting a statement and reporting it, and quotation marks announce reporting.21
Whether quotation marks announce reporting depends on what a reasonable reader would understand. Malcolm’s work gave no clue that the quotations were a rhetorical device or a paraphrase of the speaker’s actual statements. It purported to be nonfiction, the result of numerous interviews. It contained lengthy quotations attributed to Masson, and neither Malcolm nor her publishers indicated that they were anything but reproductions of actual conversations. It ran in The New Yorker, which at the relevant time seemed to enjoy a reputation for scrupulous factual accuracy. A trier of fact could therefore find that a reasonable reader would take the quotations as nearly verbatim reports, although a defendant may argue to the jury that readers viewed them as nonliteral or as reconstructions.22 Where a work signals a rhetorical device, a paraphrase, or a reconstruction, the nearly verbatim reading falls away. Baker v. Los Angeles Examiner, in which a television reviewer printed a hypothetical conversation, is an example of quotation marks that no reasonable reader would take as the named person’s actual words.23 Readers of nonfiction expect a nearly verbatim account, and the law measures accuracy by meaning: an intentional fabrication is not enough, by itself, if the quoted statements were substantially accurate in reflecting what was said.24
A separate opinion by Justice White would have gone the other way. It accepted that quotation marks assert that the person spoke the words as quoted, and it judged the case on the basis that Malcolm wrote that Masson said things she knew he did not say. Under Sullivan, malice means deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for whether the fact asserted is true or false, and that opinion treated knowing misattribution as malice by any definition of the term.25 The majority instead measured the alteration by its effect on meaning, and that is the rule to state on an exam.