Concept
Defenses in Context
Defenses and privileges to defamation
Defamation Defenses and Privileges
Defenses in Context
At common law, a defamation plaintiff made out a prima facie case with very little: proof that the defendant had made to a third party a statement damaging to the plaintiff's reputation.1 The plaintiff did not have to show that the defendant intended harm, was negligent, or knew the statement was false. That amounted to strict liability, and technically falsity was not even an element of the tort.2 In a broad variety of libel and slander per se cases, the showing also raised a presumption that the defamation had caused compensable damage. The plaintiff therefore survived a motion for a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law and reached the jury, unless the defendant could establish a defense as a matter of law.3
That structure had consequences for speakers from the start. In colonial New York, the British-appointed governor used libel law to prosecute John Peter Zenger, editor of a politically independent newspaper, for reporting the governor's misdemeanors. Zenger spent nine months in prison awaiting trial because his bail was set so high, and he won a jury acquittal only in 1735.4
Because the plaintiff's case demanded so little, the defenses did the sorting between speech that incurs liability and speech that does not. Truth comes first. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule directly: one who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not liable for defamation if the statement is true.5 Truth was a defense in the strict sense, because the defendant had to plead and prove it to avoid liability, and the plaintiff's case never depended on falsity.6 Beyond truth, the common law recognized consent and a series of privileges, some absolute and some conditional. Participants in legislative, judicial, or administrative proceedings held an absolute privilege to make defamatory statements within them, and high government officials held one for any statement made in the conduct of their office, whether or not it was made in a formal proceeding.7
A privilege rests on a simple idea: conduct that would otherwise be actionable escapes liability when the defendant is furthering an interest of social importance, even at the cost of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff's reputation. The favored interest may belong to the defendant, to a third person, or to the public. When the interest is paramount, the immunity is absolute, regardless of the defendant's purpose, motive, or the reasonableness of the conduct. When it weighs less, the immunity is qualified and depends on good motives and reasonable behavior. The defendant's belief in the truth of the statement, the purpose of the statement, and the manner of publication are immaterial when no privilege is in play, but they may decide the case once the defendant raises a conditional privilege.8
The practical payoff is breathing space for speech. If truth were the only defense, any false statement could produce liability. A speaker armed with a conditional privilege who honestly believed the statement true was protected against liability, and a speaker with an absolute privilege did not even need that honest belief. The privileges thus protected valuable statements that fear of liability for a mistaken one might otherwise have "chilled."9
The breathing space came with a cost, because the defendant carried the burden of proof. Under the Restatement, a defendant who raises a privilege must prove the circumstances necessary for its existence.10 That allocation encouraged even a defendant who believed the occasion privileged to think twice before publishing, although on paper potential defendants remained protected for a wide variety of negative statements made in the ordinary course of business or personal life.11
One qualification governs how to read everything that follows. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages, but the Supreme Court overturned the verdict. The Court held that the First Amendment requires a conditional privilege for statements about public officials, which a public official defeats only by proving actual malice with convincing clarity.12 For the most part, the constitutional doctrines operate separately from the common-law rules rather than substituting for them, and the major exception is the burden of proving whether the statement was true or false.13 In many recent cases the dispositive issue is constitutional, and defendants often win on a constitutional point when the common-law rules would have held them liable.14 States remain free to apply the old strict liability rules where no public official, public figure, or matter of public interest is involved, though many now require at least negligence.15 The common-law structure is the baseline the constitutional cases modify, so this chapter takes it first: truth, consent, the absolute privileges, the qualified privileges, and finally the defendant's burden of proving a privilege. The question of who proves truth or falsity is taken up within the discussion of truth.