Concept
Damages and Remedies
Invasion of privacy torts
Damages and Remedies
Section 652H of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states what a plaintiff recovers after establishing a privacy claim: damages for the harm to the interest in privacy resulting from the invasion, damages for mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally results from such an invasion, and special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.1 The rule completes the general principle of § 652A, that one who invades another's right of privacy is liable for the resulting harm to the other's interests,2 and it applies to all four torts alike.3 The branch the plaintiff proves decides liability, while the three heads of damages stay the same. What changes from branch to branch is which head carries the most weight.
Those three heads compensate losses already suffered. Two other remedies serve different ends: punitive damages punish and deter, and injunctions try to prevent further harm. This section takes up dignitary and emotional harm, then economic loss, and finally punitive damages and injunctions, where the privacy torts give opposite answers: punitive damages are often available, and injunctions against publication generally are not.
Dignitary and Emotional Harm
The first clause of § 652H compensates the invasion itself. Every privacy tort protects personal dignity, and an injury to dignity rarely leaves a financial trace: a tenant whose bathroom was watched or a patient whose history was broadcast may have lost no wages and paid no bills. None of the four torts therefore requires proof of out-of-pocket damages, and the plaintiff may recover for the abstract, non-monetary harm to dignity that the invasion caused.4
Intrusion makes the point most clearly, because the prying is the wrong. The intrusion itself makes the defendant liable, even though nothing obtained is published or used in any way.5 What the first clause compensates in that case is the loss of seclusion at the moment of the intrusion, and the award does not wait for later exposure.
Dispensing with proof of economic loss does not make damages presumed. Common-law libel and slander per se let a plaintiff recover without proving particular harm, but privacy damages are not presumed in that way.6 The plaintiff must still establish the cause of action, and the jury then measures the harm to dignity from the facts of the invasion. Two exam answers therefore go wrong: that privacy damages are presumed as in libel per se, and that nothing is recoverable until the plaintiff shows a financial loss.
The second clause adds emotional harm on two conditions. The plaintiff must prove the distress was actually suffered, so testimony about sleeplessness, fear, or embarrassment counts, and a jury may not assume the distress from the invasion alone. The distress must also be of a kind that normally results from such an invasion, which ties the award to the ordinary consequences of the wrong.7 Nothing in the clause requires a physical injury or a diagnosis.
Appropriation cases show the second clause working apart from commercial value. A plaintiff whose identity has no commercial value may still suffer mental anguish from an unauthorized use of her name and likeness, and few cases have suggested that she must prove the value of her identity before she can recover for that suffering.8 How serious the invasion was still counts: as Slocum v. Sears Roebuck & Co. showed in the appropriation discussion, a slight use leaves little for either clause to compensate.
Economic and Special Damages
The third clause of § 652H reaches what an invoice does record. A plaintiff recovers special damage, meaning provable financial loss such as lost wages, bills paid, or a contract that fell through, when the invasion is a legal cause of it.10 The phrase legal cause sets the limit. The plaintiff must tie each loss to the invasion under ordinary causation principles, and a loss that would have happened anyway is not recoverable merely because it came after the invasion.
Special damage is available under every branch, but economic measures weigh most in appropriation and the right of publicity, where the injury is often financial. In a successful action, damages clearly extend to economic losses and to the commercial value of what the defendant gained by wrongful use of the plaintiff's identity.11
Two measures follow. One asks what the plaintiff lost: the fee the plaintiff would have charged for permission, or an endorsement the unauthorized use displaced. The other asks what the defendant gained, which keeps the defendant from keeping the whole benefit of the taking.12
The market measure has nothing to work with when the identity had no market. A plaintiff who seeks recovery for mental suffering need not prove the value of her identity, because the anguish from an unauthorized use is compensable whether or not the identity could ever have been sold.13 A figure built on the market value of her name would have no foundation, so her recovery rests on the first two clauses.
Zacchini shows what an economic claim looks like. The Supreme Court stressed that the case was narrower than the broad category of appropriation suits: the plaintiff did not complain of a general use such as advertising, but of the televising of an entire act that he ordinarily gets paid to perform.14 The injury in issue was therefore economic, and an award on that claim would have to measure it.
Two mistakes recur on exams. One applies a market-value measure to every appropriation plaintiff and never asks whether the identity had commercial value. The other denies a celebrity economic damages because the celebrity lost no privacy, which uses the measure for dignitary harm on an economic claim.
Punitive Damages and Injunctions
Compensation repays a loss the plaintiff has already suffered.16 Punitive damages ask a different question, whether the defendant's conduct deserves punishment, and an injunction asks whether a court should order the defendant to stop. The privacy torts answer the two in opposite ways: punitive damages are often available, while injunctions against publication generally are not.
Punitive damages are a remedy, not a separate cause of action, so a plaintiff may seek them on any properly pleaded privacy claim whenever the jurisdiction's standard for the remedy is met.17 The remedy is quasi-criminal, and legislatures have wide discretion over it. Nebraska prohibits it constitutionally, and Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington permit it only when a statute expressly authorizes it.18 A privacy answer should therefore ask first whether the jurisdiction permits the remedy and what its standard requires, and should not treat an award as automatic once the tort is proved.
Privacy invasions often warrant punishment for two reasons. First, given the elements of the privacy torts, the conduct that gives rise to an invasion very often warrants punitive damages as well as compensation.19 False light shows the point: a plaintiff who proves liability under § 652E has already shown that the defendant knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be placed.20 Second, dignitary harm leaves no bill, so the compensatory award may be small and hard to quantify, and a defendant who profits from the wrong could treat that award as a cost of doing business.
Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc. illustrates the arithmetic, although it arose outside privacy law. A jury awarded $5,000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages against a hotel that concealed an infestation, and the Seventh Circuit upheld the verdict over the hotel's argument that the punitive award could not exceed four times the compensatory award. The court reasoned that the conduct was outrageous, that the compensable harm was slight and hard to quantify because much of it was emotional, and that the hotel may have profited by concealing the infestation and continuing to rent rooms.21
The traditional defenses of punitive damages add reasons that suit privacy cases. Courts and commentators defend the remedy as a way to discourage evil motives, as a partial substitute for the compensation of counsel fees that American procedure refuses, and as an incentive to sue over the petty outrages that busy prosecutors overlook and that a private person would otherwise find not worth the trouble and expense of a lawsuit.22 An injury to dignity seldom produces a loss large enough to pay for litigation, which gives that last reason particular force here.
Cheatham v. Pohle shows both kinds of damages on one privacy claim. Cheatham sued for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the jury awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.23 The reported case then addresses who receives the award. Cheatham challenged a new Indiana statute that sends 75 percent of punitive damages to the state, arguing that it violated the Takings Clauses of the Indiana and federal constitutions.24 The dispute reflects the point above, that the legislature controls the remedy, and this chapter leaves its resolution aside.
The false light cases show the same remedy at work. In an Eighth Circuit case against Globe International Publishing, Inc., a tabloid printed a ninety-five-year-old woman's photograph with a report that an Australian woman of 101 had been forced to quit her job because an affair with a millionaire had left her pregnant, and the court of appeals affirmed an award of $850,000 in punitive damages.25 The story is the kind of false portrayal on which false light claims rest.
An injunction acts before the speech does. A court that orders a publisher to stop circulating a story has decided in advance, without trying that particular speech, that the story may not be told, while a damages judgment lets the speaker speak and then answer for the result. That difference explains why the prohibition against prior restraints is applied in defamation and national security cases.27 Whether it applies the same way in privacy cases is less clear, because privacy cases implicate different policy considerations, and the weight of the free speech interest varies with the context.28
The disclosure tort follows the speech-protective rule. It yields a damages judgment after the plaintiff's privacy has been impaired, and as with defamation actions, an injunction against further publication is not granted absent another ground of liability, because such an order would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.29 Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea is the case cited for that rule.
False light raises a similar concern. When the publication concerns a public official, a public figure, or a matter of public interest, there may be a significant free speech interest in publishing it, and Time, Inc. v. Hill suggested that false light cases be treated like defamation cases for damages, at least where public officials or public figures are involved. The same free speech interest suggests that prior restraints may be impermissible in some privacy cases, particularly false light cases.30
Conduct aimed at the plaintiff changes the analysis. Privacy cases arise in many contexts, and in some of them the free speech interest is subordinate to the plaintiff's personal interests; in intrusion cases, courts have been more inclined to grant injunctive relief.31 Galella v. Onassis illustrates the point. Galella, a self-styled paparazzo, was alleged to have harassed Jacqueline Onassis and her children to get pictures, and witnesses described him jumping, lunging, rushing out, blocking, and circling in close orbit around them.32 After a full trial he was enjoined from following or surveilling the family, from coming within stated distances of their home, their schools, and the persons themselves, from using their names or pictures for advertising, and from communicating with them except through her attorney.33
The appellate court accepted the need for an injunction and narrowed it. Relief had to be tailored to the paparazzo attack that distinguished Galella's behavior from that of other photographers, and it could not needlessly burden reasonable efforts to cover her. The court therefore limited the order to four prohibitions: approaching within twenty-five feet of her or touching her, blocking her movement in public places, acts foreseeably or reasonably calculated to endanger her life or safety, and conduct reasonably foreseen to harass, alarm, or frighten her. It added that any further restriction on taking and selling pictures of her for news coverage was improper and unwarranted by the evidence.34
Set side by side, Gawker and Galella show that the outcome follows what the order commands. An order to stop publishing an accurate story restrains a message. An order to keep twenty-five feet away and stop blocking a person's path restrains conduct directed at the plaintiff, and the photographer stays free to take and sell news pictures of her. The appellate narrowing mattered for that reason: it removed what touched news coverage and kept what shielded Onassis from the attack. Treating the remedy as uniform produces two errors: assuming that a disclosure plaintiff who wins on liability can also obtain an order to take the story down, and assuming that no privacy plaintiff can ever obtain an injunction, or that Galella permits barring photographs of a public figure.