Concept
The False Representation
Fraudulent misrepresentation: false statement, scienter, and intent to induce
The False Representation
Deceit starts with something false that the defendant said or did. Section 525 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts names four subjects of the misrepresentation (fact, opinion, intention, and law) and supplies the other elements: the misrepresentation must be fraudulent, must be made to induce action or inaction, and must cause pecuniary loss through the plaintiff’s justifiable reliance.1 This part of the chapter covers only the first element. In its ordinary sense, deceit is a false statement of fact made knowingly or recklessly with the intent that someone else will act on it, and the later parts of the chapter take up the knowledge and intent in that definition.2
A misrepresentation is a false assertion. Spoken or written words usually carry it, but the term reaches any other conduct that amounts to a false assertion.3 Whether a statement is false depends on what its words mean in all the circumstances, including what a listener may fairly infer from them, and an assertion may also be inferred from conduct other than words.4 The element thus calls for an affirmative communication of false or misleading information. A failure to provide information, such as a missing warning, is the other kind of informational failure.5
Falsity alone does not make the tort. An assertion that does not match the facts is a misrepresentation whether the speaker lied, failed to check, or erred innocently, and a statement meant to be truthful can misrepresent through ignorance or carelessness, as when the word “not” is inadvertently omitted.6 Fraud adds scienter, an intention to deceive and induce reliance, which a later part of the chapter treats.7 Reliance is a separate element too, and a contract can speak to it: a party who has read and understood a clause disclaiming representations is bound by it, and the clause is inconsistent with a claim that the party relied on an oral statement contradicting it.8
Fact, Opinion, and Law
Section 525 lists opinion and law beside fact, yet fraud ordinarily requires a misrepresentation of a past or present fact.9 Treatises gather the resulting puzzles under one heading, the factual representation, which asks when opinion, law, and prediction count as fact.10 The puzzles resolve once you see why courts excuse most opinion and where the excuse ends. This subsection states the general rule, then the situations in which opinion becomes actionable, and last the treatment of statements about law.
Courts excuse puffery first. Sellers commend their wares in loose general terms, and when the praise has no specific content and refers to no facts, buyers are expected to understand that they are not entitled to rely on the words literally.11 A seller who says a crane can lift 40,000 pounds makes a claim that a load test can confirm. A seller who calls it a mighty fine crane makes none.
Predictions fare the same way unless they imply a present fact. In Hoffman, an intermediary arranging a painting sale to an undisclosed buyer assured Hoffman that the buyer was a very private individual and that the painting would “disappear” into the buyer’s collection. The buyer later put the painting up at public auction, and Hoffman lost her fraud claim, because the assurance rested on no present fact and merely anticipated the future conduct of a third party whom the intermediary did not control.12 The court’s own caveat marks the limit: the result might differ if the intermediary had had no factual basis for predicting that the buyer would not resell.13
Statements of value turn on whether the property has a definite market. A statement of worth, even one not phrased as an opinion, may represent an opinion rather than a fact, especially for property without a definite or known value or with only speculative value. A statement of the value of property with a generally accepted market price, such as government bonds, grain, or cattle, may misrepresent a fact.14 A broker’s honest estimate of what a tract of land is worth, as in Byers v. Federal Land Co., falls on the opinion side of that line. Even a value statement can be actionable when the buyer places special reliance on it and the speaker has superior knowledge.15 Negotiation practice draws a similar line: under generally accepted conventions, estimates of price or value, and a party’s stated intentions about an acceptable settlement, ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact.16
The excuse rests on how buyers treat sellers. Vendors are known to exaggerate, so a buyer may not be justified in taking a vendor’s praise of value, quality, or other advantages as an assurance that the praise is deserved. A buyer may nevertheless assume that even a vendor’s opinion has some basis in fact, and therefore that the vendor knows of nothing that makes the opinion fantastic.17 As Vulcan Metals put the point, when the parties are so situated that a buyer may reasonably rely on the seller’s opinion, giving a false one is no excuse.18 That second assumption generates the exceptions. An opinion supports deceit in four recurring situations:19
- The speaker does not honestly hold the opinion expressed.
- The opinion implies supporting facts that the speaker knows do not exist.
- The speaker has superior knowledge or expertise that invites the listener’s deference.
- The speaker knows of a special characteristic of the listener that makes reliance especially likely, and exploits it.
The first situation is the plainest, since the speaker lies about his or her own mind. In Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, a law student sued over opinions that school officials had expressed about the school’s accreditation. The district court dismissed his claim, but the court of appeals reversed and sent the case to trial on a theory of fraudulent misrepresentation: the school knew it had substantial problems in obtaining accreditation, and Rodi had made a credible preliminary showing that the officials’ opinions were not honest, given their knowledge of the ABA’s criteria and the school’s prospects of satisfying them.20 An opinion honestly held, like the land-value estimate above, stays unactionable on this ground, while an opinion contradicted by what the speaker knows does not.
The second situation arises because an opinion carries an unspoken message that the speaker knows of nothing making it unreasonable. In Briggs v. Carol Cars, Inc., an uninformed buyer bought a used vehicle from a dealer who said it was in good condition. The court rejected the argument that the remark was only opinion: from a dealer in such vehicles, “good condition” reasonably implied that the vehicle was safe and operable and would need far less oil than it did.21 A dealer who knows that a truck burns oil heavily and has safety problems cannot shelter behind the form of the statement, because the facts it implies are false and the dealer knows it.
Courts do not apply the opinion rule evenly. The pull of the general rule explains decisions like Ray v. Montgomery, which treated a seller’s remarks about a house as opinion that could not be fraud. Courts often state the general rule as an absolute, but a court that declares that “expressions of opinion are not actionable” overstates the law, because many cases permit misrepresentation actions based on opinion.22 On an exam, state the general rule and then test the statement against each situation above instead of stopping at the label “opinion.”
The third situation arises when the speaker knows more than the listener and invites reliance on that knowledge. An attorney who believes a prospective client has a weak case on the facts commits fraud by expressing a contrary opinion in order to induce the client to litigate, because the client may justifiably rely on a lawyer’s professional judgment.23 The Restatement (Third) of Torts supplies the reasoning. When a defendant purports to be an expert or otherwise invites deference by claiming access to knowledge the plaintiff cannot readily duplicate, relying on the opinion may be reasonable and more efficient than gathering the facts and forming one’s own view. The law protects that reliance by imposing liability when the opinion is falsely stated and offered as a basis for reliance.24
The fourth situation depends on what the speaker knows about the listener. Suppose the speaker knows of some special characteristic of the listener, such as lack of intelligence, illiteracy, or unusual credulity and gullibility, that gives special reason to expect the opinion to be relied on. A speaker who deliberately practices on that characteristic cannot say the reliance was unjustified because the statement was only an opinion.25
Statements of law complete the list in § 525, and they follow the logic of opinion. The traditional rule that a statement of law is not actionable has little left, because representations of law almost never come in a vacuum: they carry implications of fact.26 An assertion that a company has the legal right to do business in a state carries the assurance that the company has in fact been duly qualified there. A representation that land may be obtained by patent free of mineral reservations says that the government does not classify it as mineral land. Statements about the title to land, the priority of a lien, or the validity of a note convey similar implications of fact.27 A former tenant sued its landlords in fraud and for breach of warranty in National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Building Corp., a reminder that these questions arise in ordinary commercial disputes.28 Not every misstatement about law leads to liability. The defendant in Dernehl v. Detert, who had given assurances about what local law allowed, was held not liable, so the question remains whether a particular statement implies a checkable fact or only offers a legal view.
Misrepresented Intention
A person’s own intention is a fact, and misrepresenting it is deceit. Section 530(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a representation of the maker’s own intention to do or not to do a particular thing is fraudulent if the maker does not have that intention.30 The rule answers the puzzle left by the opinion and prediction cases, where deceit seemed to need a statement about something that already exists. An intention exists when it is held, and the Restatement’s commentary says so in one line: “The state of a man’s mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.”31 A speaker who announces an intention he or she does not hold has therefore misstated a present fact.
A broken promise becomes fraud by this route. A promise carries two messages: that the promisor will act in the future, and that the promisor presently means to. Nobody can prove the first message false when it is made, but the second is true or false at that moment. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. states the limit. A news source claimed fraud against newspapers that identified him after promising anonymity, and the governing rule is that a representation about future acts does not support fraud merely because the act did not happen, unless the promisor did not intend to perform when making the promise.32 In Carey, the court held that the plaintiff had made out a cause of action for fraud, noting that fraud is not usually predicated on a promise of future action but that such a promise qualifies if, when it was made, the promisor had no intention of keeping it.33
Timing decides most problems under this rule. The question is what the promisor intended when promising, so nonperformance cannot settle it. The plaintiff must at least produce compelling circumstantial evidence that the promisor had already decided to breach when entering the agreement, and that evidence may be hard to find if the promisor kept the intent hidden.34 The limit also keeps contract and tort apart: contract law handles the promisor who meant to perform and failed, and deceit reaches only the promisor who never meant to.
Circumstantial proof looks for facts suggesting that the promisor knew from the start that performance was out of reach or never planned to attempt it. A prompt repudiation with no intervening change in the situation, a complete failure to attempt performance, and continued assurances after performance was plainly impossible all point that way.35 A missed deadline alone does not, because an honest failure looks the same. Section 530(2) treats the intentions of other people under a different test, which the next subsection explains.
Another Person’s Intention
A speaker who reports someone else’s plans faces a different test. Under § 530(2), a representation of the intention of a third person is fraudulent under the conditions stated in § 526.37 The previous subsection’s question, whether the speaker held the intention announced, cannot be asked here, because a speaker can neither have nor lack another person’s intention. What the speaker can have, or lack, is information about those plans, so the inquiry shifts from the speaker’s own mind to what the speaker knew, believed, and implied about someone else’s.
Section 526 supplies three conditions, and any one of them makes the representation fraudulent. The maker
- knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it to be;38
- does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies; or39
- knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies.40
Applied to a third person’s intention, the first condition reaches the plain lie, as when the speaker has been told that the third person will do the opposite of what the speaker reports. The second and third reach the speaker who announces another’s plan flatly, or calls it certain, and so implies a confidence or a source of information that the speaker lacks. Each condition looks at the speaker’s own knowledge, so a forecast that later proves wrong is not fraudulent on that ground alone.
The cases draw the line in the same place. In Hoffman, the intermediary’s assurance that the buyer would keep the painting rested on no present fact and merely anticipated the future conduct of a third party whom the intermediary did not control, so the fraud claim failed.41 Nothing in that account suggests the intermediary knew or believed the buyer planned to resell, so the first § 526 condition had nothing to work on, whereas the first seller in the zoning illustration knew the board’s real position. The court itself noted that the result might differ if the intermediary had had no factual basis for the prediction, since a confident assurance about another person’s conduct implies some information behind it.42
Tying liability to the speaker’s knowledge, and not to the third person’s later conduct, separates the speaker who deceived from the speaker who guessed badly. People constantly predict what customers, regulators, and business partners will do, and they are often wrong without being dishonest. The usual exam error is to infer fraud from the fact that the third person acted differently from the prediction. The question is always what the speaker knew, believed, and implied when speaking.
Conduct and Concealment
Section 525 does not require that a misrepresentation be spoken or written.44 The term covers any conduct that amounts to a false assertion, because an assertion may be inferred from what a person does as readily as from what a person says.45 Two kinds of conduct do this work. Some conduct itself communicates a false fact, and some conduct hides a true one.
The odometer is conduct that states a falsehood. Concealment hides a truth the buyer would otherwise discover. Conduct designed to prevent another from learning a fact, or likely to prevent it, is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist, and a seller who paints over water stains to hide a leaking roof is the standard example.46 Weintraub v. Krobatsch illustrates the point in a house sale: the buyer’s concealment theory went forward on a seller’s alleged efforts to hide a known problem with the house, without any false word being required.
Every seller cleans and paints before showing a property, so the doctrine needs a line between ordinary preparation and deception, and that line runs through the seller’s knowledge and purpose. A fresh coat of paint on a living room whose only flaw is a dull color hides nothing the seller knows to be a problem and asserts nothing false. The same coat over stains the seller knows come from a leaking roof, applied so that buyers will not notice them, asserts that the roof is sound. A later part of the chapter asks whether such an impression actually induced the transaction, a question that, like inducement elsewhere, depends on all the circumstances.47
Silence is the opposite pole. A seller who says nothing and takes no step to hide anything has communicated nothing, so the representation element has nothing to attach to. Deceit rests on an affirmative communication of false or misleading information, whereas a failure to provide information, such as a missing warning, is the other form of informational failure.48 The law requires honesty but does not require candor, and nondisclosure is not a misrepresentation unless some legal basis imposes a duty to disclose.49
Silence becomes a misrepresentation only when a legal basis imposes a duty to disclose. Courts recognize that duty where the parties are in a relationship of trust and confidence, where disclosure is needed to correct an earlier assertion that has become inaccurate through a change in circumstances, and where a statute requires disclosure, as statutes increasingly do for the sale of residential real property or securities.50 A statement that is true as far as it goes, but that the maker knows to be materially misleading because of what it leaves out, sits between speech and silence, and § 529 treats it as a fraudulent misrepresentation; the next subsection takes it up.51 The common error is to call any known but unmentioned defect fraud. Ask first what the defendant did, by word, by act, or by hiding a fact, to create a false impression, because only silence without a duty to disclose fails that test.
Half-Truths
Section 529 reaches a speaker who says only true things and still deceives: a representation that states the truth so far as it goes, but that the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of a failure to state additional or qualifying matter, is a fraudulent misrepresentation.53 The previous subsection left two poles in place. Conduct that creates a false impression counts as an assertion, and silence with no duty to speak does not. A half-truth sits between them, because the speaker chose to talk and the choice brings the whole message within the law of deceit. It is a statement that is literally true about the fact it names but that produces a false implication about other facts.54
The rule follows from how listeners treat answers. A person who speaks about a subject implies that the statement covers what matters about it, and the listener, who cannot see what was left out, reasons from what was said. Suppose a buyer asks the seller of a used car how the brakes are. The seller, whose technician told him a week earlier that the brakes were very dangerous and needed urgent repair, answers, “I just had them checked last week.” The answer is accurate, yet it misleads more than a flat “I don’t know,” which might at least send the buyer off to investigate, because it invites the buyer to conclude that the check went well and to stop asking.55
The third step does the most work in practice. Knowledge or belief that the statement misleads builds scienter into the rule, and a later part of the chapter develops scienter through § 526. The requirement keeps the rule aimed at purposeful use of omission, since ordinary talk is always incomplete and a speaker who could not foresee the false inference has not used silence as a tool. The rule also applies only after the speaker speaks, so the principle that the law requires honesty but not candor stays intact.56 A seller who volunteers nothing about the brakes has made no representation to qualify, while the seller who answers with a selected truth has made one.
Two more illustrations show that the false implication can attach to different things. A manufacturer sends paneling to Underwriters Laboratories, and the paneling fails so badly that it is too flammable to earn any flame-spread rating at all. If the manufacturer then tells a prospective buyer that the paneling is “not flame-spread rated,” the statement suggests that the product has never been tested, not that it was tested and failed, and it is therefore false and fraudulent.57 The authority for that illustration is St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Construction Co. Answeringg a direct question follows the same logic. A seller with no duty to volunteer a fact may stay silent, but a seller who answers a question that fairly calls for disclosure with an answer calculated to mislead has made an affirmative misrepresentation.58 In Lerner v. DMB Realty, LLC, sellers who had left their house because a convicted sex offender lived next door were relieved by an Arizona statute of any duty to disclose that fact. When the buyers asked why they were moving, the sellers gave a different reason, and the court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the fraud claim. The statute explains why silence would have been safe, and the sellers’ exposure came from the answer they chose to give.
The professional rules for lawyers draw the same line. A lawyer ordinarily need not share information with a third person, but a lawyer who chooses to speak must be sufficiently complete not to be deliberately misleading, and Comment 1 to Model Rule 4.1 recognizes that “[m]isrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements.”59
A related situation develops over time. A statement that was accurate when made can become inaccurate through a change in circumstances, and the speaker must then disclose the change. A seller who truthfully says that a dog ate well last night must speak up if the dog becomes seriously ill before the sale, because the earlier assurance now leaves a false impression of health.60 Like the half-truth rule, the duty starts from the premise that a person who has made a representation answers for the impression it leaves.