Concept
Reliance as an Element
Justifiable reliance, materiality, and causation
Reliance, Materiality, and Causation
Reliance as an Element
A lie, standing alone, gives its hearer no claim. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537, the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation can recover for the pecuniary loss resulting from it “if, but only if,” two conditions are met.1 The recipient must have relied on the misrepresentation in acting or refraining from action,2 and that reliance must have been justifiable.3 The conditions ask different questions. The first asks whether the statement actually moved this plaintiff; the second asks whether the law will protect the movement. A plaintiff who satisfies one and misses the other loses.
Reliance supplies the causal link between the lie and the injury. A plaintiff who cannot show it ordinarily cannot show that the misrepresentation caused the harm, and the case usually fails.4 Reliance does not exhaust causation, however, because § 537 also requires that the pecuniary loss result from the misrepresentation.
Courts count these requirements differently. Some compress the tort into three, four, five, or six elements; others splinter it into as many as eleven.5 Merging actual reliance and its justification into a single element called “justifiable reliance” is one such compression.6 Whatever the label, the two questions remain, and this chapter keeps them apart.
Actual reliance is a question of fact about one plaintiff: what that plaintiff believed and then did. Justifiability tests the belief against the circumstances, and courts apply the test with a blend of subjective and objective considerations.7 The sections below take actual reliance first, then its timing, then the justifiability screen. Later sections refine the screen by asking whether the matter misrepresented was important enough to rely on, whether a given kind of statement can support reliance at all, how much checking the law expects, and what part the plaintiff’s own negligence plays.
Justifiable reliance is not the same as contributory negligence, though a few courts have thought otherwise.8 A Restatement comment on § 545A makes the point directly: the plaintiff’s reliance must be justifiable, but that “does not mean that his conduct must conform to the standard of the reasonable man.”9 The plaintiff’s own negligence as a possible defense is taken up later in this chapter.
Actual Reliance
Section 537(a) requires that the recipient rely on the misrepresentation “in acting or refraining from action.”10 The phrase has a belief half and an action half. The plaintiff, or someone acting on the plaintiff’s behalf, such as a parent, employer, or doctor, must in fact learn of the statement and then act in reliance on it: buy the product, use it in a particular way, or skip a precaution.11 A statement that never reached the plaintiff’s mind could not have shaped a decision. A statement that reached it but changed nothing about what the plaintiff did fares no better, because in neither case did the lie produce the choice that caused the loss.
Because the question is what this plaintiff believed and did, the inquiry is subjective and fact-bound. It does not ask whether a sensible person would have believed the statement; justifiability asks that. The two come apart in both directions. A plaintiff who credulously accepted a doubtful claim has relied in fact and may still lose on justifiability. A plaintiff who never believed the claim fails here, and no showing about a reasonable person can supply the missing belief.
The decision a statement shapes may be a decision to stay put. A misrepresentation can induce a plaintiff to enter a transaction or to avoid one, as when it persuades an owner to retain shares of stock rather than sell them.12 Small v. Fritz Cos., Inc. presents that situation. The tort reaches inaction because the harm is the same: a person misled into holding property or passing up a deal is injured by the deception as surely as one misled into buying, since the lie settled the choice.
The same requirement defeats plaintiffs who never met the statement. A smoker’s fraud claim fails if the smoker cannot show that he learned of the manufacturer’s statement and acted on it.13 In Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. the plaintiff alleged that AT&T falsely told the carrier for his 800 number that he wished to switch to AT&T. He knew nothing of the switch until his service was cut, so the California Court of Appeal found no reliance on the alleged misrepresentation, although it held that he had a good claim for fraudulent concealment.14 The harm there flowed from what the defendant did after the lie, with no decision of the plaintiff in between.
Reliance also fails when the plaintiff hears the statement and sees through it.
The inducement requirement explains the result. A misrepresentation normally must induce the plaintiff to enter into a transaction, or sometimes to avoid one,15 and a buyer who disbelieves the statement and buys on other grounds was induced by those grounds. A buyer who merely could have caught the lie by looking, but believed it anyway, has relied in fact. Whether that belief was justified is the separate question that the later sections on investigation and obvious falsity take up.
Everything above assumes that each plaintiff proves personal reliance, which is the ordinary rule in fraud. Open-market securities litigation is the recognized exception. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson the District Court applied a presumption of reliance created by the fraud-on-the-market theory, calling it “a practical resolution to the problem of balancing the substantive requirement of proof of reliance in securities cases against the procedural requisites of” Rule 23.16 Requiring every member of the proposed class to prove individualized reliance would have prevented the class action, because individual issues would have overwhelmed the common ones.17 The presumption stands in for the individual proof that an ordinary plaintiff supplies. An ordinary misrepresentation plaintiff still must show that this plaintiff, or someone acting for the plaintiff, learned of the statement and acted on it.18
Timing of Reliance
Section 537(a) asks whether the recipient relied “in acting or refraining from action,” and the wording builds in a sequence.20 Reliance is a form of causation, and a cause comes before its effect. The plaintiff must learn of the statement and believe it, and only then act.21 A statement made after the decision, or first learned of after it, cannot have been the reason for it. The rule also guards against hindsight: a buyer whose bargain has soured cannot rescue a claim with a statement that surfaced only later.
Williams v. Rank & Son Buick, Inc. shows the rule at work. The plaintiff visited a used-car lot looking for an air-conditioned car. He testified that the salesman called the car air-conditioned and that he relied on an advertisement describing it the same way. The advertisement, however, first appeared two days after he bought the car, and the dealer argued that he had seized on an error in the ad to seek a price reduction.22 An advertisement that did not yet exist could not have moved the purchase. The defect lies in actual reliance, not justifiability. It does not matter whether the ad was false, whether the plaintiff was honest, or whether trusting a dealer’s advertising is sensible. His other theory, that he relied on the salesman’s oral statement, failed on a different ground, taken up in the justifiability discussion below.
Schaaf v. Highfield supplies a companion illustration with a second defect layered on the first. The buyer there heard the representation about the roof only after the purchase, and he had planned to replace the roof anyway, so the statement neither came first nor changed anything he did.23 The case arose on a negligent misrepresentation claim, but the inducement logic is the same: a misrepresentation normally must induce the plaintiff to enter into a transaction, or sometimes to avoid one.24 The two decisions differ in what carries the result. Williams turns on the calendar alone, since a plaintiff who would have been moved by the ad still loses if it did not yet exist. Schaaf adds a second reason, because a buyer who meant to replace the roof would not have acted differently even had the statement arrived in time.
What counts, then, is the order of events at the moment the plaintiff decides. A statement the plaintiff had learned and believed before acting can be relied on, however much earlier it was made. A statement that came afterward cannot.
Justifiable Reliance
Section 537(b) adds a second condition: the reliance must be justifiable.26 Actual reliance and timing establish that this plaintiff believed the statement and acted on it afterward. Justifiability asks whether the law will protect that belief, given who the plaintiff was and what the situation offered. Courts answer with a blend of subjective and objective considerations,27 and a plaintiff who proves reliance in fact but fails this screen still loses, even though the lie moved the decision.
The standard for fraud is tailored to the knowledge and characteristics of the specific plaintiff, in contrast to the objective reasonable-person standard that governs negligent and innocent misrepresentation.28 The difference tracks a difference in expectations. In virtually every setting, people expect that one party will not lie to another. Among business people, though, there is probably no firm expectation that each will use reasonable care to make true the statements made in the course of business, except where information is sold as a service, as with legal or accounting advice.29
Justifiable reliance is consequently more forgiving than reasonable reliance. A recipient may rely on a fraudulent statement of fact “although he might have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation,”30 even where a reasonable person would have investigated because the check was simple and worthwhile in light of the size of the transaction.31 The § 545A comment adds that a plaintiff may be justified in relying although his conduct did not meet the community standard of knowledge, intelligence, judgment, or care.32 The screen can also favor the plaintiff on materiality: a matter may count although a reasonable person would not care about it, if the maker knows or has reason to know that the recipient regards it as important in choosing a course of action.33
The leniency has limits, and the limits come from the plaintiff’s own profile. An unusually gullible, ignorant, or stupid plaintiff may honestly and justifiably believe a statement that a normal person would not. A plaintiff with special expertise, competence, knowledge, or experience, by contrast, must use it, and may be unjustified in relying on a statement that an ordinary person would accept at face value.34 Even an ordinary plaintiff loses the benefit of the no-investigation rule when something known to the plaintiff or apparent in the situation should have warned that the statement ought not to be accepted without further inquiry.35
The decided cases bear this out. In Stambovsky v. Ackley the buyer was from out of town, had no reason to know of the house’s local reputation as haunted, and could not have learned of it by any reasonable inspection, so the buyer could justifiably be misled by the seller’s silence.36 In Rozen v. Greenberg the buyer of a business was inexperienced and rather gullible, and the court judged her reliance by those attributes rather than faulting her for failing to ask for references.37 In Willen v. Hewson the court considered the buyers’ reliance from a reasonableness perspective but rejected the seller’s argument that her niece’s mention of a trespassing problem should have led them to investigate on their own, noting that nothing visible suggested trespass or vandalism.38 In each case the particular plaintiff’s situation, not a generic buyer’s, drove the result.
The same inquiry can end a claim. In Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co. the court held that even if a brewer’s commercials had represented that prolonged, excessive drinking was safe, no consumer could justifiably rely on them as a matter of law, because the risks of alcoholism from such drinking have been commonly known for centuries.39 When a representation is so preposterous, or so obviously contrary to known or obvious facts, that no rational person of the plaintiff’s intelligence, experience, and education would believe and act on it, the plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did rely.40
Williams supplies a further example. The court primarily concluded that the buyer lacked objective reliance on the salesman’s statement that the car was air-conditioned: it was unreasonable not to “flip the knob” during a ninety-minute test drive, particularly when air conditioning was, by his own testimony, one of the main reasons for the purchase. The opinion might equally support the view that the court did not believe he relied subjectively at all.41 Both Williams and Willen framed the inquiry in terms of reasonableness, a reminder that courts do not always keep fraud’s tailored standard separate from the reasonable-person test. Materiality, opinion and puffery, statements of law and prediction, and obvious falsity each receive their own section below, because each is a distinct way a court may conclude that the plaintiff had no right to rely.