Concept
Investigation and Obvious Falsity
Justifiable reliance, materiality, and causation
Investigation and Obvious Falsity
Three rules from the Restatement (Second) of Torts settle how much doubt a fraud plaintiff must bring to the defendant's words. Section 540 says that the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in relying on its truth although an investigation would have shown it to be false.1 Section 541 withdraws that protection from a recipient who knows the statement is false or to whom its falsity is obvious.2 Section 541A adds that a recipient may still be justified in relying on a statement of fact although he believes the maker has an adverse interest in the transaction.3
All three rules test inducement. A misrepresentation normally must induce the plaintiff to enter a transaction, or sometimes to avoid one, as when it persuades a shareholder to keep stock instead of selling it.4 Each rule asks whether the defendant's statement did the inducing or whether the plaintiff's own knowledge or plain observation should have defeated it.
Notice ties the rules together. A plaintiff owes no investigation merely because checking was possible, and he may rely on an assertion of fact unless something known to him, or apparent in the situation, should have warned him not to accept the statement without further inquiry.5 The common mistake is to ask whether the plaintiff could have discovered the truth, which revives the old duty to investigate. The better question is what the plaintiff had in front of him when he acted.
The sections below take the default rule first, then the notice limit that displaces it, then the question whether the maker's opposing stake in the deal is itself a warning.
No Duty to Investigate
A recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in relying on its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity by investigating.6 The rule does two things. It permits a listener to take a factual claim as true, and it takes from the defendant the argument that the truth was available and the plaintiff never looked. The rule covers statements of fact; opinion, prediction, and law keep the separate screens discussed earlier.
Courts once held otherwise, and the rule still departs from the ordinary standard of care. The older view is no longer the law as to assertions of fact: the recipient may rely without further investigation even when the falsity could have been discovered easily and quickly.7 The rule applies even when a reasonable person would have investigated because the check was simple and worthwhile in light of the size of the transaction.8 One statement of the doctrine states the corollary plainly: justifiable reliance imposes no duty of active investigation, and it does not entitle a defendant to exploit a plaintiff's foolishness with impunity, so a defendant who deliberately preyed on the plaintiff's inattention cannot call that inattention unjustifiable reliance.9
The rule follows from what bargaining parties may expect of one another. In virtually every setting it is expected that one party will not lie to another, though there are a few exceptions.10 A plaintiff who proceeds on that expectation acts within it, and a defendant who lied on purpose is poorly placed to charge the plaintiff with carelessness for believing him.
The same reasoning answers the defense that the plaintiff should have read the document, which is the investigation defense in another form. Where a defendant employs misrepresentation to induce a party's obligation under a contract, the defendant cannot bind that party to the terms of the agreement.11 A half-truth can itself be a misrepresentation, and a party who reads a proposed contract to another while leaving out portions is an example.12
The land-sale cases point the same way. Authority is split on a buyer's duty to investigate a seller's fraudulent statements, but the trend is toward a minimal duty. A seller who made a reckless or knowing misrepresentation generally cannot defend on the ground that the buyer failed to use due care. The defense is typically allowed only where the buyer's fault was so serious that it amounted to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing. A buyer of land may therefore rely on the seller's material representations without ascertaining whether they are true.13
Some decisions seem to say otherwise. In Nigro v. Lee, a fraud claim over a used car sold on eBay, the language of the opinion strongly suggests that the claim failed because the plaintiff did not investigate. In the AHT decision, an appellate court applying New York law held that AHT could not rely on Moses's representations without trying to reach Elfersy or making independent inquiries into his disposition toward the merger. The court added that where a party in a sophisticated business transaction has access to critical information and fails to use it, New York courts are particularly disinclined to find justifiable reliance.14 Read literally, such opinions make the failure to investigate the whole ground of decision, which § 540 says cannot defeat reliance.
The conflict mostly dissolves once two questions are kept apart. Section 540 states a rule about a failure to investigate standing alone, and that omission, by itself, cannot defeat justifiable reliance. It does not address a failure to investigate in the face of warning signs, so a court that rejects reliance because the plaintiff pressed ahead despite red flags applies a different limit and does not contradict § 540.15 That limit is the notice idea: reliance without inquiry is justified unless something known to the recipient, or apparent in the situation, should have warned him.16 AHT fits that account. The company knew that Elfersy had resigned as a BioShield officer and had reason to suspect he was at odds with the company, and the court found its claim of justified reliance particularly unavailing for that reason.17 The buyer in the lien hypothetical would stand where AHT stood if a letter from the lender announcing its claim had reached him before closing.
Nigro can be explained the same way, because the setting of the transaction, a used-car sale on eBay, may itself have been a warning sign that made reliance unreasonable. The explanation is plausible but not airtight, since other decisions are harder to explain on red-flag grounds.18
The defendant's own conduct can strengthen the plaintiff's position beyond the general rule. Reliance may be justified without investigation where the defendant somehow prevents or deters further inquiry.19
A plaintiff who did investigate poses a different question, because the issue is no longer whether he had to look. It is only when he relies upon his investigation and not upon the false statement that he cannot recover.20 A misrepresentation normally must induce the transaction, so a plaintiff who acted solely on what his investigation showed was not induced by the statement.21 Whether he relied on the statement, on the investigation, or in substantial part on both is a question of fact for the jury unless the evidence clearly points one way. An investigation that tends to confirm the representation but remains somewhat inconclusive may leave the plaintiff relying on both.22 Investigation is therefore evidence of non-reliance and is not conclusive of it, because people often rely on several pieces of information at once.23 Some decisions still read any independent investigation as proof that the plaintiff trusted his own inquiry and not the defendant, so the point remains contested.24
Known or Obvious Falsity
Section 541 marks the boundary of the no-investigation rule: a recipient is not justified in relying on a misrepresentation if he knows it is false or its falsity is obvious to him.26 The two prongs rest on different reasoning. The knowledge prong is close to a matter of definition, since no one can rely upon a known falsity.27 A buyer who sees the crack in an engine block the seller called sound, and buys anyway, was not deceived. The obviousness prong stands in for knowledge. A plaintiff who shuts his eyes to what is plainly before him is treated as knowing it, because otherwise any plaintiff could keep a claim alive by declining to notice what anyone would notice.
Williams v. Rank & Son Buick, Inc. applied the obviousness prong. A used-car buyer claimed fraud because the salesman represented that the car had air conditioning and it did not. The court held that the buyer lacked objective reliance. He had test driven the car for ninety minutes, and by his own testimony air conditioning was one of the primary reasons he bought it, so the court thought it doubtful that he would not have tried the air conditioner.28 No great search was required, since a mere flip of a knob would have shown that the unit was missing.29
The court measured obviousness by whether ordinary observation would have revealed the falsity, judged in light of the intelligence and experience of the misled individual, and it also weighed the relationship between the parties.30 The plaintiff's own attributes cut both ways. A plaintiff with special expertise must use it and may be unjustified in accepting at face value what a layperson could accept, while an unusually gullible, ignorant, or stupid plaintiff may honestly and justifiably believe what a normal person would not.31 Obviousness is a question of fact, though the court has decided some such questions as a matter of law.32
The decision is open to criticism. The buyer saw a button marked AIR, and by suggesting that he should have flipped the knob the court arguably made him do more than use his senses. The court may also have disbelieved him, since he apparently lied about relying on an advertisement, and used obviousness to deny him recovery.33 Its objective-reliance reasoning might equally have shown that he did not rely on the salesman in fact.34
The two lathes differ in one fact, the location of the evidence, and that fact marks the border between this rule and the last. Section 540 forgives a failure to investigate, and § 541 does not forgive a failure to notice. Taking a housing apart is an investigation, and reading a counter in plain view is observation. Reliance without inquiry stays justified unless something known to the recipient, or apparent in the situation at hand, should have warned him that the statement ought not to be accepted unchecked.35 Williams sits at the edge of that line, which is why critics find it a hard fit with § 540.36
Warning signs short of obvious falsity also count. A court may reject justifiable reliance where the plaintiff proceeded despite red flags that would put a reasonable person on notice that the statement's truth was in question, because § 540 speaks only to a failure to investigate standing alone.37 Courts frame the question as whether the plaintiff had information that would serve as a danger signal to a normal person of his intelligence and experience, as in Sippy v. Cristich. Common knowledge is the widest source of such signals, because every plaintiff carries it and a statement that contradicts it is exposed without any inspection. In Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co., even if beer commercials had represented that prolonged, excessive drinking was safe, reliance was unjustified as a matter of law, because the risks of alcoholism from prolonged, excessive consumption have been commonly known for centuries.38
A plaintiff's own signature can supply the knowledge. New York authority holds that a person who has read and understood a disclaimer-of-representation clause is bound by it, and that the clause is inconsistent with the claim that he relied on a contradicting oral misrepresentation and was led by it to make the contract.39 The qualifier matters. A plaintiff who was misled about what a document says is in the position described in the previous section, and he is not charged with knowing its terms.
The obviousness prong shelters a defendant only when the plaintiff really could have seen through the statement. A defendant who set out to exploit the plaintiff's inattention cannot call the falsity obvious, because inattention that the defendant deliberately preyed on is not unjustifiable reliance.40 The personalized standard points the same way for an unusually gullible plaintiff.41
Adverse Parties
Section 541A completes the rules on how far a fraud plaintiff must doubt the other side: the recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact may be justified in relying on it although he believes the maker has an adverse interest in the transaction.43 An adverse interest is a stake that runs against the recipient's own, as when a seller profits from a higher price and the buyer from a lower one. The previous section showed a recipient losing the right to rely only after he held a warning, either knowledge of falsity or a plain fact that exposed it.44 The question here is whether the maker's opposing position is itself such a warning, and for statements of fact § 541A answers that it is not. The word may keeps the other requirements alive: the recipient must still show materiality, actual reliance, and the absence of any other warning.
The reason lies in what bargaining parties may expect of one another. In virtually every setting it is expected that one party will not lie to another, even though there is no firm expectation that business people will take reasonable care that what they tell each other is true.45 If adversity alone defeated reliance, nearly every sale would qualify, because buyer and seller are adverse on price. A seller could then misstate the age of a roof or the existence of a lien and answer the buyer's fraud claim by pointing out that the buyer knew the seller wanted to sell. The notice formulation avoids that result: reliance fails when something known to the recipient or apparent in the situation warns him, and § 541A holds that the maker's opposing stake, standing alone, is not such a warning.46 A buyer who holds a contradicting inspection report, or who knows that the seller has misstated facts before, loses justification because of that warning and not because of the seller's position.
Adversity weighs differently when the statement is opinion. Under § 539(2), in deciding whether an opinion may reasonably be read as an implied statement of undisclosed facts, the recipient's belief about whether the maker has an adverse interest is important.47 Section 542 goes further. A recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation solely of the maker's opinion is not justified in relying on it in a transaction with the maker unless the fact to which the opinion relates is material and the maker (a) purports to have special knowledge the recipient lacks, (b) stands in a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence, (c) has successfully endeavored to secure the recipient's confidence, or (d) has some other special reason to expect reliance.48 The difference follows from what each kind of statement can hide. An opinion about quality or value is the kind of statement an interested speaker colors, so a listener who knows of the stake has reason to discount it. A fact is either so or not so, and the speaker's stake gives him no license to change it.
The usual error runs in two directions. One is to treat the seller's adverse position as grounds for denying reliance on any statement he makes, which erases § 541A for statements of fact. The other is to carry the fact rule over to opinions and ignore that the recipient's belief about adversity is an important consideration under § 539(2). Classify the statement first. Adversity then does no work against a fact, and against an opinion it counts as a reason for caution.