Concept
Active Concealment
Fraudulent concealment, nondisclosure, and damages
Concealment, Nondisclosure, and Damages
Active Concealment
Silence and lying look like opposites, but a third course lies between them: saying nothing while arranging matters so the other side cannot see the truth. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 550 treats that course as a lie. One party to a transaction who, by concealment or other action, intentionally prevents the other from acquiring material information is subject to the same liability for pecuniary loss as though he had stated the nonexistence of the matter the other was prevented from discovering.1 A buyer who is told “there are no bats in the attic” and a buyer who is shown an attic staged so that no bats appear end up with the same false belief. The law gives the second buyer the remedy the first would have had.
Conduct counts as a representation whenever it is intended as an assertion of fact. Exhibiting a document without authority, turning back an odometer, and packaging, arranging, or camouflaging goods to conceal a known defect are misrepresentations as surely as words to the same effect.2 Information may also be conveyed pictorially or by conduct, so a seller who covers a defect with paint or grease, making a product look safer than it is, can be liable in deceit.3 The cases follow suit. In Croyle v. Moses, the defendant hitched up his horse short to hide that the animal was “a cribber and a windsucker.” In Osborn v. Gene Teague Chevrolet Co., a used car dealer set an odometer back from 100,000 to 62,000 miles, and the court sustained the buyer's fraud verdict even though the dealer made no verbal misrepresentation.4
The difference between acting and failing to act explains why concealment needs no duty to disclose. The common law consistently imposed liability for affirmative acts of harm but shrank from forcing people to help one another, and liability for nonfeasance was slow to win recognition.5 Mere nondisclosure is therefore actionable only if the person was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter.6 Fraud rests on an affirmative act of communicating, and a bare failure to provide information does not supply that act.7 Concealment is an act, so it supplies the representation itself. In Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, the termite problem was treated as pure silence. Add the assurance “you're sure to love the house” and the case moves closer to misrepresentation, and plaster over the infested woodwork and decisions like Croyle and Osborn count the cover-up as fraud even without words.8
How little conduct it can take is shown by Weintraub v. Krobatsch, a case of cockroach infestation of nightmarish proportions. The court declined the seller's application for summary judgment and let the buyer go to trial on the theory that the seller actively concealed the cockroaches by leaving all the lights on.9 The lights said nothing, yet the claim survived, so conduct alone can carry the representation step. The ruling establishes only the buyer's right to a jury, and intent and the other elements remained for trial. Jablonski v. Rapalje is the bat version of the same kind of dispute: sellers who ran floodlights and mothballs during the buyer's inspection and cleaned away the droppings were met with a concealment claim.
Two words in § 550 limit its reach. The first is intentionally. The act must be aimed at keeping the other party from learning the fact, so an incidental failure to mention something does not qualify, nor does an act that happens to cover a fact without that aim. The same act can fall on either side of the line, because fresh paint before listing may be routine sprucing up or a deliberate cover-up, and purpose must be inferred from the circumstances. The second is material information. Hiding a fact that has no bearing on the transaction does not trigger the rule.
Section 550 supplies only the representation step, so the plaintiff must still prove the remaining elements of deceit, including that the concealment actually induced the transaction. A buyer's lapse of care usually counts for little, because the seller's serious malfeasance outweighs the buyer's failure to check the facts. But actual inducement must still be shown, and where the buyer is sophisticated enough to know better, careless gullibility may break the chain of justified reliance.10
Because concealment requires an act, it should be kept apart from bare nondisclosure. When the facts show only silence, the analysis starts from the no-duty baseline and asks which recognized exception supplies a duty, such as the obligation of a seller of goods, land, or securities to disclose latent defects.11 Other areas of law draw the same line. Insurance cases sometimes treat an applicant's failure to update an insurer as a “continuing” representation, but that approach is a fiction, because after the application is submitted there usually is no act or communication from the applicant that can fairly be read as a representation.12 When concealment is invoked to toll a statute of limitations, the defendant must act affirmatively to hide facts necessary to the plaintiff's claim, and silence alone, including a failure to warn, is not enough.13 Relationships can raise the level of care a defendant owes, and courts sort them by how far the plaintiff has surrendered control. A roller coaster operator is held to a common carrier's higher duty, but a bumper-car owner is not, because patrons control the steering and acceleration of their own cars.14