Concept
Facts Basic to the Transaction
Fraudulent concealment, nondisclosure, and damages
Facts Basic to the Transaction
The last recognized duty to speak attaches to the fact itself, not to a relationship of trust or to anything the speaker has said. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2)(e), a party must disclose, before the transaction is consummated, facts basic to it if the party knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade, or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.1
The four duties covered earlier each depend on something already in the picture: a relationship of trust, or a statement that the speaker made and must keep from misleading, going stale, or being relied on after circumstances changed. This clause depends on neither. A speaker who has said nothing and owes no fiduciary loyalty can still be bound to speak when the fact is basic and the circumstances entitle the other party to expect to be told.
A duty of this shape fills a gap in the no-duty baseline. The baseline assumes that each side can protect itself by inspecting and asking questions, and the assumption fails when one party already holds a fact that the other could learn only through costly investigation or not at all. The buyer then pays to rediscover what the seller knows for free.2 Putting the burden of disclosure on the party who can reveal the fact most cheaply removes that waste. The clause limits the shift to settings in which the other party reasonably expects to be told, so that it does not grow into a general duty of candor in every bargain.
This is the category in which the law is still moving. The duty is in the process of being extended to buyers as well as sellers,3 and claims of this kind arise mostly in economic dealings, not personal relations.4 Three questions organize what follows: what the Restatement test requires, how it operates on a seller's known defects in real property and on property stigma, and what limits keep the duty from consuming the baseline.
The Reasonable-Expectation Test
Both halves of § 551(2)(e) must be met, and each does different work.5 The knowledge half concerns the speaker's state of mind. A duty to correct a mistake can be performed only by someone who can see the mistake, so a speaker who has no idea that the other side is laboring under a misapprehension has nothing to disclose, and liability for that silence would turn the rule into insurance against every fact the other side failed to learn. The speaker usually learns of the mistake from what the other party says or does during the dealing, such as describing plans that rest on a false assumption.
The expectation half is objective and looks at the listener's position. Because the baseline leaves each side of an arm's-length deal to protect itself, the law needs a way to identify the deals in which one side was entitled to lower its guard. A dependent relationship, a trade custom of volunteering certain facts, or circumstances that make independent checking impractical each tell a reasonable listener that nothing basic is amiss, and silence in that setting works like a reassurance. The expectation must be one a reasonable person would hold, so a disappointed party's private regret cannot create the duty.
The word basic narrows the category further. A fact must be basic, and not merely material, which means that it bears on an assumption on which the other party is making the contract.6
Hill v. Jones shows a court applying the rule to the most common setting. An Arizona court of appeals asked whether home buyers could put to the jury their claim that the sellers had a duty to disclose their knowledge of termite infestation.7 The court noted that the vitality of caveat emptor had waned in the latter half of the twentieth century, and that the modern view requires a vendor to disclose material facts in several situations, including where disclosure would correct the other party's mistake about a basic assumption of the contract and silence would fail the standards of good faith and fair dealing.8 It grounded the duty in the law of mistake. Contract law favors finality, but courts have recognized that in limited circumstances strict enforcement of that policy is unjust, so even a unilateral mistake of one party may justify rescission.9 The same logic reaches a buyer who knows more than the seller. If a yard-sale shopper knows that a $35 bowl is a rare antique worth more than $700,000 and says nothing, the seller, who reasonably did not know the bowl's value, should be able to rescind and recover the bowl.10
Courts treat the importance of the fact as a question for the trier of fact. A matter is material if a reasonable person would attach importance to it in deciding what to do in the transaction in question, and unless reasonable minds could not differ, the jury decides.11 Because the standard is a reasonable person's view in the transaction at hand, the same fact can be basic in one deal and trivial in another.
The same test governs dealings between merchants. In Kaloti Enterprises, Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court set out § 551 in full as it considered whether a supplier's silence could be fraud.12 Kaloti, a distributor, bought from Kellogg while Kellogg was about to begin selling directly to stores, a change that would undercut Kaloti. When Kellogg refused to cancel the sale and refund the price, Kaloti sued, and the court held that Kaloti had pleaded enough fraud to survive a motion to dismiss.13 A treatise note refines the point: what Kellogg withheld was less a marketing decision than its intention, and the real question was whether Kellogg had impliedly promised not to undercut Kaloti while knowing that it was about to break the promise.14
Both halves of the test are visible in those facts. Kellogg knew that Kaloti was dealing on the footing of the existing arrangement and was mistaken about what Kellogg meant to do. The expectation half rests on the information itself: it lay solely within Kellogg's knowledge, Kaloti could not have found it through diligent inquiry, and Kellogg's action would undermine Kaloti's expectations under the contract. A party is not generally obliged to disclose its business plans or marketing strategy, but commercial mores and the duty of fair dealing sometimes require it.15
Because the expectation half asks what a reasonable person would anticipate, courts need a way to decide when fairness calls for disclosure, and they weigh a recurring set of considerations.16 Five do most of the work:
- How the information was acquired, whether by chance or by effort, since knowledge bought with research is treated as its holder's property.
- Whether the other party could readily have discovered the fact through its own diligent inquiry.
- Whether the silent party is the seller, who typically holds the information, or the buyer.
- The type of contract, since insurance contracts and releases, for example, typically call for full disclosure.
- The importance of the undisclosed fact to the deal.
Discoverability often decides the case, and the Third Restatement's illustrations show it at work. Where denying recovery would give future buyers an incentive to pay for more expensive inspections that would rarely be worth the cost, the seller must reveal what the seller knows in the sales contract. Where requiring each side to inform itself of the facts, or even just requiring the buyer to put direct questions to the seller, is not unduly burdensome and matches the commercial customs governing real-estate transactions, the buyer has no claim.17 Both results follow from the expectation half. A duty to speak substitutes for self-help that the other party could not perform, and where self-help is cheap, an expectation of being told is no longer reasonable.
In DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Services, Inc., a jewelry store mistook a per-carat price for a total price and sold a 20-carat diamond for one-twentieth of its retail value. The buyers realized the price was far too low and said nothing, and the court held that their silence was not fraud because the store could have found the true value through its own diligence.18 The case isolates the expectation half. The knowledge half was satisfied, since the buyers knew that the store was mistaken about a fact that determined the price, yet no duty arose because a merchant able to protect itself had no reasonable basis for expecting its customers to correct its error. In Kaloti and Hill, the silent party held information the other side could not obtain; in DePrince, the mistaken party held the means to protect itself.
Some courts have moved past the Restatement's wording. They have extended the "special facts" doctrine to a broader array of settings in which one party's superior knowledge of essential facts makes a transaction without disclosure inherently unfair, a drift away from strict caveat emptor that Justice Blackmun's dissent in Chiarella noted.19 Some recent cases go beyond the Restatement's requirement of circumstances indicating an expectation of disclosure.20 An analysis should therefore anchor on the Restatement's two halves and add, where the facts show a plainly unfair informational advantage, that a court might impose the duty even when the circumstances supporting an expectation of disclosure are thin.
Hidden Defects and Stigma
Section 551(2)(e) does most of its work in the sale of a home. A seller who has lived in a house usually knows facts basic to the deal that a buyer cannot see, and a buyer in that position reasonably expects a seller who knows of such a fact to mention it.23 The Florida Supreme Court turned that expectation into a rule in Johnson v. Davis: where the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property that are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller must disclose them, and the duty applies to all forms of real property, new and used.24 Because the sellers had fraudulently concealed what they knew, the buyers recovered their $5,000 deposit with interest.25 Silence is not the only wrong the doctrine reaches. Caveat emptor does not shelter a seller's affirmative misstatements, even ones made after the purchase agreement is signed but before the property is conveyed.26
Johnson parts company with Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, in which the Massachusetts court refused to hold a seller liable for silence about termite infestation. The court saw an arm's-length business deal and "concealment in the simple sense of mere failure to reveal, with nothing to show any peculiar duty to speak."27 The decisions diverge because they begin from different rules about silence. The older rule arose in an agricultural society in which land, not the buildings on it, was the main object of most real estate sales, and a buyer could judge whether the land could be farmed profitably and cared little about the sheds. In an urban, industrialized society the rule is harder to defend, because sellers typically know much more about a property than buyers do, and leaving the burden of discovery on the buyer calls for exhaustive inspections that gather information the seller already has.28 The older rule also drew on the common law's distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance: the early common law imposed liability for affirmative acts of harm but shrank from forcing people to help one another, so liability for inaction was slow to develop.29 Courts that now reject Swinton say so bluntly; a New Jersey court wrote that it "does not represent our sense of justice or fair dealing."30
Each question answers a different worry. Materiality keeps the duty from turning every blemish into a lawsuit, because a flaw that would not change what a reasonable buyer pays hardly justifies unraveling a sale. Actual knowledge matters because a duty can be performed only by someone who can see what needs disclosing, and a constructive-knowledge standard would push sellers toward guaranteeing the condition of the house. The buyer's ignorance echoes the Restatement's requirement that the speaker know the other side is about to buy under a mistake, since a buyer who already knows has nothing to correct. Latency carries the most weight. The baseline assumes that buyers can protect themselves by inspecting, so the duty applies where inspection would not reveal the defect, and a defect that an ordinary inspection would expose leaves the buyer every means of self-protection.
Jurisdictions differ on the fourth question. Some require disclosure only of latent defects, meaning those not readily apparent on a careful inspection; others find the distinction between latent and patent defects administratively burdensome and require sellers to disclose all defects in the premises.32 Beyond the four questions, five circumstances make liability more probable when they appear in the facts: that the property was residential and bought by an unsophisticated purchaser, that the defect endangered health or safety, that the seller personally created the defect, that the seller gave the purchaser reassurances about quality, and that the seller intentionally covered the defect up.33 Each factor either enlarges the harm, shrinks the buyer's ability to look out for himself, or shows the seller's culpability. A buyer who skipped an expert inspection weakens the case for liability, though that weakness is one consideration among several and does not erase the seller's duty.34
The defects that recur in the decisions share the features the four questions describe: they are costly, invisible to a visitor, and known to the seller from living with the property. Sellers have been held liable for failing to disclose termite infestation in Obde v. Schlemeyer, a house built on collapsible soil in Hess v. Canberra Development Co., and, in Strawn v. Canuso, a site beside a landfill contaminated with toxic waste, although a New Jersey statute has since superseded Strawn.35 Obde imposed a duty for the same kind of defect that produced no duty in Swinton, which confirms that the divergence lies in the governing rule. Posner v. Davis, which the Johnson court relied on, imposed liability for a leaking roof and basement flooding that the sellers knew of and failed to disclose, and numerous other jurisdictions have followed that view.36 A defect need not be proven dangerous to count. In Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, both the seller and the broker were liable for failing to reveal ureaformaldehyde foam insulation, which the federal government had banned in new home construction, because most buyers would want to know of it.37
The duty binds those who develop land as well as those who merely own it. In Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc., a developer sold lots carved from an abandoned oil field whose salt-water disposal areas would not sustain vegetation, and it graded the tract so that purchasers could not find those areas. The buyers' grass, shrubs, and trees died, and landscaping proved impossible or very expensive.38 The Kansas court refused to imply a warranty of soil fertility from the act of subdividing and selling lots as residential sites. It nonetheless let the fraud claims go forward under the rule that a vendor's silence about a known defect outside the buyer's reasonable reach, and undiscoverable by reasonable diligence, is actionable concealment, a rule the court said approximates the Restatement's treatment of nondisclosure.39 The buyers had taken title through builders who served as a conduit, so lack of privity was no defense, and the soil condition was material because it affected the value and acceptability of the homesite.40 The two results show where knowledge does its work: the developer promised nothing about fertility, and it answered only for what it knew and let the buyers walk into.
Sellers who build, and the brokers who sell for them, face variations on the same duty. In sales of new houses by builders, an implied warranty that the house is workmanlike and fit for habitation has displaced caveat emptor in much of the country, and in Arizona it extends to subsequent buyers.41 Builders are treated like manufacturers, so the warranty does not depend on proof of the builder's knowledge or concealment, although it is usually conditioned on the defect being latent.42 Brokers occupy a different position. A growing number of courts require them to disclose known defects, and a few go further and require a broker to inspect the premises and report what the inspection reveals.43
Landlords carry a parallel duty. A landlord must disclose latent defects that exist when the lease begins, meaning conditions the tenant could not find on a reasonable inspection. The landlord's own history with the building can supply the knowledge: a prior tenant may have reported a roof leak that an ordinary inspection would not reveal.44 A commercial tenant is protected in the same way. A landlord who fails to disclose conditions that make the premises unsuitable for the tenant's particular commercial use is liable, as when a weak ceiling offered burglars a way in, and the duty is so basic that liability may be imposed despite an exculpatory clause.45
Every defect so far has been physical, but a property can also carry a history or reputation that depresses its value without any observable flaw. These stigma cases test whether the same elements reach facts that live only in the buyer's mind. In Reed v. King, a woman and her four children had been murdered in the house ten years before the sale, and the seller did not disclose it. The court reasoned that murder of innocents can so disturb buyers that they cannot live in the home, that it may deprive a buyer of the intended use of the purchase, and that murder is too uncommon for buyers to be charged with anticipating and investigating it.46 Reed did not endorse the materiality of peripheral, insubstantial, or fancied harms, and courts worry that treating every fact that disquiets some buyers as material would destabilize conveyances.47
A reputation the seller built personally pushes the analysis further. In Stambovsky v. Ackley, the seller had promoted her Nyack house as haunted by three ghosts in local and national press and did not mention it to out-of-town buyers. The court reasoned that no inspection, however meticulous, would reveal the house's ghoulish reputation in the community, that the reputation went to "the very essence of the bargain," and that the buyers could rescind.48 The court did not decide whether ghosts exist. It focused on the seller's own role in creating the perception that impaired the house's value as an ordinary residence.49 The dissent would have charged the buyer with reasonable inquiry because the reputation was widely publicized, so the majority and the dissent disagreed about where the latency line falls.50 Reed turned on the gravity of the event, while Stambovsky turned on the seller's publicity and the buyers' inability to learn of it. Other courts apply the same elements and find no duty: Milliken v. Jacono held that a seller need not disclose that a murder-suicide occurred in the listed house, and an Alaska court reached the same result when a prior owner had died and partly decomposed in the house.51
Legislatures have taken over much of this ground. Many states now have statutes that typically apply to existing, but not newly constructed, one- to four-family homes and require the seller, before the contract is signed, either to disclaim all warranties and representations or to disclose known defects across a checklist of the house's systems and features.52 A late disclosure usually gives the buyer a right to rescind, and a seller who marks the form "no" or "no knowledge" while actually knowing of a defect has produced documentary proof of concealment that can support a fraud claim.53 Statutes also subtract duties. A large number of states have denied the purchaser a remedy for at least some stigma, such as the property's having been occupied by an AIDS patient or having been the scene of a crime, and South Carolina is one of them.54 Stigma outside the scope of such a statute still carries the risk of liability.
Some states still apply caveat emptor to latent defects in used homes. Alabama treats caveat emptor as the rule for sales of used real property, and Massachusetts recognizes no common-law duty to disclose latent defects unless a statute imposes one.55 A Massachusetts seller need not disclose termites but must disclose conditions dangerous to health and safety.56 A number of states apply the rule even to apparent defects: as long as the seller does not affirmatively lie about the condition of the premises, buyers are charged with notice of what an inspection would have revealed.57 A seller in such a state is protected only against bare silence, so an answer should identify the jurisdiction's rule first and then turn to the claims of affirmative misrepresentation and active concealment that remain open to the buyer.
Limits on the Duty
The traditional baseline treats silence differently from lying. In Lord Cairns's words, mere non-disclosure of material facts, however morally censurable, is no ground for an action in the nature of an action for misrepresentation.59 Section 551(2)(e) reaches silence only when the other side, because of the relationship, the customs of the trade, or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect to be told, and that qualifier is the source of every limit on the duty.60 An expectation is reasonable only when the listener had no sensible way to protect itself. The duty therefore recedes when the other party could have learned the fact on its own, when the silent party earned the information at its own expense, and when a statute or the parties' own contract has already settled who bears the risk. The first two limits track two of the considerations listed earlier: how readily the other party could have learned the fact, and how the silent party acquired it.
Why may a customer stay silent about a jeweler's mispriced diamond when the seller of a termite-ridden house may not? The difference is accessibility. In DePrince, silent buyers escaped fraud liability because the store could have learned its own diamond's true value.61 The duty to disclose stands in for self-help that the other party cannot perform. A merchant that prices stock for a living has the records, the appraisers, and the incentive to check its own numbers, so a rule requiring customers to correct the merchant's errors would shift the cost of the merchant's carelessness onto them. A home buyer facing hidden termite damage is differently placed, because the damage can be found only through an inspection that may still miss it, while the seller can reveal what is already known at almost no cost.62
The limit bites harder on silence than on deception. When fraud involves a positive misdeed, the wrongdoer's malfeasance normally outweighs the victim's lapse in checking the facts, although actual inducement must still be shown, and a victim sophisticated enough to know better may lose on reliance because careless gullibility can break the chain of justified reliance.63 A party who merely stayed quiet gets no comparable credit on the scales, so the other side's failure to look weighs more heavily against a claim of silence than against a claim of lying or hiding.
Accessibility turns on what was realistically within reach, so it is usually a question of fact. In Hill v. Jones, the court acknowledged that a party may "reasonably expect the other to take normal steps to inform himself and to draw his own conclusions," yet it left the buyers' diligence to the jury. A seller who points to the buyers' failure to investigate therefore raises a factual dispute and does not obtain a bar to the claim.64 The same reasoning decides a lease of unimproved land. A prospective tenant with a reasonable opportunity to inspect must investigate whether the land suits the intended use, and the landlord has no duty to disclose absent a fiduciary relationship or a fraudulent representation. The picture changes when the landlord knew the tenant's particular needs and also knew of latent defects that made the land unsuitable, because the tenant could not have found them and might recover damages for the landlord's silence.65
The same reasoning explains why the duty weakens in commercial sales. The duty to disclose material latent defects does not extend to commercial properties, because commercial purchasers are more sophisticated and can have the property professionally inspected, and off-site conditions and nonphysical defects matter less to commercial owners.66 A sale in which an investor buys an uncompleted apartment complex that the builder built for its own use and management, and not for sale, is an arm's-length transaction unlike the inherently unequal bargaining position between the average home buyer and a vendor-builder of new houses.67 Caveat emptor accordingly remains viable in commercial realty and in transactions between merchants,68 although a commercial seller can still be liable for affirmative misrepresentations.69 The haunted house in Stambovsky v. Ackley lies on the duty side of the line: the seller had publicized the house as haunted and said nothing to the buyer, and the court allowed rescission because the seller had created the perception that impaired the house's value as an ordinary residence.70
The second limit protects what the silent party paid to learn. Information produced by a deliberate and costly search is treated as the searcher's own, because the law rewards the search by letting the searcher act on its results before sharing them, and a duty to hand them over would erase the reward and with it the incentive to search.71 The law rewards successful searchers much as it rewards inventors and authors, by letting them keep and use what they found.72 That is why a seller who learned of termites by living in the house must speak, while a buyer who paid a geologist to find minerals under the land need not. Dealers in antiques and rare coins make the same point from the trade side: they live on their expertise, and the expense of acquiring it would not be justified if it yielded no bargaining advantage. The logic also supports finer lines inside the category. Information a person discovers, and that might never have surfaced otherwise, merits more protection than information the holder merely learns early and that would soon become common knowledge, and information that adds to total wealth merits more than information that only shifts wealth from one side to the other.73
The protection has an edge. A yard-sale shopper who recognizes a $35 bowl as a rare antique worth more than $700,000 holds valuable knowledge, yet where the seller reasonably did not know the bowl's value, the seller may be able to rescind and recover it.74 The Third Restatement builds that boundary into its rule that better information is a legitimate advantage at the bargaining table, and that the law encourages its acquisition, with a caveat in the limited circumstances in which a party has "a legitimate reason to rely on an adversary to supply the information."75
Legislatures sometimes withdraw the duty by drawing a fixed line in place of the case-by-case question whether a buyer was entitled to expect disclosure. The Arizona statute in Lerner v. DMB Realty relieved home sellers of any obligation to disclose that a sex offender lived nearby, and the deed itself pointed the buyers to that provision and told them to investigate the point if it mattered to them.76 A fixed line tells sellers and brokers in advance which silences are safe, at the price of ignoring the circumstances of the individual buyer. New Jersey's statute on new residential construction protects sellers of new homes from liability for failing to disclose off-site conditions, provided the seller gives notice that lists of those conditions are available from the municipal clerk.77 New York lets a home seller opt out of its disclosure obligations by crediting the buyer $500.78
Statutes subtract only what they name. The Arizona provision lifted the duty to volunteer, yet the Lerner sellers had told the buyers, when asked why they were moving, that they wanted to be closer to friends. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the fraud claim, because a party who need not take the initiative of disclosing a fact, and could keep silent if not asked, commits affirmative fraud by answering a direct question about it untruthfully.79 A statute that declares one kind of stigma immaterial likewise leaves other kinds to the common law, where the risk of liability for nondisclosure continues.80
A seller can also narrow the duty by contract, and here the wording of the clause decides the outcome. A disclaimer that is clear and specific can effectively remove the duty to disclose defects, and a seller's attempt is much more likely to succeed when the clause was explicitly bargained for and identifies the kinds of defects for which the seller will not answer.81 A simple "as is" clause, which tells the buyer only that the property comes in its present condition, is treated differently, because courts often refuse to enforce it against a claim of positive misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment.82 The difference follows from what each clause tells the buyer. A specific clause names the very matter in dispute, so it warns the buyer to investigate that matter and restores the self-protection the baseline assumes. A general clause gives no such warning, and enforcing it against a seller who lied or hid a defect would let the seller buy immunity for fraud with boilerplate.
The effect of an "as is" clause therefore depends on the claim it meets. The clause does not trump the seller's duty when the seller has misrepresented the condition, and the buyer is then not bound by it as to that condition. Only when the seller is silent and the defect is discoverable on reasonable inspection does the clause defeat the claim, and a statutory duty of disclosure will not lightly be found waived.83 Merger and non-reliance clauses, which recite that the written contract is the whole agreement and that neither side relied on outside statements, meet the same resistance. In Hill, the integration clause did not bar rescission, because a provision that lets a party escape the consequences of its own fraud in procuring the contract is invalid.84 Other courts reason that no one can escape liability for his own fraudulent statements by inserting a clause saying the other party shall not rely on them.85
New York marks the exception worth knowing. In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, a party alleged that false oral statements about the building's operating expenses and profits had induced the deal, but the contract disclaimed any representation about the building's expenses, operation, or any other matter and recited that neither side relied on anything outside the writing.86 The court held that a specific disclaimer of that kind, unlike a general and vague merger clause, defeats the fraud action because it shows the party lacked justified reliance on oral representations.87 Even a sophisticated party's fraud claim can survive such clauses: in ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, the claim survived non-reliance clauses because the misrepresentation appeared in the written contract documents themselves.88 The specific-disclaimer rule therefore operates only in some jurisdictions, and only against reliance on the matter the clause actually names.
Had the seller said nothing in either deal, the clauses would face only the nondisclosure claim. That is the claim an "as is" clause is best able to defeat, and it does so when a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defect.89 A seller who also misstated or concealed the condition has moved the case out of the territory these limits protect.