Concept
Misrepresentation as Negligence
Negligent misrepresentation and strict liability misrepresentation
Negligent and Strict Misrepresentation
Misrepresentation as Negligence
A false statement can be tortious even when the speaker never meant to deceive anyone. The Restatement (Second) of Torts begins from a simple premise: a misrepresentation of fact or law may be negligent conduct.1 Negligence law evaluates conduct, and speaking is conduct. Words can send a listener onto a weak platform or into a bad purchase as surely as a shove can, so the usual question applies to a speaker as it applies to a driver: did this person, in speaking, fail to use reasonable care?
A statement meant to be truthful can still be a misrepresentation through ignorance or carelessness, as when the word “not” is inadvertently omitted or inaccurate language is used.2 Fraud lies at the other end of the fault spectrum. The plaintiff must usually show not only that the defendant’s misstatements misled her but also that the defendant knew they were false or at least was indifferent to their truth or falsity.3 The common-law claims differ chiefly in how much the speaker’s fault matters: fraud, which is intentional misrepresentation; negligent misrepresentation; and, in a very few states, strict liability in tort for public misrepresentations about a product’s safety.4 Each claim hinges on particular words written or spoken by the defendant, so a lawyer should first isolate the exact words challenged and the context in which they were conveyed.5
Italian Cowboy’s fraud claims against Prudential show where fraud begins. The court held that Powell’s representations were actionable as a matter of law and that legally sufficient evidence showed they were known to be false when made.6 That knowledge of falsity made the claim one for fraud. A speaker who passed along the same statements without checking them would lack scienter, and the plaintiff would need a negligence theory instead.
Many everyday negligence cases are misrepresentation cases in substance. A great many familiar forms of negligent conduct that invade tangible interests of person or property are in essence nothing more than misrepresentation: a driver’s misleading turn signal, an assurance that a danger does not exist, a false statement about a chattel sold.7
Does every careless false statement therefore create liability? It does not, and the next case shows why.
The ladder and the oven differ in the interest harmed and in the setting. Liability for merely negligent misrepresentation is not imposed in ordinary commercial settings. It is reserved mainly for professional and fiduciary relationships, where the parties expect reasonable care to ensure that statements are accurate, and tort liability for innocent misrepresentation generally requires that the defendant have warranted the truth of the statement.8 Expectation explains the line. In virtually every setting, people expect that one party will not lie to another, but business people probably do not expect one another to take reasonable care that their statements are true. Only where information is transferred as part of a service purchased, such as legal or accounting advice, is that expectation commonly held.9
The Restatement’s premise therefore settles that a careless statement can be negligent conduct. Whether the speaker answers for the harm depends on the interest injured and on what the listener was entitled to expect from this speaker. Two variables organize the rest of the chapter: the kind of harm (pecuniary loss or physical harm) and the speaker’s fault (knowing, careless, or innocent). The principal pairings are these:
- A careless statement that causes only economic loss supports liability mainly in business, professional, and fiduciary settings.10
- A conscious misrepresentation that induces action involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm falls under § 310.11
- Careless false information that causes physical harm through the other’s reasonable reliance falls under § 311.12
- A product seller’s public misrepresentation of a material fact about a chattel falls under § 402B when a consumer who justifiably relied is physically harmed.13 The rule imposes liability without fault but is framed in terms of public statements, such as advertising, dealer literature, labels, and leaflets,14 and only a very few states recognize it.15 Its freedom from privity echoes Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, which framed strict liability for defective products as a tort claim rather than an implied-warranty claim, so that privity was not required.16