Concept
Conscious Misrepresentation and Physical Harm
Negligent misrepresentation and strict liability misrepresentation
Conscious Misrepresentation and Physical Harm
When a false statement injures a body instead of a bank account, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 supplies the rule. An actor who makes a misrepresentation is liable for physical harm that results from an act done by the hearer or by a third person in reliance on the truth of the representation, provided the actor meets two further conditions.1 One condition concerns what the speaker expects the statement to do; the other concerns what the speaker knows about it. Together they reach intentional, affirmative misrepresentations that induce reliance carrying a risk of bodily injury, when the speaker knows the statement is false or knows he lacks the knowledge he professes.2
The limits that confined the economic-loss cases do not appear in § 310. The section has no business-setting requirement, no limited-group rule, and no restriction to pecuniary loss. Nor does it need a reasonable-care inquiry. A speaker who states what he knows to be false, or who professes knowledge he knows he lacks, has done more than mishandle information.
Section 310 is built from two strands, and a plaintiff needs both. The first concerns expectation: the speaker intends the statement to induce, or should realize that it is likely to induce, action by the hearer or a third person that involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm.3 The second concerns knowledge: the speaker knows the statement is false, or knows that he lacks the knowledge he professes.4 Because the harm need only result from an act done in reliance by the hearer or a third person, the injured person need not have heard the statement.
Section 311, the negligent counterpart, drops the knowledge requirement and substitutes a failure of reasonable care.5 A later section takes it up. This one develops the expectation strand first and then the two forms of knowledge.
Inducing Risky Action
A § 310 claim begins with what the false statement sets in motion. Subsection (a) requires that the speaker intend the statement to induce, or should realize that it is likely to induce, action by the other or by a third person that involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other.6 The stem of § 310 adds that the harm must result from an act done in reliance upon the truth of the representation.7 The two provisions describe a chain of three links: a statement, an act taken because the statement was believed, and an injury caused by that act. Subsection (a) ties the speaker to the middle link by asking whether he meant, or should have seen, that the statement would produce a dangerous act.
A manufacturer that asserts in an advertisement, manual, label, or plaque that its crane is “rated to 20,000 lbs.” supplies the standard illustration. If the crane cannot lift that weight without breaking, and an 18,000-pound load falls on a worker beneath the boom when it collapses, the worker may have a misrepresentation claim for the false assertion of capacity.8 The inducement strand is easy to see in these facts. A load rating tells operators how much the machine may carry, so a manufacturer that publishes one can expect operators to load the crane by it. The induced act is the lift, and the lift becomes dangerous only because the rating is false: an operator relying on a true rating stays within capacity, while one relying on a false rating asks the boom to carry more than it can. The crane facts establish inducement and say nothing yet about what the manufacturer knew. That is the work of the knowledge strand, taken up next.
The alternative route, under which it is enough that the speaker should realize the likely result, matters because the crane manufacturer almost certainly wanted a sale and did not want an injured worker. A requirement that the speaker intend bodily harm would excuse nearly every speaker, so subsection (a) looks to the probable effect of the statement. “Should realize” is an objective measure. It asks what a reasonable person in the speaker's position would appreciate about how listeners will use the statement, whatever the speaker privately hoped. A speaker who sends others toward danger answers for the result he should have foreseen, and hoping that the act will go well does not change what the statement is likely to produce.
Both the stem and subsection (a) allow the act done in reliance to be a third person's, so the injured person need not have heard the statement. Suppose the worker beneath the boom never read the manual. The act done in reliance was the operator's lift, and the worker is the person that lift endangered. The statement reaches the worker through another person's conduct, and § 310 treats that route as enough. That is why subsection (a) frames the risk as one to the injured person: the induced act must threaten someone in the plaintiff's position. When an exam hypothetical pairs a false statement with an injured bystander who never heard it, the bystander's silence does not defeat the claim, so long as the speaker should have realized that the act done in reliance would put the bystander at risk.
Courts have applied the same understanding to reliance. In City of New York v. Lead Industries Ass'n, the plaintiff alleged that the safety of white lead pigment had been fraudulently misrepresented. It could not prove that it had itself relied directly on the representation, but it could prove that the representation led to injury foreseeably caused to consumers of the pigment. The court found that reliance in bodily-injury cases, in contrast to economic-loss cases, may be indirect.9 The contrast with the pecuniary-loss rules is deliberate. For economic harm, the earlier sections confined recovery to plaintiffs within a limited audience who relied on the statement, because one careless report can ripple through many transactions. Section 310 draws its line elsewhere: the induced act must carry an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the person injured.
The two statements in that brochure ask different things of the reader. A capacity figure tells operators how hard to work the machine, so the act it induces puts the people near the boom at stake. A color description tells the buyer what to expect on delivery. The unreasonable-risk language in subsection (a) keeps the strand directed at statements of the first kind. The speaker must intend or should realize that the induced act itself carries an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the injured person, and a remote chance that some misfortune might follow a purchase does not meet that requirement.
Knowledge of Falsity
The second strand of § 310 asks what the speaker knew when he made the statement. Subsection (b) conditions liability on the actor's knowing something, and subsection (b)(i) names the first thing he may know: that the statement is false.11 Set beside the expectation strand, the provision describes a speaker who says what he knows to be untrue, expects someone to act on it in a way that risks bodily injury, and sees that injury follow. Knowledge makes this speaker culpable in the manner of an intentional wrongdoer. He did more than handle information badly: he put a statement into circulation while aware that its premise was false, and that awareness is why § 310 need not ask whether he used reasonable care.
The word “knows” in § 310(b)(i) corresponds to what fraud law calls scienter, the guilty state of mind that separates deceit from carelessness. In the classic formulation from Derry v. Peek, fraud is proved when a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.12 Section 310(b)(i) tracks the plainest form, actual knowledge of falsity. The elements of fraud also reach the speaker who asserts a fact as known while merely guessing, because they ask about the speaker's “knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth.”13 Section 310(b)(ii) captures that speaker, and the next subsection takes it up.
The line between § 310 and its careless counterpart runs through the speaker's honest belief. If the speaker actually believed his statement, however unreasonably, the misrepresentation was at most negligent and scienter is not established.14 Courts applying the fraud standard add that carelessness or misjudgment, however gross, does not satisfy the knowledge element, and a should-have-known test is insufficient.15 The reason lies in what each speaker did. A careless speaker failed to check, and § 311 measures that lapse against reasonable care: it imposes liability on one who negligently gives false information when reasonable reliance on it causes physical harm.16 A speaker who believed what he said did not send anyone toward danger while aware that the premise was false, so § 310 has nothing to hold him to.
The drafting of § 310 reflects this division. Subsection (a) measures the speaker's expectations objectively, asking what he should realize his statement is likely to induce.17 Subsection (b) asks what he knows, which is a question about his own mind. An objective test is tolerable in (a) because it concerns what listeners ordinarily do with a statement, and the speaker's private hope does not change that. If (b) were objective too, a speaker who ought to have known would be liable, and § 310 would collapse into § 311 and erase the difference in fault that explains why the two sections exist.
Knowledge is rarely admitted, so plaintiffs usually prove it circumstantially. If the plaintiff shows that it would have been unlikely or unreasonable for the defendant to believe his statement, the trier of fact may infer that he knew it was false, or at least that he lacked the knowledge his statement asserted or implied.18 An alleged belief “destitute of all reasonable foundation” may likewise persuade a court that it was never really entertained.19 And a speaker who has shut his eyes to the facts, or purposely abstained from inquiring into them, lacks honest belief and is as fraudulent as one who knowingly states a falsehood.20 Ultramares makes the same point about negligence or blindness: even when not equivalent to fraud, it is evidence from which fraud may be inferred.21 The careless speaker therefore falls outside § 310 by definition, yet the carelessness itself can carry a particular speaker across the line when a jury declines to credit his claim of honest belief.
Pretended Knowledge
Section 310 gives the knowledge strand a second form, and it reaches a speaker who may never have known his statement was false. Under subsection (b)(ii), the actor is liable if he knows “that he has not the knowledge which he professes.”23 Subsection (b)(i) applies when the speaker knows the statement is untrue; subsection (b)(ii) applies when the speaker presents a matter as known and is aware that he does not know it. Both forms sit under the same stem, so the statement must still be one the speaker intends or should realize will induce action carrying an unreasonable risk of physical harm, and the harm must result from an act done in reliance on it.
A pretense of knowledge counts as a knowing misrepresentation because of what a flat assertion communicates. A statement that a ship is unsinkable carries two messages: the fact itself, and an unspoken claim that the speaker has a basis for it. Listeners weigh both, since an officer's settled conclusion and a bystander's guess lead to different decisions about whether to stay aboard or leave. A speaker who knows he is guessing, yet speaks as though he knows, has told the hearer something false about the strength of his information, and he has done so whether or not the underlying fact ever proves wrong.24 The falsehood is also avoidable. A speaker escapes it by stating that he merely believes the fact or by indicating the limits of what he knows, and that costs an honest speaker nothing.25
Fraud law supplies the vocabulary. Cardozo gave the idea its best-known statement in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche: “Fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none.”26 That sentence describes subsection (b)(ii) exactly, and § 310(b)(ii) carries the idea into the physical-harm setting, which is why fraud decisions are the natural place to look for examples.
The distinctive feature of this alternative is that the speaker's belief in the fact does not rescue him. Only an honest belief that he has a sound basis would. A speaker can hope that a ship is sound, even lean toward thinking so, while knowing that he has never examined it and has nothing but a hunch. He believes the fact and knows that he does not know it; the pretense lies in speaking as though knowledge backed the belief.27 The clearest case is the speaker who avoids learning the truth so that he can assert it flatly. Having purposely abstained from inquiry, he can claim no honest belief, and he is as fraudulent as one who knowingly stated the falsehood.28 One formulation of the elements of fraud captures the line by asking whether the speaker made the statement “recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion.”29 The words “positive assertion” carry the weight, since they separate a speaker who presents a matter as settled from one who offers a guess as a guess.
Two decisions show how courts find the pretense. In Jordan v. Knafel, Knafel categorically told Jordan that he was the father of her child, thereby impliedly representing that he was her only sexual partner during the period of conception. Tests later showed that the child was not his, and the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for Jordan. Although Knafel did not know that he was not the father, she knew that he might not be, so she made her assertion without confidence in its truth.30 Jordan involved no bodily injury, but the court asked the question that subsection (b)(ii) asks: what did the speaker know about her own knowledge? In Cabot v. Christie, a seller stated the acreage of a tract without taking any step to verify it, and he was held liable because the statement implied a secure knowledge that he did not have.31 In both cases the exposure came from the claim of certainty.
The two captains differ in a single respect: what each knew about his own knowledge. Neither knew that the statement was false, so subsection (b)(i) fails against both, and each gave the assurance expecting the passenger to stay aboard, so the expectation strand is met for both. The first captain knew his assurance claimed more than he had. The second believed his report supplied what he claimed. That difference separates § 310 from § 311, which asks whether reasonable care was used in giving the information.32 A plaintiff rarely has an admission, so the first captain's state of mind will be shown circumstantially: if it would have been unlikely or unreasonable for him to believe he had a basis for his certainty, the trier of fact may infer that he knew he lacked it.33 A speaker who persuades the trier that he honestly believed what he said, however unreasonably, has at most been negligent.34
The edge is not perfectly crisp, because “knowledge” is itself elastic. A seller who states a tract's acreage from a surveyor's map he has never checked has some basis but no personal knowledge, and decisions on such facts have imposed fraud liability even though little more than negligence was involved.35
Students often search the facts for proof that the speaker knew the statement was false and, finding none, conclude that scienter is missing. That search applies subsection (b)(i) alone. Under (b)(ii) the plaintiff proves what the speaker knew about the limits of his own knowledge, so a captain who never learned that the ship could sink can still be liable if he knew his assurance claimed more than he had.