Concept
Negligent False Information
Negligent misrepresentation and strict liability misrepresentation
Negligent False Information
A misrepresentation of fact or law may be negligent conduct.1 When the harm it causes is bodily, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311(1) supplies the rule: one who negligently gives false information to another is liable for physical harm caused by action the other takes in reasonable reliance on that information, whether the harm falls on the other person or on third persons the speaker should expect to be put in peril by the action.2
Section 311 is the negligence counterpart of § 310. Section 310 reaches a speaker who intends, or should realize, that the statement will induce action carrying an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other,3 and who knows either that the statement is false or that he lacks the knowledge he professes.4 Section 311 drops the requirement of knowledge and asks whether the speaker used reasonable care. A speaker who sincerely believed a false statement escapes § 310 and may still answer under § 311.
Two further boundaries are worth fixing before the details. Section 311 demands fault but no public statement: it speaks of information given “to another.” The strict-liability rule taken up in the next section demands no fault but is formulated in terms of public misrepresentations, such as advertising, labels, and leaflets.5 Strict liability in tort, as Greenman v. Yuba Power Products established it for defective products, rests on tort rather than implied warranty and so requires no privity.6 The subsections below follow § 311 in order: what the plaintiff must prove about reliance and harm, who may recover, and how a speaker's care can fail.
Reasonable Reliance and Physical Harm
Section 311(1) joins three events: false information given without reasonable care, action the recipient takes in reasonable reliance on it, and physical harm that results from the action.7 Because the harm is physical, courts agree that ordinary principles of negligence law apply, and the plaintiff must also prove the usual elements of a negligence case.8
Reasonable reliance links the first event to the last. Without reliance, the false statement caused nothing; without reasonableness, the injury may trace to the recipient's own choice instead of the statement. The comparable requirement in public-misrepresentation claims has been explained in just these terms: the law should not give an injured buyer an easy way to escape responsibility for harm principally caused by his own careless decision, and proof that reliance was justifiable gives objective assurance that the plaintiff probably did rely on the particular representation.9
What the recipient could see moved the answer. Reasonableness is judged against the facts the recipient actually had, so a recipient who held contradicting information risks failing this element.
Comment a describes the section as suited to situations in which it is part of the actor's business or profession to give information on which the safety of the recipient or a third person depends. The physician-patient relationship may qualify. Patients rely on their physicians' assurances, and they may be influenced by statements that fall outside the physician's duty to disclose under informed-consent principles; a physician who overstates his experience, or who assures a patient that her worry about a particular risk is unfounded, has said enough.10 If that assurance had no reasonable basis, the patient proceeds, and the feared complication occurs, each link of § 311(1) is present.
A commercial setting produces the same chain. In Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., a buyer's several-week-old car developed a clicking and chopping sensation in the steering. He raised it with the dealer's service manager three times, and each time, without checking the problem, the manager said something like: “It's a new car. Don't worry about it. It'll wear out.” The steering later locked and the car crashed. The court held that a jury could find the dealer liable for negligent misrepresentation, because the manager made positive assertions without a reasonable basis to know them to be true.11 The assurance, the buyer's continued use of the car, and the crash supply the three links.
Not every careless statement carries the duty. In Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, the court refused to make a publisher independently investigate the accuracy of the text it publishes,12 reasoning that no publisher has a duty as a guarantor.13 It also would not rename that rejected duty a “mere” warning label, because deciding what to warn about would force the publisher to do the very investigation it need not do.14 Other courts have declined to impose a comparable duty on the publisher of an instruction manual, in Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., and of a diet book, in Smith v. Linn. The physician and the service manager each spoke to a particular person about a risk to that person; a duty on the publisher would run to a general readership.
The label on the claim also varies by state. Minnesota and North Carolina limit damages for negligent misrepresentation to pecuniary loss, so a personal-injury claim there may not rest on that tort, and California bars negligent misrepresentation claims for emotional distress.15 In those states the physical-harm plaintiff proceeds in ordinary negligence, which courts agree governs.16
Persons Put in Peril
Section 311(1) names two groups on whom the harm may fall: the other, meaning the recipient who acted on the information, and such third persons as the speaker should expect to be put in peril by the action taken.18
The first group needs little explanation. A recipient who acts on a careless assurance puts his own body at stake, and the speaker addressed the information to him. The buyer in Pabon was himself the person hurt when his steering locked, so the first clause applied once the other elements were shown.19
The second group reaches people who never heard the statement. The statement works through the recipient: it induces an act, and the act endangers those in its path. The test is what the speaker should expect, an objective question asked as of the time the information was given.
The duty has an outer edge. In McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, a West Virginia court held that a brand-name drug company has no duty to warn consumers of generic versions of its drug.20 The consumers' exposure came from a generic version of the drug, not from any action taken on the brand-name company's information, so the pedestrian's case and theirs differ at exactly the missing link.
Misrepresentation cases ask a parallel question about whom the speaker had reason to expect would be affected. In a land-sale case, builders took title to lots as “a conduit or temporary way station” for the purchasers who would receive title on completion of their homes, and the court treated those purchasers as the class the seller intended and had reason to expect would buy and build.21 An intermediary acting for the plaintiffs did not change who would ultimately be affected. The purchasers' losses came through intermediaries acting for them, whereas the pedestrian was simply in the path of the recipient's act, which is the situation § 311(1)(b) addresses.
Section 310 also speaks of third persons, but in the opposite position. It reaches physical harm resulting from an act done in reliance by the other or by a third person, and it asks whether the speaker should realize the statement is likely to induce action involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the other.22 Under § 310 the third person may be the one who acts and the injured person is the other. Under § 311(1)(b) the recipient acts and a third person may be the one injured. Asking who relied and who was hurt resolves a problem under either section.
How Care Can Fail
Section 311(2) says what the negligence in § 311(1) consists of: a failure to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or in the manner in which it is communicated.24 The two limbs describe two moments at which a speaker can go wrong: before speaking, when deciding how much checking the statement deserves, and in speaking, when choosing the words.
A speaker who makes a positive assertion implies some basis for it, and the first limb requires that a reasonable basis exist. In Pabon, the service manager gave a flat assurance about the steering three times without checking the problem, and the court held that a jury could find negligent misrepresentation because the assertions were made without a reasonable basis to know them to be true.25 The standard measures what the speaker did to find out. Falsity alone does not establish breach.
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. shows the first limb in the hands of a speaker who had no part in the sale. The plaintiff bought shoes that bore the defendant's seal. The court found warranty and strict liability inappropriate, because the seal implied merely that the defendant had approved the general type of shoe, not the particular pair the plaintiff bought.26 Courts agree, though the cases are sparse, that certifiers and endorsers may be liable for negligent misrepresentation but not for breach of warranty or in strict liability, because they do not “sell” products or control product safety.27 Section 311 reaches such a speaker because it asks about care in giving information and says nothing about a place in the chain of distribution. A certifier who endorses without examining, or examines carelessly, has failed to ascertain the accuracy of what the endorsement conveys.
The second limb covers carelessness in how information is put. Here the speaker's inquiry may have been thorough, and the fault lies in turning what was learned into words, so that a recipient is misled even though the speaker's own information was accurate.
Clear wording protects the speaker because reasonable reliance remains a separate element of § 311(1). Ambiguity that a careful drafter would have removed leaves the speaker answerable for the misreading.
The first limb borders § 310. A speaker who knew he lacked the knowledge he professed has pretended to knowledge and answers under § 310 if its other conditions are met.28 A speaker who thought his basis adequate but should have checked further answers under § 311(2)(a).