Concept
Injurious Falsehood Compared
Wrongful criminal proceedings (malicious prosecution) and related defenses
Injurious Falsehood Compared
Injurious falsehood and malicious prosecution both compensate harm that follows from something a defendant said or set in motion, yet they demand different proof. Malicious prosecution reaches a private person who initiates or procures criminal proceedings against someone who is not guilty, without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice, when the proceedings end in the accused's favor.1 The wrong lies in the misuse of criminal process. Injurious falsehood needs no proceeding at all. It needs a false statement, published to others, and pecuniary loss, meaning money or something worth money, that results from the publication.2
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 651(1) turns that definition into a burden. When the issue is properly raised, the plaintiff must prove each item on a list, and the list falls into four groups.3 Some items concern the statement: the interest it affected, its injurious character, its falsity, and its publication. Others concern the audience: whether the circumstances made a third person's reliance reasonably foreseeable, and how the recipient understood the words. One item concerns the pecuniary loss that resulted. The last group concerns the defendant's state of mind: knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, ill will, and intent to affect the plaintiff's interests in an unprivileged manner. If the defendant claims a conditional privilege, the plaintiff must also prove abuse of it.4 The defendant carries one burden of its own: to prove, when the issue is properly raised, that the publication was absolutely or conditionally privileged.5
The loss in this tort travels by an unusual route. A false statement about a seller's goods costs the seller nothing until a buyer hears it and decides not to buy, so the injury comes from what other people do after they hear the words. Section 633(1) builds that mechanism into the damages rule by limiting recovery to pecuniary loss that results directly and immediately from the conduct of third persons, including impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement.6 The shape of the § 651(1) list follows from the same mechanism. The words work only by passing through someone else's understanding and decision, so the plaintiff must tie the statement to a recipient, show that reliance was foreseeable, show how the recipient took the words, and trace the loss back to them. The subsections below follow that chain.
Falsity, Interest, and Publication
The first four items on the plaintiff's list give the claim its basic shape: a protected interest, a statement capable of injuring it, falsity, and publication.7 Each builds on the last. A falsehood that reaches no listener, or that touches no interest the law protects, leaves nothing for the later items on reliance, fault, and loss to attach to. The qualifier that the issue be properly raised means an item needs proof only when the defendant contests it. A defendant who concedes that it spoke to prospective customers has taken publication off the table.
The first item is the existence and extent of the legally protected interest that the falsehood affected.8 Existence asks whether the law protects the interest at all, and the court answers that question.9 Extent asks how far the interest reaches, which marks the limit of what the falsehood could have harmed. In practice the interest is usually the plaintiff's ability to sell something or realize its value, because the tort compensates loss that comes from third persons' reactions, including impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement.10 A falsehood about a product the plaintiff does not make touches no interest of the plaintiff's, and the claim fails at the threshold.
The second item is the injurious character of the falsehood.11 The court decides whether the words are capable of a disparaging or other injurious meaning, and the jury decides whether the recipient actually understood them that way.12 Injurious character differs from falsity because a statement can be untrue without hurting anyone. The requirement keeps the tort aimed at statements that can plausibly produce the third-party reactions on which the loss depends. How listeners took the words is a separate item, taken up in the next subsection.
The third item is falsity, and the plaintiff must prove it.13 Falsity appears among the matters § 651 assigns to the plaintiff, while the defendant's burden is limited to privilege.14 A plaintiff cannot rest on the damage a statement caused. The jury finds whether the statement was untrue, subject to the court's control.15 A true statement that costs a seller sales passes along accurate information, and the tort gives no reason to make its speaker pay. Section 634 states the same point from the defendant's side: a publisher is not liable if the facts stated, or implied as justification for an opinion, are true.16 The discussion of truth below returns to that section.
The fourth item is publication.17 Publication means communication to at least one person other than the plaintiff. The requirement follows from how the loss arises. A false statement hurts a seller only when someone hears it and acts by declining to buy or by offering less, and recoverable loss is the loss that results directly and immediately from third persons' conduct.18 Words that stay with the speaker, or reach only the plaintiff, have no listener whose reaction could cause loss. Publication also identifies the audience, which the next items examine.
An exam stem that reports only a false remark about the plaintiff's product has supplied, at most, falsity. It has not yet shown that anyone heard the remark, that the remark could injure, or that the plaintiff lost money. Those showings come from the later items.
Foreseeable Reliance and Understanding
The first four items fix what was said, that it was false, and that it was published. The next three turn to the people who heard it. The plaintiff must prove that the circumstances of the publication made reliance by a third person reasonably foreseeable, that the recipient understood the communication in its injurious sense, and that the recipient understood it as applicable to the plaintiff's interests.20 All three ask what a listener would do with the statement and how the listener took it. They matter because the plaintiff's money disappears through the decisions of third persons, such as a buyer who walks away or a supplier who tightens its terms, and the recoverable loss is the loss that results directly and immediately from that conduct.21 A falsehood that no listener would act on, or that every listener understood harmlessly or as describing someone else, cannot produce that kind of loss.
Foreseeable reliance is judged from the circumstances of the publication.22 The inquiry looks at the setting the speaker chose: who heard the statement, what decision that audience was positioned to make, and whether the statement arrived when someone would use it. A false claim of insolvency told to a lender who is setting credit terms lands where reliance is a natural consequence. The same words told to someone with no decision to make carry little foreseeable reliance. The item asks only what the circumstances made foreseeable. Whether anyone actually acted, and what the action cost, belongs to the separate pecuniary-loss item.23
The second item asks how the recipient took the words. The plaintiff must prove the recipient's understanding of the communication in its injurious sense.24 The item overlaps with injurious character but asks a different question of a different decision-maker. The court decides whether the words are capable of an injurious meaning, and the jury decides, subject to the court's control, whether the recipient actually understood them that way.25 Words capable of injury can still land harmlessly, as when a listener hears an exaggerated boast as banter. A recipient who does not take the message as bad news has no reason to change how the recipient deals with the plaintiff.
The third item adds that the recipient understood the communication as applicable to the plaintiff's interests.26 A listener may grasp that a statement is damaging and never connect it to the plaintiff's product or business. That listener has no reason to treat the plaintiff differently from anyone else, so no loss can run through the listener's decision. The jury decides whether the statement was understood to be published of and concerning the plaintiff's interest, just as it decides whether the recipient took the words as injurious and whether reliance was foreseeable.27
Both scenes involve a false statement about a business. The difference lies entirely on the audience's side: a decision-maker who received a pointed warning about the plaintiff at the moment of decision, against a crowd that laughed the remark off and pointed it at someone else. An exam stem that says only that a rival told customers something false about the plaintiff's product has supplied the first four items at most. To carry these three, the stem must say who heard the statement, what decision those listeners were positioned to make, and how they took the words. Listeners who laughed, who thought the remark concerned a competitor with a similar name, or who had no role in any purchase leave the items in doubt. A buyer who heard a pointed warning about the plaintiff's own product while buying satisfies them. None of this settles whether the plaintiff actually lost money, a separate item addressed below.
Fault and Intent
The remaining items on the § 651(1) list turn from the audience and the loss to the defendant. They ask what the publisher knew, felt, and meant to accomplish.29 The qualifier that the issue be properly raised ties each item to a live dispute, so which items carry weight depends on what the defendant contests, including whether it claims a privilege.
The first item is the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statement or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.30 The item offers two routes to one showing. A publisher who knew the statement was untrue satisfies the first. A publisher who did not know, but spoke without caring whether it was true, satisfies the second. The item separates the speaker who made an honest mistake from the speaker who put a damaging statement into circulation with no reason to trust it. Falsity itself is a separate item. This one asks what the defendant was aware of at the time of speaking.
The second item is the defendant's motivation of ill will.31 Ill will is hostility or spite toward the plaintiff, and it differs from knowledge because the two occur apart. A defendant may despise the plaintiff and sincerely believe what it said. Another may know a statement is false and feel no animosity, circulating it only because it moves customers. The Restatement lists the two separately, and this item reaches only the first. Malicious prosecution offers a useful contrast: its improper-purpose element is met when the defendant acted primarily for any purpose other than bringing an offender to justice,32 while this item names ill will itself.
The third item is the defendant's intent to affect the plaintiff's interests in an unprivileged manner.33 It has two parts. The first asks whether the defendant aimed at the plaintiff's interests, such as the plaintiff's trade. A remark that reaches the plaintiff's customers in passing, during some other conversation, shows no such aim. The second part turns on the word unprivileged: affecting another person's interests is not wrongful in itself when the manner of doing so is privileged. The defendant must prove, when the issue is properly raised, that the publication was privileged,34 so this item cannot be read apart from the privilege rules below.
The same list closes with abuse of a conditional privilege, and a conditional privilege can be lost through abuse.35 Facts showing what a publisher knew, felt, and intended may therefore matter twice: once in the plaintiff's affirmative case, and again in deciding whether a privilege the defendant claims has been forfeited. Each of these items concerns a mental state inferred from conduct, so the jury decides it, subject to the court's control.36
A false statement about a rival's product, standing alone, does not reveal what the speaker knew or intended. A defendant who dislikes the plaintiff intensely but believes the statement true has supplied ill will and nothing on knowledge. A defendant who lies knowingly for profit has supplied knowledge without any hostility. An exam stem that describes anger toward a competitor has therefore not yet supplied knowledge or reckless disregard. Look for facts showing what the defendant had seen, heard, or checked before speaking, and for facts showing what the defendant was trying to accomplish.
Causation and Pecuniary Loss
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 632 supplies the last link: the publication of an injurious falsehood is a legal cause of pecuniary loss if two conditions are met.39 The publication must be a substantial factor in bringing about the loss.40 And no rule of law may relieve the publisher from liability because of the manner in which the publication resulted in the loss.41 The earlier items establish a wrong, and this one connects the wrong to money. A falsehood that cost the plaintiff nothing, or cost only what the plaintiff would have lost anyway, supports no recovery.
The first condition asks whether the falsehood contributed meaningfully to the loss. It does not require the falsehood to be the only reason the plaintiff lost business, because commercial losses usually have several sources, but it does require a real contribution and not a trivial or coincidental one. Without that requirement a publisher would pay for sales that other forces had already doomed. The jury decides whether the publication caused pecuniary loss and how much, subject to the court's control, and the court decides whether the loss is sufficient to support a cause of action at all.42
The second condition addresses a feature peculiar to this tort. The publisher never takes the plaintiff's money directly. Other people produce the loss by their choices: a buyer decides not to buy, a lender decides to call a loan, a supplier decides to demand cash in advance. A defendant might argue that the loss flowed from those free decisions and not from the words that prompted them. Section 632 closes off that argument by providing that no rule of law relieves the publisher because of the manner in which the publication resulted in the loss, so the fact that the injury traveled through other people's choices is no defense in itself.43 The route through third persons is the ordinary way this harm is done, which is why recoverable loss is defined as loss resulting from the effect of third persons' conduct, including impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement.44 A rule that let a listener's independent choice break the chain would remove the tort's central mechanism and free the publisher in nearly every case, since nearly every case involves such a choice.
The two conditions divide the work. Whether a listener acted because of the falsehood belongs to the first condition, and the fact that the listener acted by choice does not enter the second. Proof that recipients had already made up their minds defeats causation at the first step. Proof that they acted freely after hearing the statement leaves causation intact.
Causation is only part of the plaintiff's task, because § 651(1) separately lists the pecuniary loss resulting from the publication among the matters the plaintiff must prove when the issue is properly raised.45 The item has two parts, a loss and a result: money must have been lost, and it must have been lost because of the publication. Proof that sales fell after a false statement shows at most a loss and says nothing about its source, since a decline can have many explanations. The plaintiff therefore needs evidence tying the decline to the statement, such as listeners who changed course after hearing it or timing that links the departures to its publication. An exam stem that reports only a falsehood, an audience, and falling revenue has not yet carried the plaintiff's burden. Look for facts showing why the recipients acted as they did. The next subsection turns to which losses the plaintiff may recover once the link is shown, and how the plaintiff may prove them.
Recoverable Pecuniary Loss
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633(1) answers the question the causation rule leaves open: once a plaintiff ties a falsehood to some loss, which losses can the plaintiff recover? The section restricts recoverable pecuniary loss to two categories. The first is loss that results directly and immediately from the effect of third persons' conduct, including impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement. The second is the expense of measures reasonably necessary to counteract the publication, including litigation to remove the doubt that disparagement cast on vendibility or value.48 The first category covers what listeners do after hearing the falsehood, and the second covers what the plaintiff spends to undo its effect. A loss outside both categories is not recoverable in this tort, however real it may be.
The first category follows the way this tort inflicts injury. A false statement about a seller's product costs the seller nothing until a listener reacts, so the recoverable loss is the loss that flows from the reactions of third persons: the dealer who cancels an order, the lender who withdraws credit, the buyer who offers less. Vendibility means the capacity of goods or property to be sold, and the category expressly reaches impairment of vendibility or value caused by disparagement. A plaintiff whose goods now fetch less because doubt surrounds them has a loss even when no particular buyer has walked away.49 The words directly and immediately set the boundary. A lost sale can start a chain in which a cash shortage produces a missed payment, the missed payment produces a lost contract, and the lost contract produces further losses. A rule without a boundary would make the publisher answer for the whole chain, though the plaintiff's own finances shaped every link after the first. Limiting recovery to loss that comes straight from the listeners' reaction ties the publisher's liability to what the falsehood itself accomplished.
The second category rests on a choice every plaintiff faces once a falsehood is circulating. The plaintiff can wait while listeners keep acting on the statement, or can spend money to correct it. If recovery covered only sales already lost, the plaintiff who spent to stop the damage would bear that cost alone, while the plaintiff who did nothing and let the losses grow would recover them. Section 633(1) removes that penalty by treating the expense of measures reasonably necessary to counteract the publication as recoverable, and it names litigation to remove the doubt cast on vendibility or value as one such measure.50 The qualifier reasonably necessary does the limiting work. The plaintiff recovers what a sensible person would spend to answer the falsehood that was actually published, and spending far out of proportion to the harm invites the challenge that it was unnecessary.
Proving the first category raises an evidentiary problem, and § 633(2) addresses it. Customers who stop dealing with a seller rarely announce why, so a rule requiring the plaintiff to name each lost customer and show that customer's reason would defeat well-founded claims. The section therefore lets the plaintiff establish the loss in either of two ways: by proof of the conduct of specific persons, or by proof that the loss resulted from the conduct of a number of persons whom it is impossible to identify.51 The first method suits a plaintiff who holds cancellation letters or testimony from buyers who said why they left. The second suits a plaintiff whose loss is spread across many anonymous shoppers or prospects, and it permits proof through the pattern: the timing of the falsehood against the sales figures, the places where it circulated, and the reasons some customers did give. The second method changes who must be identified and leaves untouched what must be shown, because the text still requires proof that the loss resulted from the conduct of those persons. A decline in revenue with no evidence connecting it to the falsehood is a loss without a source, which the causation requirement already excludes.
An exam stem that reports falling revenue after a false statement has therefore raised several separate questions. One is what kind of loss is claimed: money lost through other people's reactions falls under the first category, and money the plaintiff spent in response falls under the second. Another is whether each lost-revenue item came straight from the listeners' reaction or only through a longer chain of later consequences. The last is how the plaintiff can prove it, through named persons or through a pattern pointing to persons who cannot be named.
Truth and Privilege
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 634 provides that the publisher of a statement injurious to another is not liable for injurious falsehood if the facts stated, or implied as justification for an opinion stated, are true.54 The preceding subsections assembled the plaintiff's case, from the protected interest through pecuniary loss. This subsection takes up two matters that can defeat or excuse liability even after the plaintiff has proved a damaging statement and a resulting loss: truth, which § 634 treats as a complete answer, and privilege, which § 651 allocates between the parties in a set order.
The tort compensates loss that reaches the plaintiff through the decisions of listeners who were misled, and a listener who hears an accurate fact and takes business elsewhere has not been misled. Making a speaker pay for passing along accurate information would penalize the information, which contains no wrong. Section 651(1) puts the falsity of the statement on the plaintiff's list of matters to prove,55 so § 634 and the falsity item meet from opposite sides. A plaintiff who cannot show that the facts stated were untrue has not made out the claim, and § 634 states that consequence as an answer available to the publisher. Once the facts are true, two things drop out of the analysis: the size of the harm, which may be large, and the publisher's motive. A rival who circulated accurate facts out of pure ill will is as free of liability as one who acted without hostility.
The second half of § 634 reaches opinions. An opinion rarely arrives alone, because the speaker usually states or implies the facts that make the opinion reasonable, and the listener weighs the opinion in light of those facts. If the facts behind it are accurate, the listener decided on true information and the opinion carries no falsehood. If they are false, the opinion carries the falsehood, and the listener's reaction rests on an untruth. By testing the facts stated or implied as justification instead of the label of opinion, the section keeps a speaker from escaping the truth requirement by wrapping a false factual claim in the language of judgment.
An exam stem that says the defendant merely voiced an opinion has therefore not ended the inquiry. Look for the facts the opinion stated or implied, and test those. A stem that stresses the defendant's hostility toward the plaintiff does not defeat the truth provision either, because ill will changes nothing when the facts are accurate.
Truth is not the only matter that can excuse a publication. Under § 651(2), the defendant has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised, that the publication was absolutely or conditionally privileged.56 The text names two kinds of privilege without describing either, so the point here is who must prove what. The burden falls on the defendant because the defendant is the party relying on the privilege. The plaintiff's case concerns the falsehood, its audience, the defendant's fault, and the loss, and nothing in it requires the plaintiff to anticipate and negate every excuse the defendant might later offer. A privilege rests on the circumstances in which the publication was made, which are circumstances the defendant is best placed to know. The qualifier properly raised matters as well, since a defendant who asserts no privilege leaves the question out of the case. The plaintiff's list does include an intent to affect the plaintiff's interests in an unprivileged manner,57 but read alongside § 651(2), that item does not oblige the plaintiff to disprove every possible privilege in advance. The defendant who claims one must establish it.
The allocation has a further step when the privilege is conditional. Section 651(1) lists abuse of a conditional privilege among the matters the plaintiff must prove when the issue is properly raised.58 The sequence therefore has three moves: the defendant proves the privilege; if it is conditional, the plaintiff may still prevail by proving abuse. The word conditional explains the order. A conditional privilege protects the publication on a condition, and the plaintiff who contends the condition failed relies on the matter that returns the case to liability, so the plaintiff carries that proof. The list speaks of abuse only for a conditional privilege, which indicates that forfeiture through misuse attaches to that kind. The evidence the plaintiff gathers on what the defendant knew, felt, and intended may therefore do double duty, once for the fault items and again here. The attached Restatement text does not itemize what counts as abuse, so an answer should draw that content from the privilege rules the jurisdiction applies.
An exam stem that recites that the publication was privileged, without supplying the circumstances, leaves the defendant's burden unmet. The next subsection takes up which of these questions the court decides and which the jury decides.
Judge and Jury Roles
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(1), the court determines five matters in an action for injurious falsehood: whether the statement is capable of a disparaging or other injurious meaning, whether the interest the statement affected is entitled to legal protection, whether any loss the plaintiff suffered is sufficient to support a cause of action, whether a particular item of loss may be considered by the jury in assessing damages, and what circumstances are necessary to create a privilege.61 Every item on that list asks what the law is. An answer on any of them governs the next plaintiff and defendant who come to court, so assigning the questions to the judge keeps the tort from meaning one thing before one jury and something else before another. A court states a rule that later cases can follow and an appellate court can review.
Most of these questions are legal gates in front of items the plaintiff must prove, and the earlier subsections met several of them. The protected-interest question sits in front of the first item on the plaintiff's list, so a plaintiff whose claimed interest the law does not protect never reaches falsity or publication. The capability question sits in front of the injurious-character item, which is why the court decides whether the words could bear an injurious meaning. The two loss questions govern the damages case. The court decides whether the loss is enough to support a claim and which items the jury may count, and the limits that § 633 places on recoverable loss are rules of law, so a ruling that excludes an item outside those limits is the kind of decision the fourth question describes.62 The last question connects to the privilege discussion: the court fixes what circumstances create a privilege, and the defendant who relies on one must then prove that those circumstances existed.63
Subsection (2) assigns the remaining questions to the jury, subject to the court's control. They are ten matters in five groups, and the groups track the subsections already covered.64
- The audience's reaction: whether the recipient understood the statement as disparaging or otherwise injurious, whether it was understood to be published of and concerning the plaintiff's interest, and whether the circumstances made a third person's reliance reasonably foreseeable.
- Falsity: whether the statement was false.
- Loss: whether the publication caused pecuniary loss to the plaintiff and, if so, its extent.
- The defendant's mind: whether the defendant knew the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, whether the defendant published from ill will, and whether the defendant intended to affect the plaintiff's interest.
- Privilege: whether the circumstances necessary to create a privilege existed, and whether facts existed that would constitute an abuse of a conditional privilege.
Each of these ten matters is answered from evidence. How a buyer took a remark, whether sales fell because of it, and what a rival knew when speaking all depend on testimony, documents, and inferences from conduct, and the jury is positioned to weigh witnesses and draw those inferences. The phrase subject to the control of the court preserves the judge's power to keep the jury within the law, so every question assigned to the jury remains under judicial supervision.
Three matters appear on both lists, once as a legal gate and once as a finding of fact, and the order in which they run is the center of the division. The court asks first whether the words are capable of an injurious meaning, and only if they are does the jury decide whether the recipient actually understood them that way. The court decides whether the loss is sufficient to support a cause of action and which items may be counted, and the jury then decides whether the publication caused loss and how much. The court states what circumstances create a privilege, and the jury decides whether those circumstances existed. In each pair the court's answer marks the edge of the field and the jury's answer is a finding made inside it, so a jury's conclusion that a buyer took the words as injurious cannot revive a claim built on words the court has held incapable of that meaning.
Section 652 allocates the decision, while § 651 allocates the burden of proof, and the two can point to different actors on the same issue. A burden determines who loses when the evidence is missing or evenly balanced, and the decider is the one who weighs the evidence in the first place. Falsity shows the pairing in its simplest form: the plaintiff must prove it, and the jury decides it.65 Privilege passes through three hands. The court says what circumstances create it, the defendant carries the burden of proving that those circumstances existed, and the jury finds whether they did.66 If the privilege is conditional, the burden passes back to the plaintiff to prove abuse, and the jury again decides whether facts constituting abuse existed.67
An exam question that asks whether the judge may rule before the jury hears the evidence is asking which list the contested issue belongs on. A claim that fails at an item on the court's list, such as an interest the law does not protect or words that cannot bear an injurious meaning, ends as a matter of law. A claim that turns on disputed falsity, on how a listener took the words, or on what the defendant knew belongs on the jury's list, and the court's control over the jury leaves the weighing of that evidence to the jurors.